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Introduction
If I cast my mind back and try to recall what it was that persuaded me to 
undertake a book on semantic prosody, it may be that my original objective 
was simply to pin this concept down once and for all, to establish precisely 
what semantic prosody is. Indeed when I began researching the subject, 
interested colleagues would enquire about my investigations and ask me 
what this arcane-sounding ‘semantic prosody’ might be. My response was 
generally of a rambling, circuitous nature, more often than not expressed 
in highly metaphorical terms, in view of the fact that semantic prosody 
appears to attract metaphors like a light bulb attracts moths.
In retrospect it seems bizarre that I should have encountered such dif-
fi culty in proposing a cursory defi nition of the topic of my own research 
project, but as I think will emerge already from the fi rst chapter of this 
book, the notion of semantic prosody does seem somehow resistant to bite-
sized explanations. Certainly what comes across in the literature on corpus 
linguistics is that the term ‘semantic prosody’ combines different interpre-
tations and embraces a broad range of features.
The most common interpretation—but by no means the only one or 
even the most persuasive—tends to be couched in terms which I have para-
phrased as follows, with the explanation expressed through an example: 
Semantic prosody is instantiated when a word such as CAUSE co-
 occurs regularly with words that share a given meaning or meanings, 
and then acquires some of the meaning(s) of those words as a result. 
This acquired meaning is known as semantic prosody. 
Purely for the purposes of preliminary illustration I shall provide an exam-
ple of this widespread approach through a very brief analysis of the verb 
BREAK OUT in all its infl ected forms.1 A search in the British National 
Corpus (BNC) for this verb retrieves 1,126 occurrences. A random selec-
tion of these is reproduced in Table I.1.
The data reported would suggest that in the majority of cases the verb 
BREAK OUT has conventionally undesirable things or states of affairs 
in its immediate environment, above all as its grammatical subject (war, 
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confl ict, infection, crisis). The apparent exceptions to this rule are few and 
far between, for instance gleaming green with new foliage that had broken 
out from the charred branches (line 20).
Habitual co-occurrences are often broken down into one or more seman-
tic sets (for BREAK OUT these sets could include, for instance, ‘situa-
tions of confl ict’, ‘diseases’ or, more broadly, ‘problematic circumstances’), 
and these have been described as the semantic preference(s) or semantic 
association(s) of a given word. (As recommended by Hunston (2007:250), 
‘word’ should really be in scare quotes because the core item may in reality 
be of two or more words.) Now the substantial number of expressions rep-
resenting undesirable things in the immediate environment of the keyword 
has been said to ‘colour’ or ‘infect’ it in some way (the metaphors of both 
Table I.1 BNC Concordance to ‘break/breaks/breaking/broke/broken out’ 
as Verb (Random Selection of 30/1,126) 
 1. cattle plague is life. Fires keep breaking out. Rumours — that Fama of The
 2 terrorists and was programmed to break out yesterday, wiping out all data
 3. A new wave of IRA attacks then broke out early in 1979, including several
 4. variety of levels showed signs of breaking out of the loyalist versus republican
 5. 1880, The fi rst of the Boer wars broke out. W. E. Gladstone had returned as
 6. 20 minutes, ‘Mill began to break out of their defensive shell and fi nd space
 7. dismay to the news. Violencehad broken out, and there had been anti-Catholic
 8. sound of it, World War II was breaking out behind her and after the race
 9. debated in the Senate when war broke out three years later. The First World
 10. Conservative press. ‘Labour war breaks out,’ said one paper. ‘Struggle over
 11. roasted in their handcuffs if fi re breaks out. The VWA, one of fi ve Dutch
 12. Here we have a team unafraid to break out from any area of the fi eld and run
 13. a club versus country confl ict breaking out between Chelmsford and Essex
 14. Thirdly, the way the war had broken out stamped the assumptions of the
 15. unlikely to question why it should break out. It formed part of the accustomed
 16. 1948 a communist insurrection had broken out in Burma. In Malaya, the
 17. strikes the cattle, and skin infection breaks out on man and beast, carried by
 18. the Marcher lords, open civil war broke out and Edward was forced to acquiesce
 19. Weren’t sick then, were you?’ Rohmer broke out into an immediate, drenching
 20. gleaming green with new foliage that had broken out from the charred branches
 21. even before the current crisis broke out. Furthermore, United States Secretary
 22. agree with authority, fearful to break out across the frontiers of duty and
 23. will then have owner access after breaking out of the Captive environment.
 24. approval listings can be inspected by breaking out to an editor using PF1/1
 25. it looks like they could soon break out of the cult ghetto. But hopefully
 26. why she came home. Kids have to break out. She didn’t do this to hurt you.
 27. it seems that feminist art hasn’t broken out of the tine art ‘ghetto’. This is
 28. Lane, North Allerton, when a blaze broke out in the lift shaft. The fi re started
 29. A fi re brigade spokesman said the fi re broke out at a house in The Bank at
 30. evacuated from a ward after a fi re broke out. Staff and fi re crews moved
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colour and infection have been consistently adopted in the literature), with 
the result that BREAK OUT, while it may not necessarily be classifi ed as a 
word whose basic meaning is unfavourable, is considered to be associated 
with an unfavourable semantic prosody or ‘aura of meaning’ which is con-
tingent upon its semantic preferences. In the case in point this process of 
colouring would apply more readily to those occurrences where the mean-
ing of BREAK OUT corresponds to ‘start/develop suddenly’—the prosody 
in these cases is such that if an expression representing a conventionally 
favourable state of affairs, such as peace, is used as the subject of BREAK 
OUT, then the effect may well be ironic or comic.
This, I repeat, is the most widespread interpretation of semantic prosody 
in the literature on corpus linguistics, and in the fi rst instance it may seem 
relatively unproblematic. However, once we go beyond the stage of the pre-
liminary defi nitions used in the literature, a closer analysis of the concept 
reveals its complex and multi-faceted nature. Indeed, in accordance with 
whichever of its multiple features is/are prioritised, it has been approached 
in such diverse ways that it has ended up meaning markedly different things 
to different people. This is perhaps to be expected when the concept in 
question is as young as semantic prosody, but what is striking is that so far 
there has been little acknowledgement by individual authors of the some-
times very diverse readings of it from one study to the next. Furthermore, 
it can happen that confl icting positions are adopted within a single work, 
again without any apparent recognition of this confl ict. 
With this in mind, my principal aim in this book is to examine closely 
all the various characteristics which have been attributed to this notion, in 
order to assess (i) the validity of such characteristics when examined indi-
vidually, and (ii) whether such characteristics taken as a whole can be said 
to justify semantic prosody as a unitary theoretical concept. I shall then 
suggest ways in which we might attempt to reconcile the various descrip-
tions provided in the literature. Attendant upon my investigations are issues 
of relevance for corpus linguistics in general, for example the way we seek 
and interpret corpus data, and the relationship between word and environ-
ment. I should alert the reader straightaway that during the course of the 
book I repeatedly discuss and frequently challenge studies conducted on 
semantic prosody so far, above all in Chapters 5 and 6. This approach may 
ultimately come across as tiresome, but it is my belief, fi rstly, that schol-
ars in any given fi eld need to engage with each other directly in order to 
move that fi eld on, and, secondly, that many of the research premises and 
theoretical foundations upon which work on semantic prosody is based lie 
within treacherous terrain, and must be met head on if this concept and 
fi eld of analysis are to continue as an object of investigation.
In Chapter 1 a brief chronological review is provided of contributions 
on semantic prosody—in particular of the way it has been defi ned—from 
1987, when ideas behind this concept were fi rst propounded, until the 
present day. It should be emphasised that very few of these contributions 
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deal with semantic prosody alone—observations regarding semantic 
prosody tend to be housed within works touching upon a range of aspects 
pertaining to corpus linguistics. The purpose of the review is not to estab-
lish any coherent chronological development on the subject, something 
which in any case would not be straightforward, but to identify a set of 
attributes which have been associated with semantic prosody over the last 
20 years. These attributes are then examined in greater detail in subse-
quent chapters.
Chapter 2 examines two characteristics which have been claimed for 
semantic prosody by the great majority of contributions on the subject—
its evaluative function and its ‘hidden’ quality. Even these features, how-
ever, require close attention. The evaluative quality attributed to semantic 
prosody is not uncontroversial, and in any case overlaps awkwardly with 
the sphere of connotation, while the hidden attribute is perhaps not as 
fundamental to semantic prosody as has been claimed. Indeed the hidden 
attribute would appear to rest upon an assumption of semantic ‘neutrality’ 
of the lexical item for which the prosody is inferred, but this gives rise to 
the question of whether semantic prosody can be inferred for lexical items 
which are not semantically neutral, and thus to the question of whether all 
lexical items might have prosodic potential.
Chapter 3 examines contributions on semantic prosody in terms of 
synchrony and diachrony. Many authors present semantic prosody both 
in synchronic and diachronic terms—the latter in particular often being 
expressed by means of a range of metaphors—though they consistently 
adopt synchronic corpora to illustrate it. It is argued here that although it 
goes without saying that either approach is perfectly defensible, an unstated 
confl ation of the synchronic and the diachronic is injudicious. Crucial in 
this connection is the nature of the ‘unit’ with which semantic prosody has 
often been associated.
In Chapter 4 the question of the unit is taken up in earnest, with focus 
on semantic prosody within the framework of the relationship between 
lexical item and environment. The nature of this relationship has been con-
strued in different ways in studies on semantic prosody, with some explana-
tions considering semantic prosody to belong primarily to the word, and 
others taking it to be a feature of a longer sequence. It is argued that both 
approaches have theoretical drawbacks. 
In Chapters 5, 6 and 7 semantic prosody is considered in connection 
with the broader issues of the use, role and infl uence of corpus data—in 
particular data accessed via concordances—and with the role of intuition 
and introspection in corpus investigations.
Chapter 5 introduces the issue of how semantic prosody is inferred from 
corpus data. Initially, questions are asked about the claim that semantic 
prosody is best revealed, or only revealed, by corpus searches. This is fol-
lowed by a brief review of the main methods used to assemble corpus data, 
and by some considerations concerning the ways we interpret the data using 
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the criteria of collocation and semantic consistency. It is then argued that 
the way we infer semantic prosody through corpus investigations is crucially 
affected by our judgements about the world, in particular how we distinguish 
good from bad, by the nature and length of the textual sequence taken as the 
unit of analysis, and by the criteria we adopt in analysing that sequence.
Chapter 6 continues the theme of the previous chapter, this time con-
centrating on the features of the concordance. It is claimed that the unique 
structure of the concordance has had signifi cant bearing upon the way 
semantic prosody has been described in the literature. 
Chapter 7 addresses the crucial roles of intuition and introspection, 
often minimised or stigmatised in studies on semantic prosody, in seeking 
insights about word meaning and in utilising corpora to search for and 
identify prosodies. Central to this will be the opposition between intuition 
and introspection on the one hand, and corpus data on the other.
In Chapter 8 I try to position semantic prosody with respect to Hoey’s 
(2005) theory of lexical priming. References are made to lexical priming 
during the course of the book but such is the importance of Hoey’s theory 
that I have thought it best to reserve more earnest considerations for a 
separate chapter.
The Conclusions will attempt to bring together the work of the rest of 
the book in order to assess the theoretical validity of semantic prosody, to 
clarify some outstanding terminological questions, and to point the way for 
further research in the fi eld.
All the concordances analysed in this book, with the exception of those 
reproduced from the work of other scholars, are from the British National 
Corpus, which I judged to be suffi ciently representative for my purposes. For 
details about the BNC see www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk. Unless otherwise stated, 
all references to sections (e.g., 2.1, 5.1.2) are to sections of this book.
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1 Features of Semantic Prosody
Infi nite riches in a little room
1.0 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I shall provide a brief chronological review of the literature 
on semantic prosody, starting from some initial observations by Sinclair in 
1987. I shall do this because it seems important to place contributions on 
the subject within a temporal context from the very outset, despite the fact 
that these contributions are not necessarily characterised by any system-
atic chronological development. On the contrary, the literature on semantic 
prosody is more usefully examined on a thematic basis, and subsequent 
chapters are in fact organised by theme rather than by chronology or by 
individual scholar.
This initial review is by no means intended to be exhaustive, its purpose 
is simply that of furnishing a preliminary outline of the most important 
works and scholars in the fi eld, functioning as a backdrop to the closer and 
more critical analysis provided by the chapters which follow.
1.1 A CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW
1.1.1 Sinclair (1987, 1991)
Semantic prosody is a concept which has been a focus of interest among 
corpus linguists over the last 15–20 years. It was originally an idea of Sin-
clair’s in 1987, though he did not use the term as such when he fi rst dis-
cussed it. Interest was initially kindled by Sinclair’s observations regarding 
the lexicogrammatical environment of the phrasal verb SET IN, later reit-
erated in Sinclair 1991 (74). Using a corpus of around 7.3 million words, 
the author makes the following observations:
 1. The clauses in which set in is chosen are in general rather short—six 
words or fewer in the main. The longer ones are longer because of an 
adjunct rather than the subject, which is in most cases a single word 
or an article and noun pair.
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 2. A number of clauses are subordinate. With the samples available, it is 
not possible to assign status in every case, and there are some of clear 
main clauses; but I think the tendency to lower status should be noted.
 3. Set in is fi nal in the clause in 22 of the 29 cases, and sentence-fi nal in 
nine of them, showing a clear tendency to end structures.
(Sinclair 1991:74)
Particularly salient in the concordance of SET IN are this verb’s grammati-
cal subjects (ibid.: 74–75):
The most striking feature of this phrasal verb is the nature of its subjects. 
In general, they refer to unpleasant states of affairs [ . . . ] The main 
vocabulary is rot, decay, malaise, despair, ill-will, decadence, impover-
ishment, infection, prejudice, vicious (circle), rigor mortis, numbness, 
bitterness, mannerism, anticlimax, anarchy, disillusion, disillusion-
ment, slump. Not one of these is conventionally desirable or attractive. 
Later in the same work the author (ibid.:112) notes, within the framework 
of his idiom principle, that “many uses of words and phrases show a ten-
dency to occur in a certain semantic environment. For example the word 
happen is associated with unpleasant things—accidents and the like”.
These observations were striking because they were new and backed 
up by replicable corpus data, which included conspicuous numbers of co-
occurrences representing unpleasant states of affairs in the respective envi-
ronments of both SET IN and HAPPEN. 
1.1.2 Louw (1993)
The term ‘semantic prosody’ itself gained currency in Louw (1993), and 
was based upon a parallel with Firth’s discussions of prosody in phono-
logical terms. In this respect Firth was concerned with the way sounds 
transcend segmental boundaries. The exact realisation of the phoneme /k/, 
for example, is dependent upon the sounds adjacent to it. The /k/ of kan-
garoo is not the same as the /k/ of keep, because during the realisation of 
the consonant the mouth is already making provision for the production 
of the next sound. Thus the /k/ of kangaroo prepares for the production 
of /æ/ rather than /i:/ or any other sound, by a process of “phonological 
colouring” (ibid.:158). In the same way, Louw claims (ibid.:170) that an 
expression such as SYMPTOMATIC OF prepares (the hearer/reader) for 
the production of what follows, in this case something undesirable (e.g., 
parental paralysis, management inadequacies, numerous disorders).
The realisation of phonemes is of course infl uenced by the sounds 
which precede them as well as those which follow, and therefore the 
semantic analogy extends not only to words that appear after the key-
word, but more generally to the keyword’s close surrounds. According to 
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Louw (ibid.:159), “the habitual collocates of the form set in are capable 
of colouring it, so it can no longer be seen in isolation from its semantic 
prosody, which is established through the semantic consistency of its 
subjects”.
Hence Louw’s (ibid.:157) defi nition of semantic prosody as a “con-
sistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates”, 
with its implications of a transfer of meaning to a given word from its 
habitual co-text. His examples include UTTERLY, BENT ON and 
SYMPTOMATIC OF, for all of which he claims unfavourable proso-
dies. Louw is particularly interested in irony, and more specifi cally the 
type of irony produced by deviations from habitual co-occurrence pat-
terns (ibid.:157):
Irony relies for its effect on a collocative clash which is perceived, albeit 
subliminally, by the reader. In order for a potential collocative clash 
to attract the ironist’s interest, there must be a suffi ciently consistent 
background of expected collocation against which the instantiation of 
irony becomes possible. 
Thus if SYMPTOMATIC OF is followed by a conventionally favourable 
expression such as their courage, the resulting prosodic confl ict might be 
interpreted, perhaps subliminally, as ironic. However, Louw is careful to 
point out that this is not necessarily the case. A clash of this type may in 
his view be quite involuntary, with no ironic intention at all, perhaps dis-
closing the “speaker’s real attitude even where s/he is at pains to conceal 
it” (ibid.:157). The author subsequently states “the full hypothesis”, which 
runs as follows (ibid.:171):
Where encoders intend their remarks to be interpreted ironically, they 
‘write the device’ in the form of an exception to an established semantic 
prosody. Conversely, where an utterance runs contrary to an estab-
lished semantic prosody and it is clear that it is not intended by the 
encoder to be interpreted ironically, we fi nd that ‘the device writes the 
encoder’.
The author concludes by discussing the potential implications of semantic 
prosody for stylistics and the persuasion industry. 
Louw’s hypothesis concerning collocates ‘imbuing’ forms must rest on 
diachronic assumptions—the process of a form being imbued by its col-
locates presumably takes place over a reasonably lengthy period of time. 
Nevertheless the author makes few explicit allusions to diachronic con-
siderations, remarking that “Prosodies are undoubtedly the product of a 
long period of refi nement through historical change” (ibid.:164). The dia-
chronic question is however taken up more earnestly by Bublitz (1996), 
as explained below.
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1.1.3 Bublitz (1996)
Louw’s 1993 article put semantic prosody on the map, so to speak, and 
has hugely infl uenced subsequent investigations into the subject. One such 
investigation is that of Bublitz (1996), who goes along with the idea that a 
node may be coloured by its habitual co-occurrences, acquiring a “halo” of 
meaning as a result:
Words can have a specifi c halo or profi le, which may be positive, pleas-
ant and good, or else negative, unpleasant and bad [ . . . ] Of course, 
with semantic prosody, what is involved is negative or positive seman-
tic colouring of node (e.g., utterly) and collocate (e.g., meaningless). 
The node itself is then habitually associated with its semantic prosody, 
which is based on a semantically consistent set of collocates.
 (Bublitz 1996:9)
The author also reiterates on a number of occasions the Firthian idea 
of a phenomenon which crosses segmental boundaries and “stretches 
over several units” (ibid.:9). Thus, Bublitz continues, “meaning resides 
not in a single word but in several words”. His examples of words char-
acterised by semantic prosody include CAUSE, HAPPEN, COMMIT, 
SOMEWHAT and PREVAIL, but the author is keen to point out—and 
in this he moves on from Louw—that prosodies will vary according to 
the different basic meanings of any given word. Sinclair had claimed an 
unfavourable semantic prosody for HAPPEN, but this does not apply to 
certain meanings of the verb, for example what Bublitz (ibid.:17) terms 
its “by-chance-meaning” (e.g., ‘I happen to know his work’). Similarly, 
the verb COMMIT co-occurs signifi cantly with unpleasant things when 
its meaning is that of perpetrate: in the corpora used by Bublitz, co-
occurrences include adultery, offence, crime, atrocities, suicide, outrage, 
hara-kiri, murder, sin, error, acts of vandalism, misconduct, death in life, 
sacrilege, theft and infraction of taste. However, when COMMIT has 
other meanings, for example, commit someone/oneself to (something), 
the unpleasant prosody is not manifest—right-hand co-occurrences 
include productivity, modernisation, establishing man’s supremacy, a life 
of austerity, new plant construction.
Particularly worthy of note is that Bublitz’ explanation of semantic 
prosody (ibid.:11) has a more explicitly diachronic emphasis than previous 
accounts: “we know from lexical semantics that constantly using a word in 
the same kind of context can eventually lead to a shift in its meaning: the 
word adopts semantic features from an adjacent item”.
Shortly after, referring to Stubbs’ (1995:50) hypothesis that CAUSE, 
owing to increasing co-occurrence with predominantly unpleasant words, 
has developed a much more unpleasant meaning than it once had, Bublitz 
(1996:12) stresses the need for more evidence:
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Particularly promising seems to be a diachronic, contrastive ap-
proach, i.e., a close look at cause and its collocates in earlier and 
present-day texts. This should, at least for written discourse, show 
whether or not the number of negative collocates has been increasing 
over the decades. If this proves to be the case, we could safely talk of a 
development, a tendency of cause to collocate exclusively with words 
marked for negativity.
1.1.4 Sinclair (1996a, 1998)
Sinclair (1996a:87–88) defi nes semantic prosody as follows:
A semantic prosody . . . is attitudinal, and on the pragmatic side of the 
semantics/pragmatics continuum. It is thus capable of a wide range of 
realisation, because in pragmatic expressions the normal semantic val-
ues of the words are not necessarily relevant. But once noticed among 
the variety of expression, it is immediately clear that the semantic pros-
ody has a leading role to play in the integration of an item with its sur-
roundings. It expresses something close to the ‘function’ of an item—it 
shows how the rest of the item is to be interpreted functionally. 
For Sinclair, semantic prosody is to be understood within his model of 
the lexical item/extended unit of meaning, which integrates collocation 
(lexical choices), colligation (grammatical choices), semantic preference 
(the association of formal patterning with a semantic fi eld) and semantic 
prosody, which has attitudinal and pragmatic function and is crucial to the 
unit because this pragmatic function very often constitutes the speaker’s 
reason for making the utterance. As pointed out by Stubbs (2007b:179), 
these categories correspond to Morris’ (1938) distinction of syntax (in Sin-
clair’s model both collocation and colligation), semantics (semantic prefer-
ence) and pragmatics (semantic prosody). The semantic prosody is one of 
the obligatory elements of the unit of meaning along with the ‘core item’, 
“which is invariable, and constitutes the evidence of the occurrence of the 
item as a whole” (Sinclair 1998:15), while the other elements are optional. 
The author exemplifi es this by examining (1996a:84–91) the units of 
meaning containing the following core items: (i) NAKED EYE, for which 
he posits a semantic preference of ‘visibility’ and a semantic prosody of 
‘diffi culty’ on account of its frequent co-occurrence in the corpus he uses 
with sequences such as barely visible to, too faint to be seen with, invisible 
to; (ii) TRUE FEELINGS, for which is claimed a semantic preference of 
‘expression’—usually manifested through verbs such as show, reveal and 
share—and a prosody of ‘reluctance’, i.e., reluctance to express our true 
feelings, on account of co-occurrences such as will never reveal, prevents 
me from expressing, less open about showing, guilty about expressing; (iii) 
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BROOK as a verb, characterised by a typical environment along the lines 
of ‘we (authority) will not brook (any) + OBJECT’. 
The methodology used here represents a major break from previous work 
on the subject, which had tended (i) to privilege searches where a span of 
little more than two words to the left or right of the node was suffi cient to 
suggest a prosody, and where as a result the co-occurrences were more eas-
ily highlighted in corpus data (‘the rot set in’, ‘bent on destruction’, ‘some-
what ridiculous’), (ii) to focus on prosodies consequent upon ‘semantic sets’ 
which were either markedly good/pleasant or bad/unpleasant (though in 
practice almost always the latter), and (iii) to show greater concern for the 
diachronic processes responsible for semantic prosody. Sinclair explored a 
broader span, a broader ‘unit of meaning’, in order to reach his conclusions 
within a synchronic framework, and did not restrict himself to the good/
bad opposition. (As suggested above, on a terminological level Sinclair uses 
both ‘unit of meaning’ and ‘lexical item’ to denote this broader span, but 
it should be underlined that in corpus linguistics, ‘lexical item’ or simply 
‘item’ is often used in a more general sense, i.e., not only for this longer 
sequence but also for a single word (Teubert 2005:5). Since, as will become 
clear, the distinction is a crucial one in the context of semantic prosody, 
from this point on I shall prefer the terms ‘word’ on the one hand and ‘unit 
of meaning’ (for the longer sequence) on the other, to ensure this distinc-
tion, though the boundaries between the two are sometimes blurred. When 
no distinction is intended, i.e., when the reference is to both words and 
units of meaning, I shall adopt ‘lexical item’ or simply ‘item’.)
1.1.5 Stubbs (1995, 2001a)
Stubbs has made a signifi cant contribution to studies in the fi eld, not least 
in terms of the sheer number of examples he has brought to light of lexical 
items characterised by prosodies. These include:
accost, amid, amusement, backdrop, care, cause, commit, community, 
deadlock, distinctly, soar, heritage, lavish, loiter, lurk, proper, provide, 
somewhat, standard, undergo, untold.
Stubbs’ work is rich in observations and insights, such as the element 
of what might loosely be called ‘protection from danger’ present in the 
habitual lexical environment of HERITAGE (2001a:149–151), e.g., guard, 
safeguard, preserve, protect, save; or the lexical profi le of the term CREDI-
BILITY (ibid.:107), which includes gap, lack, damaged, undermine; or the 
relationship of interdependency between prosody and syntax with regard 
to the verbs ACCOST, LOITER and LURK (ibid.:198–206).
In his 1995 work Stubbs had made reference to diachronic consider-
ations in connection with the word CAUSE (1995:50):
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CAUSE is near the stage where the word itself, out of context, has 
negative connotations. (AFFECT is already at this point.) The selec-
tion restrictions on CAUSE are not (yet?) categorical: it is not (yet?) 
ungrammatical to collocate CAUSE with explicitly positive words. But 
it is easy to see how an increase in frequency of use can tip the balance 
and change the system.
Generally speaking, however, the author operates within a synchronic frame-
work when discussing semantic prosody, underlining the role of discourse, 
above all political and ideological discourse. Indeed in his 2001 work Stubbs 
switches the nomenclature from ‘semantic prosody’, which he had adopted in 
earlier contributions, to ‘discourse prosody’—a terminological decision which 
reaffi rms the pragmatic and discourse functions of semantic prosody so vital 
to Sinclair’s approach: “I will prefer the term ‘discourse prosodies’, both in 
order to maintain the relation to speakers and hearers, but also to emphasize 
their function in creating discourse coherence” (Stubbs 2001a:66). 
The author’s defi nition of discourse prosody places strong emphasis on 
its attitudinal quality (ibid.:65):
A discourse prosody is a feature which extends over more than one 
unit in a linear string. [ . . . ] Discourse prosodies express speaker at-
titude. If you say that something is provided, then this implies that 
you approve of it. Since they are evaluative, prosodies often express 
the speaker’s reason for making the utterance, and therefore identify 
functional discourse units. 
1.1.6 Tognini-Bonelli (2001)
Tognini-Bonelli operates within a Sinclairian framework in terms of 
co-selection and extended units of meaning. The author points out that 
(2001:24) “what is consistently shown by corpus work is the strict correla-
tion between lexical and grammatical choices which extends the bound-
aries of the initial unit”. The pragmatic dimension is once again central 
(ibid.:111):
If a word is regularly used in contexts of good news or bad news or 
judgement, for example, it carries this kind of meaning around with 
it; and, as noted by Sinclair [ . . . ] the choice that a speaker/writer 
will make when selecting a multi-word unit will involve the more local 
grammatical and lexical constraints around the word, but will also in-
clude a perhaps more remote semantic preference and its correspondent 
on the pragmatic side, semantic prosody.
While Tognini-Bonelli’s analyses are based on Sinclair’s unit of meaning, 
she also takes Louw (1993) as a point of reference for her revealing studies 
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on prosodies in both English and Italian, including PROPER (see 4.3.1 for 
a discussion of this item) and the verbal expression ANDARE INCON-
TRO (literally ‘go towards’, but also ‘(to) face’ in a metaphorical sense).
1.1.7 Hunston and Francis (1999), Hunston 
and Thompson (1999), Hunston (2002)
Work on semantic prosody over the last ten years or so has mostly discussed 
and rediscussed, with varying degrees of focus, the features of seman-
tic prosody suggested by Sinclair and Louw. The notion of the semantic 
consistency of lexical profi les is taken up again by Hunston and Francis 
(1999:137), who explain that “a word may be said to have a particular 
semantic prosody if it can be shown to co-occur typically with other words 
that belong to a particular semantic set”. 
Hunston and Thompson, in their ‘Editors’ Introduction’ to Channell 
(1999:38), reiterate the evaluative quality of semantic prosody, as well as 
the notion that words ‘take on’ meaning from their immediate surrounds. 
They also stress (ibid.) the subliminal element which had been of particular 
importance within Louw’s framework:
The notion of semantic prosody (or pragmatic meaning) is that a given 
word or phrase may occur most frequently in the context of other words 
or phrases which are predominantly positive or negative in their evalua-
tive orientation [ . . . ] As a result, the given word takes on an association 
with the positive, or, more usually, the negative, and this association can 
be exploited by speakers to express evaluative meaning covertly.
The covert nature of semantic prosody is highlighted above all by Hunston 
(2002:61, 119, 141–142), who also recalls the notion that semantic prosody is 
a result of transferred meaning (ibid.:141): “The term semantic prosody [ . . . ] 
usually refers to a word that is typically used in a particular environment, such 
that the word takes on connotations from that environment”.
1.1.8 Louw (2000)
Louw (2000) marks a change of focus with respect to his 1993 article. The 
author makes no reference to auras of meaning, giving less emphasis to 
the notion that meaning is transferred over time from habitual collocates 
to node through contagion. Having provided a review of current under-
standing of semantic prosodies, he then proposes an amplifi ed defi nition, 
claiming that they are a product of fractured contexts of situation. His 
focus is on unfavourable prosodies, where the fractured context derives 
from the absence in the immediate co-text of “elements such as persons/
personalities and/or relevant objects or even outcomes”. From this derives 
his Contextual Prosodic Theory, which (2000:48) “would seek to elucidate 
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through semantic prosodies the Firthian view that situational and linguis-
tic contexts are co-extensive”.
Louw is keen to distinguish semantic prosody, which he describes as a 
“strongly collocational” phenomenon (2000:50), from connotation, which 
he considers to be more “schematic” in nature. In other words, while seman-
tic prosody is contingent upon co-text and is thus inferable in a corpus by 
means of observation of a word’s habitual co-occurrences, connotation is 
more a question of the instinctive semantic associations that we make with 
that word, irrespective of co-occurrence factors.
Despite this shift of emphasis by comparison with his 1993 article, 
Louw’s basic defi nition of semantic prosody picks up on some familiar 
themes, namely the semantic consistency of collocates and the attitudinal 
function of semantic prosody:
A semantic prosody refers to a form of meaning which is established 
through the prox imity of a consistent series of collocates, often charac-
terisable as positive or negative, and whose primary function is the ex-
pression of the attitude of its speaker or writer towards some pragmatic 
situation. A secondary, though no less important attitudinal function of 
semantic prosodies is the creation of irony through the deliberate injection 
of a form which clashes with the prosody’s consistent series of collocates. 
 (Louw 2000:60)
1.1.9 Partington (1998/2004a)
Partington (1998, in particular 65–78) also focuses upon the similarities and 
dissimilarities of semantic prosody and connotation, and on a pedagogi-
cal level examines the extent to which dictionaries cater or fail to cater for 
semantic prosody. The author examines the prosody associated with the verb 
PEDDLE, and is particularly interested in prosodies within the context of 
political discourse in newspapers, analysing the expressions SHARP DEAL-
INGS and GREEN FUNDAMENTALISM/FUNDAMENTALIST. In the 
latter case he claims that “the more frequently green collocates with funda-
mentalist the more tainted the former is likely to become” (1998:76).
In Partington 2004a (131–132) semantic prosody is defi ned as a type 
of evaluative meaning which is “spread over a unit of language which 
potentially goes well beyond the single orthographic word and is much 
less evident to the naked eye”. Partington goes on to survey the charac-
teristics of a number of (i) “happen words” (HAPPEN, TAKE PLACE, 
OCCUR, SET IN, COME ABOUT), and (ii) “amplifying intensifi ers” 
(ABSOLUTELY, PERFECTLY, ENTIRELY, COMPLETELY, THOR-
OUGHLY, TOTALLY, UTTERLY), noting sometimes subtle variations 
among them with respect to syntax, cohesion, register and above all seman-
tic prosody. The author also discusses the interaction and partial overlap 
between the concepts of semantic preference and semantic prosody.
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1.1.10 Hoey (2005)
One of the fundamental tenets of Hoey’s theory of priming is the 
following:
As a word is acquired through encounters with it in speech or writing, 
it becomes cumulatively loaded with the contexts and co-texts in which 
it is encountered, and our knowledge of it includes the fact that it co-
occurs with certain other words in certain kinds of context. The same 
applies to word sequences built out of these words; these too become 
loaded with the contexts and co-texts in which they occur.
(Hoey 2005:8)
Priming, however, unlike semantic prosody, goes beyond circumscribed 
sequences of words and beyond the sentence, in that a word may be textually 
primed, i.e., primed to appear in particular textual positions with particular 
textual functions, something greatly infl uenced by text domain and genre. 
Thus whereas semantic prosody is contingent upon lexical co-occurrence 
within a fairly restricted window (usually 5–6 words to the left and right of 
the node or core item), priming is concerned with a span which may corre-
spond to longer stretches of text. Further, while semantic prosody has gener-
ally been described as belonging either to the word or to the unit of meaning, 
Hoey stresses that although he uses the word as his starting point rather than 
a longer sequence (ibid.:158), priming nevertheless belongs to the individual 
rather than the word: “Words are never primed per se; they are only primed 
for someone” (ibid.:15). 
It is also worth noting that priming is described as a feature of all lexical 
items, whereas in descriptions so far semantic prosody has been confi ned to 
a fairly restricted selection.
Priming thus has a different scope and emphasis by comparison with seman-
tic prosody, which itself is described (ibid.:22–24) as a problematic concept in 
the literature. With reference to Whitsitt (2005), Hoey points out that the notion 
of semantic prosody as understood by Louw has been disputed, and that in any 
case Louw’s interpretation of it is different from Sinclair’s. Hoey (2005:23) 
also stresses the need to avoid blurring the boundaries between the concepts of 
semantic prosody and semantic preference as originally proposed by Sinclair, 
and admits to having confl ated the two notions himself in some of his earlier 
works. In his 2005 work Hoey favours the denomination ‘semantic associa-
tion’ in place of ‘semantic preference’, for the following reason (ibid.:24):
The terms semantic preference and semantic association may be seen as 
interchangeable. My reason for not using Sinclair’s term is that one of the 
central features of priming is that it leads to a psychological preference on 
the part of the language user; to talk of both the user and the word having 
preferences would on occasion lead to confusion [ . . . ] The change of term 
does not represent a difference of position between Sinclair and myself.
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1.1.11 Whitsitt (2005)
Whitsitt (2005) represents something of a turning point in studies on seman-
tic prosody in that his contribution is the fi rst to express forthright reser-
vations about the way it has been presented in the literature. The author 
claims that semantic prosody as a concept is far from univocal, having been 
described in three distinct ways: from a primarily diachronic point of view 
(above all Louw 1993, Bublitz 1996), from a primarily pragmatic point of 
view (Sinclair, Stubbs), and in connotative terms (Whitsitt refers to Parting-
ton 1998, but see also Partington 2004a, Stubbs 2001a, Hunston 2002). 
He takes issue in particular with Louw’s (1993) description of semantic 
prosody, focusing (i) on the synchronic/diachronic question, (ii) on the role 
of intuition in identifying prosodies, and (iii) on Louw’s liberal use of insuf-
fi ciently explained metaphors in his description of semantic prosody. All 
these aspects will be examined singly in the forthcoming chapters.
1.1.12 Hunston (2007)
Hunston reaffi rms the point underlined by Whitsitt (2005), that semantic 
prosody has been described in various ways, her primary distinction being 
between Sinclair’s use of the term to refer to the discourse function of a unit 
of meaning, and other scholars’ interpretations of it as the implied attitudinal 
meaning of a word/expression. Hunston’s work is particularly valuable in the 
way it pinpoints what the author terms “sites of disagreement” (2007:250), 
which include (i) the issue of whether semantic prosody is to be regarded as 
the property of a word/expression or of a longer unit of meaning, (ii) whether 
semantic prosody’s attitudinal meaning is best expressed as a binary distinc-
tion (positive vs. negative, favourable vs. unfavourable) or whether its char-
acterisation should ideally be conceptually more specifi c (for example the 
prosodies of ‘diffi culty’ and ‘reluctance’ posited by Sinclair—see 1.1.4), (iii) 
the question of whether semantic prosody can ‘carry over’ from one context 
to another. The author also focuses on the more general theme of how corpus 
evidence is to be interpreted, in particular the degree to which corpus evidence 
of what is usual can be used to predict the effect of an individual instance (the 
reference is principally to Louw 1993, who had argued that a “collocative 
clash” will point to irony or insincerity), rather than simply to explain it.
1.2 OTHER KEY AREAS IN STUDIES 
ON SEMANTIC PROSODY
1.2.1 Local Prosodies
Discussions of semantic prosody are usually conducted using large general 
corpora with no privileging of any specifi c text type as the object of 
analysis. Worth noting in passing, however, is the increasing number of 
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references to the prosodic implications of literary texts, e.g., Louw (1993), 
Adolphs and Carter (2002), Stubbs (2005), Adolphs (2006), O’Halloran 
(2007), while Hoey (2005:172–177, 2007) has focused on literary creativity 
within his theory of lexical priming. Particular attention has been devoted 
to the poet Philip Larkin’s First Sight (Louw 1993, Hoey 2007, who refers 
back to a much earlier analysis in Sinclair 1966). 
Some studies are reserved for the role of semantic prosody in other text 
types or specifi c subject areas. Tribble has introduced the concept of ‘local 
prosodies’, for example in Tribble 2000 (86): 
words in certain genres may establish local semantic prosodies which 
only occur in these genres, or analogues of these genres [ . . . ] I am not 
assuming that all keywords in a text will have specifi c local semantic 
prosodies, but I am proposing that this is an aspect of language worth 
considering as it will constitute important local knowledge for writers 
in a specifi c genre. 
With this in mind Tribble posits a local prosody for the term EXPERI-
ENCE in a corpus consisting of project proposals submitted to the Euro-
pean Union’s PHARE programme (the PP corpus), in view of the fact that 
in the corpus in question this term appears to be used for things such as 
offi ce experience, work experience, skills experience, whereas in all text-
types the word has a much wider range of use. Similarly, Nelson (2006) 
makes an analysis of semantic prosody in business English, investigating 
words such as competitive, market and export and noting in particular 
how words become more collocationally fi xed in specialist linguistic envi-
ronments. Cheng (2006) identifi es prosodies in a collection of spoken dis-
course concerning the SARS crisis in 2003, extracted from the Hong Kong 
Corpus of Spoken English. The aim is to describe (ibid.:325) “the cumula-
tive effects of the habitual co-selection in the lexical items that contribute 
to textual meanings and coherence within and across the texts”.
Stubbs often points out the lexical profi les of words in specifi c sectors. 
For example in the general corpus used by the author (2001a:95–96), around 
80% of a random selection extracted from a concordance to CHOPPED 
had recipes as their source, with a profi le including fi nely, fresh, parsley, 
onion, garlic, tbsp, tomatoes. The other 20% occurred in other text-types 
and had a greater tendency to combine with the prepositions off, up and 
down, some from contexts involving violence to humans. A further exam-
ple: the author notes (ibid.:89–95) that the verb UNDERGO is character-
ised by a generally unpleasant prosody, but that (p.92) “in scientifi c and 
technical English, the word is usually neutral”.
Partington (2004a:153) notes more generally that “initial research seems 
to show that it is highly likely that the quality and strength of the prosody 
of a good many items will differ from genre to genre or from domain to 
domain”. He then cites investigations carried out by Stubbs (2001a:106), 
Stewart 6th pages.indd   17 8/11/2009   9:03:06 AM
18 Semantic Prosody
T&F Proofs: Not For Distribution
affi rming that generally speaking the term lavish as an adjective can have a 
“neutral-to-good” prosody, but that in journalism its prosody is much less 
favourable. Partington (2004a:153–154) concludes that 
in the ‘lexi-grammar’ of newspaper reporting, the word lavish [as an ad-
jective] is accompanied by the indication that ‘this word is often used to 
express disapproval’, whereas in the lexi-grammar of, say, normal British 
conversation, the entry for lavish would contain no such indication.
Hoey (2004:23) too underlines the importance of sector-specifi c factors 
within his theory of priming:
Part of our knowledge of a word is that it is used in certain kinds 
of combination in certain kinds of text. So I hypothesise (supported 
by small quantities of data) that in gardening texts during the winter 
and during the winter months are the appropriate collocations, but in 
newspaper texts or travel writing in winter and in the winter are more 
appropriate; the phrase that winter is associated with narratives.
Hunston (2007:263–265) also underlines the register-specifi c nature of 
semantic prosody. For example she notes that CAUSE, which has been 
assigned an unfavourable prosody by other authors (e.g., Stubbs 1995:26), 
may lose its association with unfavourable evaluation in scientifi c registers.
1.2.2 Semantic Prosody in Contrastive Studies
The last few years have featured a number of studies of semantic prosody 
across languages. These include Xiao and McEnery’s (2006) comparison 
of prosodies of near-synonyms across English and Chinese, and Berber-
Sardinha’s (2000) similar comparison of English and Portuguese. Xiao and 
McEnery conclude that collocational behaviour and semantic prosodies of 
near-synonyms are fairly similar in English and Chinese, an important claim 
in view of the obvious dissimilarities between the two languages. However, 
the authors stress the diffi culty of achieving a balanced comparison in view 
of the fact that collocation and semantic prosody may be affected by mor-
phological variations in English but not in Chinese, where such variation is 
absent. Berber-Sardinha’s conclusion is that semantic prosodies may vary 
across English and Portuguese: in some cases the prosody appears to be 
similar for near-synonyms (commit vs. cometer), while in others it is not 
(set in vs. estabelecer-se/manifestar-se).
Both studies stress, however, that such phenomena should receive far 
more attention in pedagogy (language teaching, translation teaching, dic-
tionary compilation) than is currently the case. Similarly, in Munday’s 
(forthcoming) cross-linguistic analysis of semantic prosodies in compara-
ble reference corpora of English and Spanish, the author envisages more 
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earnest collaboration between translation studies theorists, monolingual 
corpus linguists and software developers. He also makes the important 
point that corpus data are particularly useful to translators (in this case, 
translators working into their mother tongue) because “the translator 
may be aware of the general semantic prosody of target text alterna-
tives (since these are in his/her native language) even if sometimes he/
she is less sensitive to subtle prosodic distinctions in the foreign source 
language.”
Tognini-Bonelli (2001:113–128, 2002) uses corpus data to compare 
semantic prosody within analogous units of meaning in English and 
Italian, Stewart (2009) analyses the question of prosodies in translation 
between English and Italian, and Partington (1998:48–64) claims that per-
fect equivalents across English and Italian are few and far between because 
even words and expressions which are ‘lookalikes’ or false friends (e.g., cor-
rect vs. the Italian corretto) may have very different lexical environments. 
Dam-Jensen and Zethsen (2008) test awareness of prosodies in English on 
the part of non-native English students of translation.
1.2.3 Intuition
Before proceeding it is worth recalling two further claims that are men-
tioned recurrently by a substantial number of scholars in their discussions 
of semantic prosody. The fi rst is that semantic prosody is best, or even only, 
revealed by computational methods, e.g., Hunston (2002:142): “Semantic 
prosody can be observed only by looking at a large number of instances of 
a word or phrase, because it relies on the typical use of a word or phrase”. 
The second claim, manifestly related to the fi rst, is that intuition is an 
unreliable guide to semantic prosody. To take just two examples among 
many, Bublitz (1996:23) affi rms that “intuitions about frequency and like-
lihood of co-occurrence are notoriously thin and not always accurate”, and 
Stubbs (1995:24) takes the view that “attested data are required in collo-
cational studies, since native speaker intuitions are not a reliable source of 
evidence”.
There will be some preliminary discussion of these claims in Chapters 5 
and 6, before the matter is taken up in earnest in Chapter 7.
1.3 AN IMPORTANT RIDER: SEMANTIC PROSODY 
AS MEANING OR PROCESS?
Most of the defi nitions and descriptions examined so far present semantic 
prosody as a type of meaning. However, so close is the association between 
semantic prosody and the process or phenomenon from which it derives 
that it is not uncommon to fi nd semantic prosody defi ned as a process 
rather than as a meaning. For example, in Baker et al.’s (2006:58) Glossary 
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of Corpus Linguistics, the entry for ‘discourse prosody’ (the authors prefer 
the nomenclature proposed by Stubbs—see 1.1.5) runs as follows: “A term 
. . . relating to the way that words in a corpus can collocate with a related 
set of words or phrases, often revealing (hidden) attitudes”. The defi nition 
supplied by Coffi n et al. (2004:xxi) is similar: “The way in which appar-
ently neutral terms come to carry positive or negative associations through 
regularly occurring in particular collocations”.
In these defi nitions semantic prosody is described not as a meaning but 
as a “way”, as a type of semantic or pragmatic process. Compare also 
the defi nition provided in Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org—accessed 
28.1.2009): “Semantic prosody, also discourse prosody, describes the way 
in which certain seemingly neutral words can come to carry positive or 
negative associations through frequently occurring with particular col-
locations”. Gavioli (2005:46) defi nes it as “the way in which words and 
expressions create an aura of meaning capable of affecting words around 
them”. Semantic prosody has also been defi ned as a pattern (e.g., Berber-
Sardinha 2000:94) and as a phenomenon (e.g., Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 
1996:153).
The term ‘semantic prosody’ is thus used to denote not only a type of 
meaning but the ways or processes that give rise to that meaning.
1.4 Summary
The preceding review of the literature on semantic prosody, though deliber-
ately brief, suggests that it is a many-sided concept which has been approached 
in different ways. As explained in the Introduction, the various features 
which have been attributed to it will be addressed in more detail in the chap-
ters which follow. The next chapter deals with two elements common to all 
descriptions of semantic prosody—its evaluative and its hidden features.
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2 The Evaluative and the Hidden
Some words are more equal than others
2.0 INTRODUCTION
This and the following chapters offer a more earnest analysis of semantic 
prosody as described in the literature so far. Up to now I have claimed that 
semantic prosody has been assigned many different characteristics with vary-
ing degrees of emphasis, but the present chapter will be devoted to the two 
features of semantic prosody which are common to just about all descriptions 
of it—its evaluative function and its ‘hidden’ quality. I shall argue, however, 
that these features are, for differing reasons, anything but straightforward.
2.1 EVALUATION
It emerges from the literature review offered in Chapter 1 that almost all 
discussions of semantic prosody include some type of reference to its evalu-
ative or attitudinal quality, and for many, notably Sinclair, this quality is 
absolutely central. Before going any further, however, let us consider what 
is understood by evaluation. Thompson and Hunston (1999:5) defi ne it as 
follows:
Evaluation is the broad cover term for the expression of the speaker or 
writer’s attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the 
entities or propositions that he or she is talking about. That attitude 
may relate to certainty or obligation or desirability or any of a number 
of other sets of values.
The defi nition is very broad—indeed the authors admit that defi ned in this way 
the concept is a slippery one—but evaluation has sometimes been interpreted 
in a more restricted sense, with greater emphasis on lexical expressions of 
the speaker’s/writer’s emotional attitude. This more specifi c sense, akin (i) to 
what has been called “attitudinal stance” (see for example Conrad and Biber 
1999), and (ii) to theories of Appraisal (see for example Martin 1999 and the 
Appraisal website1) and its sub-categories of affect (dealing with expressions 
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of emotion), judgement (moral assessments of behaviour) and appreciation 
(aesthetic assessments), would appear to correspond more readily to the type 
of evaluation referred to by many scholars who have contributed to the topic 
of semantic prosody. Schmitt and Carter (2004:8), for example, write that the 
prosody associated with the phrase BORDERING ON is that of “approach-
ing an undesirable state (of mind)”, a meaning which “entails a negative evalu-
ation of the situation which is key to the meaning sense it imparts”, and it was 
recorded in Chapter 1 that according to Stubbs (2001a:65), prosodies “express 
speaker attitude. If you say that something is provided, then this implies that 
you approve of it. Since they are evaluative, prosodies often express the speak-
er’s reason for making the utterance”. 
It follows from this that when speakers/writers use items such as NAKED 
EYE, TRUE FEELINGS, PROVIDE, COMMIT, SET IN, UNDERGO, 
HAPPEN, CAUSE, SYMPTOMATIC OF—items often cited in the litera-
ture as being associated with semantic prosody (see again Chapter 1)—they 
make some type of evaluation or convey some type of attitude. In this way 
an utterance such as the cold weather set in might be considered more obvi-
ously attitudinal than, for instance, the cold weather started; John Smith 
had to undergo an operation more attitudinal than John Smith had to have 
an operation; and symptomatic of management inadequacies more attitu-
dinal than indicative of management inadequacies. 
Verifi cation of this would require a close examination of the context in 
which utterances of this type are produced and the effect they are designed 
to have. Nevertheless it does not seem too hazardous to claim straight-
away that the evaluative quality of lexical items described as being associ-
ated with semantic prosody is not always manifest. Take the prosody of 
‘diffi culty’ ascribed by Sinclair (1996a:87) to NAKED EYE (see Section 
1.1.4). Although the author makes it clear that NAKED EYE interacts 
crucially with other elements within a larger unit of meaning, the evalu-
ative element is not necessarily pivotal, and indeed may be anything but 
obvious—describing something as visible or invisible to/with the naked eye 
might come across more as a simple statement of fact than an expression 
of evaluation or attitude as such. While it is true that Austin (1962:133) 
hypothesised that ultimately all utterances are characterised by some type 
of illocutionary force, the evaluative element is not salient, for example, in 
the following BNC occurrences of NAKED EYE:
Mars and Venus, as viewed by the • naked eye, do not change size appreciably
other stars that are visible to the • naked eye lie within a few hundred light 
years
clusters; both are visible with the • naked eye, not far from the Scorpion’s sting
Consider also the common expressions rigor mortis set in and commit sui-
cide. As pointed out in Chapter 1, both SET IN and COMMIT have been 
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assigned unfavourable prosodies on account of their semantic preferences 
(e.g., illnesses, decay/decline, despair/disillusionment for the former, crimes 
and death for the latter). Thus one might speculate that the speaker/writer 
who uses rigor mortis set in or he committed suicide wishes to express an 
unfavourable attitude towards rigor mortis and suicide, but in reality this 
seems anything but straightforward. The problem is that a recurrent alter-
native, for example, to set in in the expression rigor mortis set in does not 
suggest itself: rigor mortis began? rigor mortis started? was activated? got 
going? None of these seems appropriate as a neutral, non-ironic alternative. 
In the BNC RIGOR MORTIS occurs 26 times: in 11 of these it governs 
a verb. Of these 11, the verbs in question are set in (8 times), be (twice: is 
complete, was already well-established) and progress (once: was progress-
ing). Now it follows that if a lexical or grammatical choice is practically 
automatic, then its ability to bring to bear any extra pragmatic nuance is 
severely restricted. For this reason the hypothesis that rigor mortis set in 
involves a negative evaluation is suspect, perhaps especially within scien-
tifi c registers. Similarly, there is no obvious alternative to committed in 
the expression he committed suicide. Of course there are alternatives to 
commit suicide as a combination, such as end it all, end one’s life, kill one-
self, but it would nonetheless seem excessive to postulate that the sequence 
COMMIT suicide must entail an expression of attitude. 
The item CAUSE has also been assigned an unfavourable prosody in the 
literature (see 1.1.3) on account of co-occurrences such as accident, prob-
lem, chaos. However, consider the following two occurrences of CAUSE 
as verb in the BNC:
The door closed and then Elaine pulled the magazine in, • causing the letter box 
to snap shut smartly.
The inhibitors might therefore be • causing amnesia not because they prevent pro-
tein synthesis but because of their effect on increasing animo acid levels.
Here once again it seems problematic to postulate that some sort of attitude 
is being expressed, because it is not clear of whom or of what the respective 
speakers/writers might disapprove. Of letter boxes? Of Elaine? Of inhibitors? 
Of amnesia (which is, after all, not something to be welcomed)? Perhaps, 
but a wider context would be required to support this, and it should not 
be taken for granted. Indeed Hunston (2007:263) supports the hypothesis 
that CAUSE as verb “loses its association with negative evaluation when it 
occurs in ‘scientifi c’ registers”, and it may well be that in a fair percentage of 
its occurrences no evaluation as such is being expressed at all. Louw (2000) 
assigns negative prosodic status to the sequence LOAD OF on account of 
its frequently unfavourable right-hand occurrences (rubbish, nonsense), cit-
ing an interesting example of this expression on the side of a fl eet of deliv-
ery trucks: ‘Another Load of Crystal Candy and Cadbury’s Chocolate Being 
Delivered’. Again, the question of whether an evaluation is being expressed 
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is debatable. Considering the nature of the situational context, one could 
hypothesise that the message writer’s primary concern was to gain the atten-
tion of passers-by through an eye-catching word combination.
The notion of evaluation is thus a complex one, as illustrated by the 
Appraisal system. Not only would one need to take into account the sub-
systems of affect, judgement and appreciation, but also the concept of 
engagement—the system of options embracing the speaker’s/writer’s degree 
of commitment to the appraisal expressed—and this takes us into the area 
of presupposition. A further thorny issue is that of exactly whose attitude is 
being expressed. Considering the perceived importance of semantic prosody 
for pragmatics and discourse, one assumes that the evaluation belongs to the 
speaker/writer. However, as Bernardini and Aston (2002:291) point out:
would this be the speaker as principal, author or animator (to use Goff-
man’s (1981) famous breakdown of the speaker discourse role (Levinson 
1988))? In contexts of reported speech, it is clear that prosodies may 
indicate the evaluation of the cited speaker, not the citing one, as the 
author (but not animator) of the text in question.
In this respect Hunston (2007:256) notes that “the adjective persistent 
[ . . . ] is a word that can be used to indicate a mismatch of viewpoints, 
with the producer of a text indicating a difference between his or her own 
values and those of one of the participants in the text”. See also Adolphs 
and Carter (2002:8–10).
2.1.1 Unusual Word Combinations
These are just some of the many factors to be borne in mind when consider-
ing the evaluative force of utterances, but they may serve to highlight the 
complex and mercurial nature of this area of pragmatics. Having said that, 
evaluative function might be considered more easily accounted for when 
our expectations are overturned and the prosody is, so to speak, ‘reversed’. 
In the Introduction I discussed a concordance of BREAK OUT (Table I.1), 
to which some scholars have ascribed an unfavourable prosody in view of 
the fact that a substantial number of its typical co-occurrences represent 
unpleasant things or states of affairs, such as crises or confl icts. Two of the 
concordance lines reproduced were:
October 1880, the fi rst of the Boer wars • broke out. W. E. Gladstone had 
returned
dismay to the news. Violence had • broken out, and there had been anti -Catholic
Now it may be true that a more unfavourable attitude is expressed with 
the Boer wars broke out or violence had broken out by comparison with 
analogous usage such as the Boer wars began or violence had started, but 
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once again it could just as well be argued that the co-occurrence of break 
out and war/violence is so conventional that no particular nuance—or no 
extra nuance—is conveyed by their juxtaposition. Yet the situation may 
change if the usual juxtapositions are fl outed. For example, a further BNC 
occurrence, not included in Table I.1, is 
aware that she should contribute to the peace that had • broken out between 
them 
which comes across as ironic, i.e., an attitude of irony on the part of a 
participant in the discourse. This involves the notion of implicatures—de-
ducing implications from what has been said concerning what has not been 
said—in particular whereby one or more of the maxims of the cooperative 
principle is violated (Grice 1975). Indeed one suspects that if it were not for 
less habitual co-occurrences such as this, the unfavourable prosody said to 
characterise BREAK OUT, though of considerable importance within a 
co-selection framework, might not, from an evaluative point of view, gener-
ate much interest at all.
Therefore the relatively unusual peace had broken out is striking 
because of the apparent irony which it instantiates. Yet unconventional 
combinations can occur for other reasons which are not easily explained. 
It was noted in 1.1.2 that Louw (1993:157) defi nes semantic prosody as 
a “consistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its col-
locates”. If we briefl y take this sentence as our object of analysis, the 
co-existence within a single sentence of aura, meaning, form, imbued and 
collocates is certainly unusual, but let us focus here on the phrase aura of 
meaning. There is no occurrence of this phrase in the BNC, though the 
sequence AURA OF has some interesting occurrences at R1, the most fre-
quent being mystery (6), power (5), and wealth (4). The same search was 
carried out in a much larger corpus which has only recently become avail-
able, the Brigham Young University (BYU) ‘American Corpus’ (www.
americancorpus.org), which contains over 385 million words of recent 
American English within a plethora of text typologies. Here the most 
frequent occurrences at R1 are:
invincibility (24), mystery (20), power (15), authority (10), confi dence 
(9), authenticity (7), success (6), inevitability (6) legitimacy (5), light 
(5). Co-occurrences appearing 4 times at R1 include infallibility, com-
mand, excitement, romance and exclusivity. 
Perhaps partly as a result of these habitual co-occurrences, Louw’s obser-
vation is a striking one, though it certainly does not come across as ironic. 
Perhaps the author is expressing some other type of evaluation, and/or, as 
Louw himself (1993:157) has noted, what underlies it is “the speaker’s real 
attitude even where s/he is at pains to conceal it”. Yet it may also be the case 
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that unconventional word combinations of prosodic interest are present for 
reasons which do not immediately connect with the notion of evaluation. 
Of course we also need to bear in mind that in the sentence analysed the 
author is adopting metaphors, and that metaphorical language is the epit-
ome of the unorthodox word combination (see Whitsitt 2005:298–300 for 
an interesting discussion)—something which might debilitate any endeav-
ours to read between Louw’s lines on the basis of typical co-occurrence.
The conveying of attitude via unusual co-occurrence is discussed by 
Hunston (2007), who notes that this belongs to (261) “a more general tra-
dition of calling on the discontinuity between the norm and the individual 
example to account for the recognition of a variety of stylistic effects”. 
However, as Hunston goes on to point out, although this seems legitimate 
as a way of explaining individual instances, predicting meanings such as 
irony or insincerity (Louw 1993) on the basis of unusual co-occurrence is 
more complicated. Adopting the example of TO THE POINT OF, which 
according to Hunston (2007:261) is used “to link a less saturated evaluative 
item with a more saturated one (as in thin to the point of emaciation)” and 
is associated with a negative evaluation, she notes that occurrences which 
fl out this norm are not necessarily indicative of irony, insincerity etc., but 
may simply be examples of atypical usage with no extra shade of mean-
ing intended (ibid.:262). The occurrence she cites is fresh to the point of 
invigoration, where in the article from which the occurrence is drawn any 
negative evaluation would be, according to the author, unjustifi ed. 
In the same way we might predict that, for example, the combination 
utterly compelling contains some unfavourable or ironic subtext on account 
of the consistently unfavourable R1 co-occurrences of UTTERLY (e.g., 
disgraceful, ridiculous, useless—see also Partington 2004a:147 and 6.2.2), 
even though compelling is an adjective with favourable meaning. Yet the 
seven occurrences of utterly compelling in the BNC, as well as the numer-
ous instances I have checked in The Guardian archives, do not appear to 
support this prediction.
In short, if we insist that every time speakers or writers use unorthodox 
word combinations, particularly when they involve words which have been 
assigned clear prosodies (e.g., UTTERLY), there must necessarily be some 
kind of evaluative subtext, and if we insist that all readers will make a simi-
lar assumption, then we have waded into treacherous waters. Corpus data 
can certainly help us to describe how words combine, but not necessarily 
to explain why words combine. In the words of Teubert (2005:2), corpus 
linguistics “wants to describe what cannot be explained”. 
2.1.2 Semantic Prosody and Connotation
As mentioned in 1.1.1, Whitsitt (2005) claims that semantic prosody has 
been defi ned in three different ways and that one of these (ibid.:285), 
“which is very widespread, treats semantic prosody as if it were a synonym 
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of connotation”. There is certainly no denying that references to connota-
tive aspects abound in descriptions of semantic prosody. 
According to Berber-Sardinha (2000:93), “semantic prosody is the con-
notation conveyed by the regular co-occurrence of lexical items”. Parting-
ton (1998:67), commenting upon a concordance of COMMIT, notes that 
an “unfavourable connotation can be seen to reside not simply in the word 
commit but over a unit consisting of commit and its collocates”, while in 
a later work, the author (2004a:131) observes that semantic prosody is 
“usually described as an aspect of connotative meaning” and more spe-
cifi cally of the expressive aspect of connotative meaning. Along similar 
lines, Hunston (2002:142) states that semantic prosody “accounts for 
‘connotation’: the sense that a word carries a meaning in addition to its 
‘real’ meaning. The connotation is usually one of evaluation, that is, the 
semantic prosody is usually negative, or, less frequently, positive”. If we 
interpret Hunston’s remarks as suggesting that fundamentally semantic 
prosody corresponds to evaluative connotation, then this would suggest 
that semantic prosody is a subset of connotation. However, the notion 
that semantic prosody “accounts for” connotation requires elaboration, 
especially as elsewhere the author appears to present the two concepts as 
synonymous. Commenting on the phrasal verb SIT THROUGH, Hunston 
(2002:62, note 3) writes that “speakers may be alerted to the presence 
of connotation or semantic prosody by a single example that exploits or 
misuses it” [my italics].
A similar situation obtains in Stubbs, who also seems to regard connota-
tion and semantic prosody (or discourse prosody, as he terms it—see 1.1.5) as 
synonymous when he writes (2001a:106): “The distinction between inherent, 
propositional meaning and connotational meaning (or discourse prosody) 
may in any case be based on unreliable intuitions”. This apparent synonymy 
is again manifest when Stubbs takes CAUSE as a case study to show that 
(ibid.:43) “observable corpus data can provide evidence of both denotational 
and connotational meaning”, concluding that (ibid.:49) “cause has over-
whelmingly unpleasant connotations”; later, however (ibid.:65), he gives the 
unpleasant connotations of cause as a fi rst example of discourse prosody. See 
also Tognini-Bonelli (2004:20) Teubert (2005:5), Adolphs (2006:56).
Other authors are not keen on excessive overlap between connotation 
and semantic prosody, above all Louw (2000:50), who examines an entry 
in the 1995 edition of the Collins Cobuild English Dictionary for Advanced 
Learners: 
We need to make it plain that semantic prosodies are not merely con-
notational. The Cobuild defi nition of connotation runs as follows:
The connotations of a particular word or name are the ideas or 
qualities which it makes you think of (1995:343).
One of the examples provided in the dictionary entry reads:
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‘Urchin’, with its connotations of mischievousness, may not be a 
particularly apt word.
Having supplied this example, Louw continues (2000:50):
Whereas knowledge of connotations is often a form of schematic 
knowledge of repeatable events, e.g. what urchins do, where they live, 
their fi nancial means or lack of it and how they behave, etc, SPs are 
more strictly functional or attitudinal. They relate more directly to 
what literary critics call authorial tone and are supported by a series of 
collocates such as those mentioned earlier in Stubbs’ analysis of cause. 
Here connotation is construed as a form of schematic knowledge, whereas, 
if I have interpreted Louw’s position correctly, semantic prosody is more 
attendant upon co-occurrence factors, and is more functional or attitu-
dinal in nature than connotation. The question of semantic prosody as a 
co-occurrence phenomenon is an important one, and will be dealt with 
later in this book. More interesting for present purposes is Louw’s allusion 
to “authorial tone”, apparently adopted to support the attitudinal aspect of 
semantic prosody.
2.1.3 Authorial Tone
The Cobuild recommendation that urchin “may not be a particularly apt 
word” must be based on the premise that this term, “with its connota-
tions of mischievousness”, may be construed as pejorative, or more pre-
cisely, as revealing a pejorative attitude on the part of the person who 
uses it. Therefore, presumably, caution is required when we use or come 
across it. And of course the same is true of thousands of other words 
with specifi c connotations. To take a very obvious example, if most of us 
avoid adopting the word nigger, with all its attendant connotations, it is 
because we do not wish to risk giving the impression that we are making 
a pejorative evaluation of black people or that we have an unfavourable 
attitude towards them. 
This makes it hard to understand why Louw regards semantic prosody 
as “more strictly attitudinal” than connotation, and why it “relate[s] more 
directly [than connotation] to what literary critics call authorial tone”. The 
author does not state what he means by ‘tone’, but it would in any case 
seem arduous to argue that the use of terms such as urchin or nigger may 
not contribute to authorial tone. Whitsitt (2005:286) fi nds Louw’s recourse 
to the term ‘tone’ unconvincing since, he argues, this is “precisely how con-
notation has often been described”.
However, Louw’s distinction is a valuable one inasmuch as it suggests 
that whereas semantic prosody is contingent primarily upon the relation-
ship between the item and its typical lexical environment, and upon the 
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attitudinal aspects that might attend upon this relationship, connotation 
ties in principally with the relationship between the word and the speaker/
hearer, or better the world experience the speaker/hearer associates with a 
word. Clearly there is a substantial degree of overlap here, because the atti-
tude of the speaker/hearer would appear to be crucial to both connotation 
and semantic prosody, but for reasons which will be outlined in the next 
section, this type of overlap is perhaps not conducive to a clear understand-
ing of the concept of semantic prosody.
2.1.4 Connotation and Peripheral Meaning
In his classic work on semantics, Lyons (1977:176) defi nes the connota-
tions of a word as “an emotive or affective component additional to its 
central meaning”, and later (ibid.:278) as having “secondary implications”, 
while Palmer (1981:92) writes that connotation chiefl y refers to “emotive or 
evaluative meaning”. Crystal (1991:74) writes that the main application of 
connotation is “with reference to emotional associations (personal or com-
munal) which are suggested by, or are part of the meaning of, a linguistic 
unit, especially a lexical item”.
Stubbs (2001a:34) notes that connotation is “affective, associative, atti-
tudinal and emotive meaning”, and that “connotations are often thought 
of as subjective, second-order or peripheral meanings, which depend on a 
relation between the word and the speaker/hearer” (ibid.:35). According to 
Yallop (2004:28): “The term connotation tends to slip awkwardly between 
something like ‘peripheral meaning’ and ‘emotive meaning’ and ‘personal 
associations’”.
If we compare this brief cross-section of defi nitions with the descrip-
tions of semantic prosody cited so far in this book, what emerges is that 
semantic prosody and connotation share an attitudinal/affective attribute, 
and Crystal’s comments suggest that connotation, like semantic prosody, 
may characterise linguistic units rather than simply words. Some overlap 
is perhaps inevitable if only because, as Partington (2004a:154) points out, 
connotation is such a versatile concept:
The term ‘connotation’ is made to do an immense amount of work, 
covering concepts as varied as social connotation (consider awfully 
clever and dead clever), cultural connotation (whisky in Glasgow or 
Riyadh) and expressive connotation, the latter being close to evaluative 
meaning.
See also Palmer (1981:92) regarding the various interpretations of ‘con-
notation’. However, what seems particularly important is that in the works 
cited connotation is consistently described as “additional”, “peripheral” 
and/or “second-order” meaning. Now although Partington (2004a:154) is 
careful to point out that there may be nothing secondary about expressive 
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connotation (his example is the item pig-headed), the fact remains that in 
view of the way the term ‘connotation’ is normally construed, any scholar 
who defi nes semantic prosody in connotative terms at once risks collision with 
Sinclair, for whom semantic prosody is anything but secondary or peripheral. 
On the contrary, according to Sinclair semantic prosody is absolutely central 
to the unit of meaning and indeed represents the initial functional choice 
linking the meaning to the purpose (see 1.1.4). When Sinclair (2004:175–176) 
posits a prosody of ‘anticipated failure’ for the unit of meaning containing 
EFFORTS TO (see also 4.2) he carefully underlines that “the selection of 
the item is controlled by the prosody, because the whole point of expressing 
oneself in this way is to pre-evaluate the actions, which would otherwise be 
evaluated positively by the reader/listener” (ibid.:175, my italics).
Also worth noting in passing is that connotation has traditionally been 
considered to characterise the word, whereas for Sinclair semantic pros-
ody characterises an entire unit of meaning (a theme which will be taken 
up again in Chapter 4). This is not to suggest that Sinclair should have a 
monopoly on defi nitions of semantic prosody, but it would seem advisable 
for authors framing semantic prosody in connotative terms to acknowledge 
the degree to which this move may confl ict with Sinclair’s ideas.
2.2 HIDDEN MEANING
The second characteristic of semantic prosody shared by just about all 
descriptions is its hidden, subliminal, ‘unconscious’ nature. Hunston and 
Thompson, in their ‘Editors’ Introduction’ to Channell (1999:38), state 
that semantic prosody “can be exploited by speakers to express evaluative 
meaning covertly”, while Partington (2004a:131) writes that it describes the 
same type of evaluative meaning as the more traditional notion of connota-
tive meaning but “is much less evident to the naked eye”. Tognini-Bonelli 
(2001:112), citing Louw’s (1993:169–171) argument that semantic prosody 
can reveal speaker attitudes even when the speaker tries to conceal them, 
hypothesises that “this lack of control suggests that semantic prosodies 
operate mainly subliminally and are not readily available to the speaker 
as discourse devices at the conscious level”, and she confi rms this later 
(ibid.:114), stating: “As mentioned above, semantic prosodies are mainly 
engaged at the subconscious level”. Remarks about the subconscious are 
also made by Hunston (2001:21), who believes that “in instances of seman-
tic prosody the function that a lexical item has in a given text is responded 
to subconsciously by the reader or hearer”. 
In similar vein, McEnery, Xiao and Tono (2006:84) write that “It would 
appear, from the literature published on semantic prosody [ . . . ] that it is 
at least as inaccessible to a speaker’s conscious introspection as collocation 
is”. Louw (1993:171–173) believes that until the advent of corpus linguis-
tics semantic prosodies were hidden from our perception for thousands of 
Stewart 6th pages.indd   30 8/11/2009   9:03:07 AM
The Evaluative and the Hidden 31
T&F Proofs: Not For Distribution
years, while Hunston (2002:61, 119, 141–142) makes several references to 
how semantic prosody can convey covert messages, hidden meanings and 
attitudes, and includes this attribute as one of its defi ning characteristics 
(ibid.:141). Munday (forthcoming) takes the view that semantic prosody is 
about the way that sense and connotation spread surreptitiously across 
collocates or from the typical surrounding co-text. Since it is often 
not overtly controlled by the text producer, it may reveal a writer or 
speaker’s underlying attitude or evaluation.
This covert, subliminal feature is not as a rule stressed by Sinclair, but 
arguably one of the reasons that his analyses of expressions such as 
TRUE FEELINGS are so fascinating is that the prosodies attributed to 
them are not obvious. However that may be, the impression from most 
authors, even from those who do not explicitly defi ne semantic prosody 
in ‘hidden’ terms, is that unless a meaning is in some way concealed it 
may not qualify as a semantic prosody at all. Or at least, if a lexical item 
expresses evaluative meaning transparently, then any prosody it may be 
associated with is not worth identifying. Here too there are similarities 
with the more traditional concept of connotation, since connotations are 
sometimes described as hidden. Nevertheless the impression is that the 
concealed quality is somehow more fundamental to semantic prosody 
than it is to connotation.
Before going any further it seems important to emphasise that although 
the idea of hidden, subliminal, covert etc. meaning may give the momentary 
impression of something to which only a highly perceptive few are privy, 
the point that the scholars quoted are making, if I have understood them 
correctly, is that as users of a language we would experience diffi culty if we 
were asked to describe the nature of the specifi c prosody in question. That 
is, although some awareness of semantic prosodies presumably reaches right 
across the speech community—for example, one imagines that the potential 
irony of an assertion such as after six months their marriage set in would be 
picked up by most native speakers of English—those native speakers may 
nonetheless be unable to articulate either the semantic preferences or the 
semantic prosody characterising SET IN. The issue of speaker awareness 
raises the question of our ability or inability to intuit or to introspect about 
prosodies, a crucial question which will be taken up in Chapter 7.
There is no doubt that the notion of hidden meaning is highly appeal-
ing because it has crucial implications for stylistics and critical discourse 
analysis. Peeling away layers of subtext in discourse is an important and 
engrossing activity, and if corpus linguistics can help us to do this then so 
much the better. As Koller and Mautner (2004:223) underline, semantic 
prosody “is at least as exciting a concept for the critical discourse analyst 
as it is for the lexicographer and the grammarian”. However, whether we 
should axiomatically associate semantic prosody with covert meaning is 
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open to question. Such an association, as I argue in the following section, 
seems to rest crucially upon the fact that prosodies are usually attributed to 
semantically more ‘neutral’ items.
2.2.1 Semantic Neutrality
Channell (1999) is analogous to Louw (1993), in that both authors use 
corpus data to shed light on less transparent meanings of words and 
phrases. Nevertheless, Channell differs from Louw in that she does not 
confi ne herself to items with less obviously evaluative meanings, since 
her analysis embraces not only items such as REGIME and PAR FOR 
THE COURSE, where it could be argued that a less obvious (negative) 
evaluation is implied, but also FAT and SELF-IMPORTANT, where the 
speaker’s/writer’s evaluation may be more transparent. It is worth not-
ing, however, that in her contribution Channell makes no recourse what-
soever to the term semantic prosody, or for that matter to connotation, 
and does not employ separate terms for transparent and hidden meanings 
respectively. She adopts the expression ‘evaluative polarity’ throughout 
the article, but this is extended equally to both more and less transparent 
meanings. 
This is interesting in the current context because almost all studies on 
semantic prosody produced so far have focused on lexical items which 
do not appear to have manifestly positive or negative basic meanings. 
In other words, there is a predilection for words and expressions with 
a rather more neutral basic meaning, and indeed this notion of seman-
tic neutrality is occasionally stated explicitly, for example when Munday 
(forthcoming) remarks that “semantic prosody refers to how what might 
be expected to be a semantically neutral form, such as the lemma cause, 
in fact tends be used with words that give it a particular hue (negative in 
the case of cause)”.
As recorded earlier, classic examples (‘classic’ in the sense that many 
of them have been discussed and rediscussed) of items associated with 
semantic prosody include: HAPPEN, SET IN, BREAK OUT, CAUSE, 
COMMIT, UNDERGO, PROVIDE, SOMEWHAT, UTTERLY, 
ABSOLUTELY. What is particularly noticeable here is that the basic 
meanings of the items in this list—and those of other items discussed in 
the literature—could be said to fall into extremely frequent and fairly 
‘neutral’ semantic groups: ‘happening, making happen’ (HAPPEN, SET 
IN, OCCUR, TAKE PLACE, COME ABOUT, BREAK OUT, CAUSE, 
BRING ABOUT), ‘doing’ (COMMIT), ‘receiving’ (UNDERGO), 
‘giving’ (PROVIDE), ‘rather’, ‘fairly’ (SOMEWHAT), ‘completely’ 
(UTTERLY, ABSOLUTELY, as well as TOTALLY, COMPLETELY, 
ENTIRELY). The literature on semantic prosody abounds with studies 
of items of apparently innocuous meaning such as AMID, A BIT OF A, 
EFFORTS TO.
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Worth noting also is the recurrence of prepositional verbs used as exam-
ples of lexical items associated with semantic prosody (SET IN, BREAK 
OUT, SIT THROUGH, COME ABOUT, BRING ABOUT, FORK OUT, 
ANDARE INCONTRO (literally ‘go towards’—see Tognini-Bonelli 
2001:113–116). Of course prepositional verbs in general are not especially 
characterised by neutral meanings—they can have meanings which are just 
as strongly positive or negative as any other item (e.g., they’ll take it out on 
me, she blew up at them), but it should be recalled that one of the reasons 
learners of English fi nd these verbs so diffi cult to assimilate and remember 
is precisely that their meaning is very often not transparently derived from 
the verb + preposition combination, something which may bestow upon 
such verbs a superfi cially more neutral quality.
Analyses of the semantic prosodies characterising more obviously posi-
tive or negative items, on the other hand, are relatively uncommon, though 
there is the odd example. Partington (1998:67) analyses RIFE, Stubbs 
(2001a:85) takes a brief look at the lexical profi le of RECKLESS, and 
Tognini-Bonelli (2001:19–21) examines FICKLE, items which intuitively 
come across as possessing unfavourable basic meanings (though this is not 
the focus of interest in the analyses mentioned), but in the literature these 
are the exception rather than the rule. 
Naturally items with an ostensibly ‘neutral’ meaning lend themselves 
more readily to analyses of any hidden shades of meaning, precisely 
because of their apparent neutrality. It is no coincidence that Partington 
(2004a) makes a detailed examination of the prosodies of various ‘hap-
pen words’, including not only HAPPEN and SET IN but also OCCUR, 
COME ABOUT and TAKE PLACE, and of various “amplifying inten-
sifi ers” (ABSOLUTELY, UTTERLY, TOTALLY, COMPLETELY, 
ENTIRELY, THOROUGHLY), presumably (i) because at fi rst sight 
the items of each of these sets are more or less synonymous, and (ii) 
because they do not come across as markedly favourable or unfavourable 
in meaning.
Mahlberg (2005:149–150) proposes a three-way categorisation of the 
evaluative meanings of lexical items in context, the subdivisions being 
(i) core meaning, referring to words which have a core meaning which 
is clearly evaluative, (ii) prosody, and (iii) text meaning, referring to 
words “that do not typically express evaluation, but depend to a larger 
extent on a specifi c text” (ibid.:150). The division proposed would seem 
to exclude that items with evaluative core meanings—which have been 
referred to in semantics as ‘attitudinal lexis’ (see also Thompson and 
Hunston (1999:14), who defi ne such items as “very clearly evaluative, 
in the sense that evaluation is their chief function and meaning”)—have 
prosodic potential. Yet in the literature on semantic prosody, prosodies 
have been assigned primarily on the basis of an item’s co-occurrence 
with words and expressions denoting favourable/unfavourable states of 
affairs, and we need to bear in mind that the habitual co-occurrences of 
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items with evaluative core meaning can be just as consistently favour-
able or unfavourable as the co-occurrences of less obviously evaluative 
items. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1996:157) writes: “I would see no 
reason [ . . . ] not to use the term semantic prosody for the cases when the 
semantic load of an item is quite explicit”.
An examination in the BNC of the lexical profi les of, for example, what 
I shall loosely call ‘superior words’, such as SUPERIOR, SNOBBISH, 
PRIGGISH, SELF-RIGHTEOUS, PATRONISING, CONDESCEND-
ING, POMPOUS, STUCK UP, SELF-IMPORTANT, rapidly discloses 
not only apparently ‘innocent’ co-occurrences such as look, expression, 
attitude, person, as well as a couple of apparently positive ones such as 
smile, but also a striking array of highly uncomplimentary co-occurrences 
such as opinionated, preposterous, smug, sod, bastard, bitch and other 
even more vigorously unpleasant descriptions. The adjectives FAT and 
SELF-IMPORTANT, according to Channell (1999:41–44), who was using 
the Bank of English when its size was around 200 million words, are also 
to be found in undesirable company: FAT co-occurs with old, ass, bald, 
slob, crafty, pompous, and SELF-IMPORTANT co-occurs with swill, 
slop-bucket, insincere, overwrought, self-adoring, plodding, bloated, 
alarmingly. This is because, as Channell (ibid.:44) points out, “speakers 
and writers cluster negative items so that there is a mutually supporting 
web of negative words”. One of the texts included in the BNC can boast 
the following sequence of epithets: ‘(I also linked wealth with being) self-
ish, greedy, materialistic, hard-hearted, snobbish and dull’, and Martin 
(1999:146) reports an extraordinarily long and uninterrupted sequence of 
adjectives indicating highly unfavourable judgements from an article in the 
Sydney Morning Herald. See again Lewandowska- Tomaszczyk (1996).
2.2.2 A Test Case: SNOBBISH vs. BENT ON
Some readers may be unconvinced by this comparison between the lexi-
cal environment of items such as BREAK OUT and SOMEWHAT on 
the one hand, and that of items such as SNOBBISH and PRIGGISH on 
the other. It might be objected that although the latter do most assuredly 
have some very undesirable customers in their habitual co-text, their 
lexical profi les are nevertheless not as consistently negative as those of 
BREAK OUT, SOMEWHAT etc. In other words, it is predictable that 
a substantial percentage of the most frequent co-occurrences of SNOB-
BISH and PRIGGISH will be comparatively unobjectionable words like 
person, people, attitude, and even cheerful-sounding words such as smile 
and laugh, whereas the co-occurrences of BREAK OUT, SOMEWHAT 
etc. are reported to be more consistently gloomy. Let us test this by com-
paring the concordance of SNOBBISH, on the one hand, with the con-
cordance of another of the items analysed in the literature for which a 
negative prosody has been claimed, namely BENT ON. 
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Louw (1993:164–166) reproduces a selection of a concordance to 
BENT ON as an example of an item associated with a distinctive seman-
tic prosody, concluding that “this concordance shows that the pursuits 
that people are BENT ON are almost always negative or unpleasant 
in some way” (ibid.:166). Yet since Louw is particularly keen to stress 
the subliminal qualities of semantic prosody which “cannot be retrieved 
reliably through introspection” (ibid.:157), we must assume that he 
examines BENT ON precisely because its negativity is felt to be not 
especially manifest, at least not ‘on the surface’. But let us begin by 
examining the results of a simple BNC query for SNOBBISH. There 
are sixty occurrences, of which a random selection is reproduced in 
Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 BNC Concordance to ‘snobbish’ (Random Selection of 30/60)
 1. invalid and recluse, of someone snobbish and sometimes selfi sh and inhumane
 2. British fi lmmaking for being ‘snobbish, anti-intelligent, emotionally inhibited
 3. beck and call of her wicked, snobbish guardians, with a travelling shoe salesman
 4. move away’, he appealed, ‘from our snobbish caste-ridden hierarchical obsessions
 5. and his own diaries, an intolerable man— snobbish, reactionary, racist, lamenting
 6. ‘culture’. I use this word not in its snobbish sense, but as a scientist uses it. Culture
 7. of transport cannot reach. To the snobbish traveller coach tours are a subject of
 8. tawdry behaviour? Am I naïve or snobbish in thinking that better standards ought
 9. suburban family, this pretentious and snobbish side of Eva amused Dad and me.
 10. laden communication. If you’re snobbish about the vocals then you’re probably
 11. people and their empty lives? Coward’s snobbish game-playing is history. The
 12. his skills for Juventus. Tax on snobs SNOBBISH homeowners are appealing to be
 13. on admiring them in the face of the snobbish dismissal of them by many artists of
 14. inarticulate. The plain fact of the matter, snobbish though it may sound, was that
 15. The worst were incompetent and snobbish. The second type of individual head
 16. a mother fi gure. Privileged yes, snobbish no. At a very early age the Spencer
 17. was almost spat out, a mean and snobbish cut. ‘And the ladies were peacefully
 18. as if she were some doggedly snobbish godmother, inviting them home every 
 19. and there were the silly ones, the snobbish ones, the would-be debutantes and
 20. in one way or another, prejudiced and snobbish, although they would have denied
 21. the music is not its own art? The snobbish distinction between art and craft only
 22. the aristocrats, so I’m sure the snobbish doctor’s ghost will tolerate my company
 23. superiority. Evelyn Waugh is at his most snobbish worst. Claud Cockburn sneers
 24. I would have been insufferably snobbish and complacent. It is perhaps better
 25. idea of what Liberty’s is. How very snobbish of you, you will say; why should
 26. class for generous rewards or for some snobbish appeal. The powerful could act,
 27. In the Hapsburg empire, under the most snobbish and conservative regime of all,
 28. Married her father’s curate, against his snobbish wishes, in eighteen fi fty four the
 29. he shouted across the streets to the snobbish people of Chichester. ‘I lov ‘em’, he
 30. I mean, erm it’s so easy to be snobbish  but if the problems of experimentation
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In some cases the co-text of SNOBBISH seems harmless enough or 
at least fairly inconclusive, such as lines 6, 7, 26, 29. Yet what is far 
more conspicuous is its recurrently unpleasant company. According to 
my approximate calculations, the co-texts of around 34 of the total of 
60 occurrences contain words or expressions which could be classifi ed as 
representing unpleasant states of affairs, and many of these occurrences 
have three, four or fi ve unpleasant-sounding words within a single line. 
The co-text includes: selfi sh and inhumane; anti-intelligent; emotionally 
inhibited; wicked; arrogant; caste-ridden, hierarchical obsessions; intol-
erable; reactionary; racist; tawdry; appallingly; spongers; pretentious; 
greedy, materialistic, hard-hearted; sneering; infestation; prejudiced; 
prudish; insufferably; complacent; bigoted; hypocritical, as well as some 
aggressive expletives.
Now let us consider the concordance reproduced by Louw as part 
of his analysis of BENT ON. The author provides a selection from a 
37-million word Cobuild corpus. In this there are 103 occurrences of 
BENT ON, of which the author produces every third one, plus a hand-
ful of further occurrences constituting “examples of irony”. These are 
brought together in Table 2.2.
As noted previously, Louw concludes from these occurrences that 
“the pursuits that people are bent on are almost always negative or 
unpleasant in some way” (ibid.:166). Yet in the concordance there are 
plenty of positive-looking pursuits that people are bent on, for example 
achievement, demanding greater and greater protection, doing good, 
expiating the great Fascist guilt, fi nding a beauty, getting fi t, helping 
his fellow man, recreation, seeking the comfortable security, sincer-
ity, success, and there are many others which do not sound unpleasant 
such as business, change, escaping, going that way, its early despatch, 
some purpose, those 700 acres. Indeed the indisputably unfavourable 
co-occurrences are in reality quite thin on the ground in the selection 
in question.
The percentage of occurrences with unfavourable lexis in the immedi-
ate environment appears to be signifi cantly higher for SNOBBISH than 
for BENT ON. A further difference is that whereas BENT ON has its 
unpleasant co-occurrences mostly to the right of the node, SNOBBISH 
does not appear to have this restriction, with ‘unpleasantries’ occur-
ring abundantly to both left and right. Finally, the SNOBBISH concor-
dance bears out Channell’s (1999:44) observation (quoted previously) 
apropos the clustering of negative items and a “mutually supporting web 
of negative words”, in that many of the lines feature several negative 
co-occurrences.
Naturally this very brief comparison leaves a number of questions 
open. Firstly, it may be that SNOBBISH and BENT ON are not suf-
fi ciently representative as terms of comparison. Secondly, there is too 
great a reliance on hasty semantic categorisations of co-occurrences into 
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positive, negative and neutral (see 5.3.1 for further discussion of this). 
However, the impression is that the co-text fl anking SNOBBISH is on 
the whole more unpleasant than the co-text of BENT ON, which at times 
actually sounds quite upbeat. It could therefore be argued that SNOB-
BISH, notwithstanding the fact that it indisputably belongs to the cat-
egory of attitudinal lexis and is thus not in any way semantically neutral, 
Table 2.2 Concordance to ‘bent on’ in Louw 1993 (Alphabetical Sorting 
 at R1)
 1. in a society hell bent on achievement. Mutable thinkers don’t
 2. werful enchanter, bent on bringing Arthur to his ruin this dev
 3. iding donkeys all bent on business, they were forcibly impress
 4. cter development. bent on change, even to the point of shatter
 5. r world she seems bent on conquering. Well, I suppose that you
 6. am presently hell bent on courting you. ‘Very well then listen
 7. overnment is hell bent on demanding greater and greater
 8. of Yoller’s wood, bent on destroying all survivors before purs
 9. he people who are bent on doing good they can be the danger, s
 10. stic savagery and bent on engulfi ng and drowning trapped men a
 11. sonal safety and bent on escaping not only the enemy, but the
 12. seen seems hell bent on expiating the great Fascist guilt. H
 13. marriage, he was bent on fi nding a beauty if, while out walki
 14. one else is hell bent on getting fi t, I might as well join in
 15. and one twitcher bent on glory crossed the razor backed rock
 16. pass but he was bent on going that way, the shortest way, to
 17. lish countrywoman bent on good works and the continuance of tr
 18. , who really was bent on helping his fellow man, and who was
 19. e mine, patently bent on its early despatch and eager to witn
 20. hy was I so hell bent on locking myself up in a hotel in orde
 21. er as if I was bent on making me see the Host clearly, then
 22. le making youths bent on mischief coming along my previous pa
 23. y. He seems hell bent on owning all of Colorado’. Fancy fi ndi
 24. d and fast as if bent on placing an irrevocable distance betw
 25. came, but people bent on recreation had a much narrower idea
 26. e Derby, who was bent on resigning, that in the interests of
 27. ish battleships, bent on revenge for the sunken Hood in the s
 28. lear you’re hell bent on ruining yourself’. And he walked out
 29. s they were hell bent on seeking the comfortable security of
 30. to an apprentice bent on sincerity this multiplicity of inter
 31. n of individuals bent on some purpose on which they all agree
 32. the 7th is hell bent on success it can be totally destroyed,
 33. he fools were so bent on taking over the national government
 34. f dead but still bent on these 700 acres in the sea. There is
 35. ut why he seemed bent on tripping up the deal with all that m
 36. Tartar cavalry, bent on villainy. After which much happened
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is a far stronger candidate for (an unfavourable) semantic prosody than 
BENT ON, precisely because semantic prosody is so contingent upon an 
item’s lexical environment.
2.2.3 Disclosure
Despite the arguments outlined in the section above, the fact remains 
that within the framework of semantic prosody as it is usually described 
in the literature, the lexical environments of SNOBBISH, POMPOUS, 
SELF-IMPORTANT etc. excite scarcely any interest at all. Such terms 
are instantly recognised as unpleasant, so any claim that they are associ-
ated with a prosody of unpleasantness, though in theory perfectly defen-
sible, would be considered unremarkable because there is no ‘revelation’ 
or disclosure as such, there is no concealed subtext. In other words, the 
unpleasant prosody would not be suffi ciently hidden to warrant serious 
investigation. 
In the BNC the term DECKCHAIR (deck chair is also present in the 
corpus, but I focus on the former) has (mostly) left-hand co-occurrences 
which include asleep, lazing, reclining, fallen asleep, settled down, set-
tling back, plonked himself, and (mostly) right-hand occurrences which 
include at sunset, at the front, in Japan, in the back garden, in the front 
garden, in the sun, on the outfi eld, on the sea front, under the tree. 
It would seem justifi able to infer from this that DECKCHAIR has 
a semantic preference of something like ‘relaxing outdoors’, and from 
this one might wish to infer a positive, favourable prosody, but as things 
stand in the literature, this type of inference would probably not be 
taken seriously because it is too intuitively transparent. Indeed one won-
ders if SNOBBISH and DECKCHAIR, notwithstanding their distinc-
tively unfavourable/favourable profi les, would be eligible for semantic 
prosody at all.
If discoveries were made to the effect that certain items with a strongly 
positive basic meaning, such as BREATHTAKING, had habitually 
unfavourable co-text, and that certain items with a strongly negative 
basic meaning, such as LOUSY, had habitually favourable co-text, then 
that really would be news and could represent stimulating avenues of 
research. (In actual fact it could be claimed that such a discovery has 
already been made, though it might have the effect of backfi ring upon 
certain interpretations of semantic prosody rather than lending weight 
to them—see 4.4.) Perhaps the closest we have come to this scenario is (i) 
Sinclair’s analysis (1996a:89–90) of TRUE FEELINGS, an expression 
which would intuitively be regarded as signifying something positive, 
i.e., ‘genuine sentiments’, but which, according to Sinclair’s fi ndings (see 
Section 1.1.4), is actually characterised by a prosody of ‘reluctance’, i.e., 
a reluctance to express sentiments, and (ii) the analyses by both Tognini-
Bonelli (2001:106–110) and Stubbs (2001a:156–159) of PROPER, with 
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its prosody of ‘absence’ or ‘lack’, since PROPER, it is claimed, is usu-
ally part of an extended unit of meaning which is a “complaint for the 
absence of something that we all think should be present or available” 
(Tognini-Bonelli 2001:110). However, reluctance to express one’s true 
feelings is not necessarily a bad thing, and is in any case very much cul-
ture-dependent, so a contrast here between a very positive basic mean-
ing and a very negative prosody might be less cogent as a result, while 
the prosody inferred for PROPER, though extremely insightful, perhaps 
asks as many questions as it answers (see 4.3.1).
However that may be, up to now semantic prosody has been dis-
cussed only when there is some type of disclosure or revelation, only 
when something which apparently lies beneath the surface is ‘extracted’ 
(see Xiao and McEnery 2006:106) from the corpus data. If this is the 
objective, then semantically non-neutral words such as PRIGGISH or 
MAGNIFICENT are unlikely candidates for semantic prosody. All this 
ties in with a question raised by Schmitt and Carter (2004:8–9): “it 
seems clear that formulaic sequences can carry semantic prosody, but 
to our knowledge no one has done research into how many do and how 
many do not”.
This in turn raises the question of whether all lexical items are potential 
candidates for semantic prosody.
2.2.4 Can Semantic Prosody be Inferred for All Lexical Items?
It might be contested that my concern with the distinction between items 
which have a markedly positive or negative basic meaning and those which 
do not is something of a red herring. Surely, the argument might run, we 
can resolve the question by affi rming that all lexical items, with the pos-
sible exception of grammatical words, have potential for semantic proso-
dy—whether hidden or not—and that it is only natural that scholars should 
devote their attention to cases where the prosody is less manifest. This argu-
ment is in itself unexceptionable. Firstly, the idea that lexical items across 
the board are candidates for semantic prosody appears to be supported by 
Hoey’s theory of priming: “I would hypothesise that all words are primed 
for one or more collocations, semantic associations and colligations, even if 
these are on the face of it unremarkable” (Hoey 2005:116). In similar vein, 
Stubbs (2001a:225) underlines that “there are always semantic relations 
between nodes and collocates”, while Louw (2000:51) talks of the poten-
tial for discovering forms of prosodic behaviour even with high-frequency 
grammatical items such as a. 
Secondly, it is indeed perfectly natural that scholars should wish to focus 
upon less obvious or more subliminal instances of prosodies. However, 
there is a theoretical drawback, which is that in many works on the subject 
the hidden quality of semantic prosody is presented as part of its defi ni-
tion, as one of its central features. Indeed a glance through the defi nitions/
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explanations of semantic prosody reported in Chapter 1 would suggest that 
if the meaning in question is not concealed in some way, then it cannot be 
classifi ed as a prosody. 
Why this should be so, however, is not clear. The only implied argument 
in support of it is a circular one. Why is semantic prosody hidden, covert, 
not visible to the naked eye? Well, because if it weren’t hidden, it wouldn’t 
be semantic prosody. The point is crucial, precisely because this supposedly 
hidden quality has been presented as being so fundamental. If it could be 
established that all lexical items are equal as regards their potential associa-
tion with prosodies, and that prosodies are not necessarily hidden, then it 
might emerge, in studies on semantic prosody so far, that some items are 
more equal than others.
2.3 SUMMARY
It was emphasised in Chapter 1 that the term ‘semantic prosody’ has been 
adopted in the literature in connection with a number of different phenom-
ena, and certainly semantic prosody as a concept has been assigned a broad 
range of characteristics. This chapter has tried to identify those character-
istics which would appear to be common to all descriptions of semantic 
prosody. It is claimed that two features are almost always mentioned by 
scholars: (i) its attitudinal function and (ii) its hidden quality. 
However, even with regard to these two features, signifi cant differences 
emerge. A number of authors defi ne the attitudinal function of semantic 
prosody in connotative terms, but the attribute of secondary meaning so 
often ascribed to connotation confl icts with the notion promoted by other 
scholars that semantic prosody has a central, pivotal role within the unit of 
meaning. In the same way, for most scholars the supposedly hidden qual-
ity of semantic prosody is so crucial that it actually constitutes part of the 
defi nition of this concept, while for other scholars this is not the case.
Furthermore, I have argued (i) that semantic prosody is not always char-
acterised by attitudinal function—in some of the examples of semantic 
prosody provided in the literature there is no obvious expression of attitude, 
and (ii) that it is not suffi ciently clear why semantic prosody needs to be 
regarded as hidden anyway. It could be contested that words such as SELF-
IMPORTANT, where the negative evaluation is more transparent, are as 
much a candidate for semantic prosody as COMMIT and SYMPTOM-
ATIC OF. This raises the question of whether or not all words/expressions 
might qualify for prosodies of some description.
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3 The Diachronic and the Synchronic
Company, villainous company, hath been the spoil of me
3.0 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 examined two features which seem to be common to almost 
all descriptions of semantic prosody, although some points of contrast 
emerged. In this and the following chapter the focus will be on differ-
ences rather than similarities, i.e., features which are present in some 
accounts but which are absent or at least given much less emphasis in 
others. The current chapter deals with semantic prosody in connection 
with diachronic and synchronic aspects. Of critical importance in this 
context is the nature of the ‘unit’ with which semantic prosody is fre-
quently associated.
3.1 SEMANTIC PROSODY: DIACHRONIC ASPECTS
1
 
Most defi nitions and descriptions of semantic prosody, be they detailed 
accounts or just passing references, embrace the idea that prosodic mean-
ing is somehow attached or transferred to an item, the process of attach-
ment/transfer usually being expressed in metaphorical terms. It will be 
argued later that the process described rests squarely upon diachronic 
assumptions.
3.1.1 Semantic Prosody is Attached Meaning 
The notion that semantic prosody attaches itself to a word is a common 
one, and is expressed by a broad range of metaphors in the literature (these 
are italicised in this and in the following section). Hunston and Thomp-
son, in their ‘Editors’ Introduction’ to Channell (1999:38) state that “a 
given word takes on an association with the positive, or, more usually, the 
negative” (see 1.1.7 for the full quotation). The same metaphor is adopted 
by Hunston (2002:141—see again 1.1.7), and by Tribble (2000:86), who 
asserts that “the local semantic prosody of ‘experience’ in PP results from 
the predominant association it takes on in this environment” (as noted 
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in 1.2.1, ‘PP’ is a corpus of project proposals submitted to the European 
Union’s PHARE programme). Also to be found is the notion of a word tak-
ing semantic prosody (Ooi 1998:62).
Semantic prosody may not only be ‘taken on’, but also ‘attached’ or 
‘acquired’. Hunston (2002:141) gives SIT THROUGH as an example 
of a lexical item to which semantic prosody may be assigned, remarking 
that “because it is often used with items that indicate something lengthy 
and boring, connotations of boredom tend to attach to the phrasal verb 
itself”, and Coffi n and O’Halloran (2006:91) note that semantic prosody 
attaches to phrases, while Stubbs (1995:51), discussing CAUSE, argues 
that “CAUSE acquires guilt by association. At some point the word itself 
acquires unpleasant connotations”. Also with reference to CAUSE, Bublitz 
(1996:11–12) writes that “constant association (through collocation) of 
CAUSE with clearly unpleasant, negative words could, at some point, result 
in the word itself acquiring unpleasant, negative connotations”. 
The notion of attached or acquired meaning is reinforced by metaphors 
involving auras (Louw 1993:157) and halos (Bublitz 1996:9, 27), which 
might be construed as hovering beatifi cally around the main body of the 
word without being fully integrated (but see 3.4). 
3.1.2 Semantic Prosody is Transferred Meaning
The assumption that meanings are ‘attached’, ‘taken on’, or ‘acquired’ 
would suggest that they have arrived from elsewhere, and there is no doubt 
that the idea of semantic transfer is crucial to a great many descriptions of 
semantic prosody. It is summarised by Bublitz (1996:11) as follows: “We 
know from lexical semantics that constantly using a word in the same kind 
of context can eventually lead to a shift in its meaning: the word adopts 
semantic features from an adjacent item”. The “shift” mentioned by Bublitz 
is sometimes considered to be the result of infection. Ullmann (quoted by 
Louw 1993:159) recalls Bréal’s (1897) notion of contagion:
Habitual collocations may permanently affect the meaning of the terms 
involved; by a process known since Bréal as ‘contagion’, the sense of 
one word may be transferred to another simply because they occur 
together in many contexts.
(Ullmann 1962:185)
Ullmann (ibid.) then provides an example of this:
Among its widespread ramifi cations, Latin ‘persona’ has become a 
negative particle in French. This change is due to purely linguistic rea-
sons: contiguity with the negative particle ne has ‘infected’ this word, 
in the same way as rem, passim, punctum, by a process which Bréal has 
termed ‘contagion’.
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Louw (1993:159) goes along with this, adding that “‘contagion’ is a gen-
eral linguistic phenomenon which pervades every type of language”, and 
adds later (ibid.:164) that “prosodies are undoubtedly the product of a long 
period of refi nement through historical change” (see also Louw 2005, Sec-
tion 2). Sinclair (1996b:101) alludes briefl y to the idea that words adopt 
“some of the meaning of their surroundings through contagion”, and we 
have seen (1.1.9) that according to Partington (1998:76), “the more fre-
quently green collocates with fundamentalist the more tainted the former 
is likely to become”.
In similar vein, Bublitz (1996:11) refers to Leech’s (1981:16) observa-
tion that the meaning of items co–occurring with any given word rubs off 
on that word, creating what Leech calls refl ected meaning, while various 
authors refer to the notion of the colouring of a word, for example McEn-
ery, Xiao and Tono (2006:84):
As the Chinese saying goes, ‘he who stays near vermilion gets stained 
red, and he who stays near ink gets stained black’—one takes on the 
colour of one’s company—the consequence of a word frequently keep-
ing ‘bad company’ is that the use of a word alone may become enough 
to indicate something unfavourable.
Adolphs and Carter (2002:11) observe that “semantic prosodies are also an 
aspect of ‘shading’ or ‘colouring’ in discourse” (see also Adolphs 2006:10, 
69), while according to Munday (forthcoming), a semantically neutral form 
can be affected by co–occurrences “that give it a particular hue”. Chromatic 
metaphors are also present in Louw (1993:158–159), Bublitz (1996:9) and 
Tribble (2000:88). Further, Louw (ibid.) takes the view that forms can be 
imbued by their collocates, while Hunston (2001:20–21) states that Louw 
uses the term semantic prosody “to indicate a meaning which accords to a 
word because of the environment in which it is usually found”.
Finally, the element of transfer is also attendant upon Sinclair’s (1996b:115) 
reference to a “spillover of meaning” between words. Further recurrent met-
aphors in the literature are those of semantic prosody being carried (e.g., 
Tognini-Bonelli 2001:111, Cotterill 2001:296, Schmitt and Carter 2004:8, 
Adolphs 2006:57) or held (Baker 2006:107) by a word or phrase.
3.1.3 Transferable Meaning
Thus according to the metaphors we fi nd in the literature, prosodic mean-
ing may be attached, be taken on, be taken, be acquired, be accorded, be 
carried or be held; it may imbue, colour, taint, rub off, be refl ected or spill 
over; further, prosodic meaning is an aura, a halo, a shade or a hue, and is 
the result of infection or contagion. Most of these—whether this is stated 
explicitly or simply implied—suggest a shift of meaning during the course of 
time from one word to another. It is also worth noting that even in passing 
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references to semantic prosody, i.e., where the concept is briefl y defi ned but 
not examined or discussed, the positioning of semantic prosody within a 
diachronic framework may be taken for granted. Scott and Thompson, in 
their ‘Editors’ Introduction’ to Hunston (2001:13–14), write the following: 
“Another key concept . . . is that of semantic prosody: the fact that certain 
words and phrases have become associated, through repeated use, with 
negative or positive contexts”. 
Whitsitt (2005:288–293) was the fi rst to note, in the context of seman-
tic prosody, the substantial number of metaphors implying a transfer of 
something from one form to another, usually over an unspecifi ed period 
of time. This ‘something’, he underlines, is in metaphorical terms often 
either liquid or infection (though the combination imbue/aura also has 
something of the spiritual), whereas in non-metaphorical terms, what is 
transferred must be meaning. 
The diachronic considerations suggested by the metaphors discussed 
are stated explicitly in certain contributions. Bublitz (1996:12), discussing 
Stubbs’ (1995:50) hypothesis that the lemma CAUSE, owing to increasing 
co-occurrence with predominantly unpleasant company, has developed a 
much more negative meaning than it once had, stresses the need to verify 
this in earlier and present-day texts, i.e., to investigate whether or not the 
unfavourable co-occurrences of CAUSE have in fact increased over the 
decades/centuries (see 1.1.3).
In other words, if we were to go back in time and establish that, for 
instance, in nineteenth-century English CAUSE did not have negative 
meaning and did not co-occur with prevalently unpleasant company, then 
the diachronic argument would benefi t from some important empirical 
support. Frustratingly—inasmuch as the metaphors discussed privilege dia-
chronic rather than synchronic aspects—in the literature such support is 
conspicuous by its absence. Stubbs (1995:50) remarks that more systematic 
diachronic data might be able to shed some light on the issue, but takes 
this no further. Whitsitt (2005:302, note 9), however, goes on to argue that 
even if there were such empirical evidence this would perforce prove incon-
clusive, i.e., even if one were able to establish that CAUSE, at an earlier 
stage of language, used to have a meaning which was neither particularly 
good nor bad, then co-occurred frequently with bad company, and, at a 
later état du langue, developed an unpleasant meaning, this would still not 
constitute proof that a transfer of meaning had taken place from one form 
to another. It is thus claimed that the hypothesis is unprovable.
It should be emphasised that Whitsitt’s objections do not contest the 
idea that the meanings of words are subject to gradual change—the word 
gay is a topical example, since its meaning has altered relatively recently. 
Nor—as far as I understand—does he take issue with the idea that the 
typical co-text of a word will change as the word’s meaning changes—it 
can safely be assumed that the habitual co-text of gay is now markedly 
different by comparison with 50 years ago. But the implication in a great 
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many descriptions of semantic prosody seems to be that alterations in the 
co-text took place fi rst, and that these subsequently affected the meaning 
of the word—something which raises the contentious question of why the 
alterations in a word’s co-text came about at all. (Note that this kind of 
unidirectional meaning transfer is not necessarily implied when we think 
of the semantic evolution of gay: the meaning of this word has changed, its 
typical co-text has changed. But this does not mean that the co-text must 
have changed fi rst, i.e., that the modern meaning of gay was ‘received’ from 
its habitual co-text.) 
The process of meaning transfer as presented in descriptions of seman-
tic prosody tends to imply that a word such as UTTERLY, which com-
monly qualifi es unpleasant-sounding adjectives and adverbs (see Louw 
1993:160–161—in the corpus used by Louw these include arid, confused, 
demolished, insensible, meaningless, ridiculous, terrifi ed, unreasonable, 
unsympathetic), was infected by its unpleasant environment but apparently 
did not return the compliment. Now although theories of language change 
tell us that words interact constantly and reciprocally over time, the notion 
that UTTERLY might originally have been one of the bad guys, gradually 
transmitting turpitude to its habitual co-occurrences, does not appear to 
be contemplated in explanations of semantic prosody (see again Whitsitt 
2005:295–296).
Hunston (2007:266) provides some important insights on the issue of 
the ‘transfer’ of attitudinal meaning from one context to another. With 
reference to Teubert (2003—but see also Teubert 2007), she points out that 
arguably meaning does not exist except in context, in which case it would 
seem illogical to postulate that a word can transfer its meaning from one 
context to another. It would be suffi cient to say, the author continues, that a 
word such as CAUSE often appears in contexts of unfavourable situations 
but not always. At the same time, Hunston reminds us that even if meaning 
may not be transferable from one text to another, there are “resonances of 
intertextuality”, which enable us, for instance, to interpret cause a fi re dif-
ferently from light a fi re. Along similar lines, Hoey (2005:23), commenting 
on Whitsitt’s observations, writes that 
the difference is not as great as Whitsitt thinks between saying that 
cause (for example) is negative because its collocates are character-
istically negative (a position which Whitsitt correctly identifi es as 
unsustainable) and saying that because the co-texts of cause are char-
acteristically negative we may interpret negatively those co-texts that 
are on the face of it neutral.
Hunston (2007:266) sums up the situation as follows:
The dilemma, then, is that the notion of ‘transferring’ attitudinal 
meaning from the majority of instances to a single instance sometimes 
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works very well in explaining interpretations of that single instance. 
In other cases it is irrelevant. To say that a word cannot possibly carry 
an attitudinal meaning from one context to another is to deny an ex-
planation of much implied meaning. On the other hand, to argue that 
this necessarily happens always, just because it clearly often happens, 
is equally misleading.
Interestingly, diachronic considerations in the literature on semantic pros-
ody very often rest upon the notion that SET IN, UTTERLY etc. were once 
semantically neutral (see 2.2.1), but proved easy prey to the unpleasantness 
of their habitual co-text (crucially, as will be explained in 4.4, other words 
appearing habitually in bad company seem perfectly at ease in that com-
pany, apparently able to resist infection). Notable in this respect is that in 
the vast majority of cases examined, semantic prosody is unpleasant rather 
than pleasant, the result of mixing with bad rather than good company.
3.1.4 The Badge of Lost Innocence
In studies on semantic prosody there are comparatively few lexical items 
for which favourable prosodies have been claimed. These include: DIS-
COVERIES, EXPRESSION, MUTUAL (Stubbs 2001a:107); CAREER, 
LAUNCH (Stubbs 2001b:459); FLEXIBLE (Tognini-Bonelli 2001:21–
24); and a positive ‘polarity’ is claimed for OFF THE BEATEN TRACK 
(Channell 1999:50–51). The overwhelming preponderance of unfavourable 
prosodies is accounted for by Louw (2000:52) in the following way:
In the same way that unrequited love forms most of the subject matter 
for the greatest love poetry in English and not requited love (with the 
superb exception of John Donne’s The Good Morrow), we ought not to 
be surprised to fi nd that contented human beings utter much less than 
discontented ones.
This explanation has a strongly literary feel, and in any case Louw might 
change his mind if he were to meet my strongly non-literary next-door 
neighbour, capable of banging on for hours about the virtues of his gar-
den. However, Louw may well be right. Channell (1999:55), for example, 
recalls that during the writing of the Collins Cobuild English Dictionary, 
“compilers noted more than double the number of negatively loaded words 
to positively loaded ones” (though this may be due to the fact that, as Chan-
nell points out (ibid.), the compilers “were more sensitive to negative items 
because the social consequences of an error with a negative item are much 
greater than those arising from the misuse of a positive item”), while Par-
tington (2004a:133) speculates that “humans have a greater tendency or 
need to communicate to each other the ‘bad things’ which happen in life 
and this could be refl ected in texts”.
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Be that as it may, what is especially striking in this respect is the notion, 
apparently promoted or at least tacitly accepted by many scholars, that the 
form to which a negative prosody is attributed was originally ‘innocent’ 
or ‘neutral’ but subsequently veered off the straight and narrow path on 
account of its bad company. The whole idea of the morally good or at 
least morally average person falling into bad company seems to be irresist-
ibly alluring and has something of the folkloristic about it, being a staple 
ingredient, for example, of stories and fairy tales (Oliver Twist, Pinocchio, 
Snow White, Hansel and Gretel etc.). Whitsitt (2005:292) relates this to 
“an organising myth, as old as it is tritely formulaic, of the fall from inno-
cence into a world of bad company”.
Perhaps it is this, along with the tantalising notion that these cor-
rupted forms (e.g., UTTERLY, SET IN), now irreversibly contaminated, 
will, vampire-like, go out into the world and taint other innocent parties 
(through usage such as utterly perfect, or their marriage has set in), which 
explains the prioritising of ‘bad’ semantic prosodies. While the triumph of 
good over bad is edifying, à la Beauty and the Beast (Belle’s beauty and 
goodness remain untainted by the Beast, whom she actually manages to 
‘reform’), it is Dracula that captures the imagination.
It may be for this reason that the opposite scenario, i.e., the notion of 
‘bad’ or ‘neutral’ forms being morally improved by good company has 
aroused little interest. That is, the idea that a form such as PROVIDE, 
considered to be characterised by a ‘good’ prosody, was originally ‘bad’ 
or ‘neutral’, but subsequently improved after mixing with morally decent 
co-occurrences, (services, assistance, comfort) is never pursued. Nor is the 
idea that the now reformed PROVIDE could then ‘spread the word’ (see 
3.3.2 on the notion of ‘spreading’) and edify others, exerting a good infl u-
ence on its bad co-occurrences.
The diachronic dimension is clearly important and extremely recurrent 
in descriptions of semantic prosody, though one might argue that it is never 
entirely central. Most of the authors cited in this chapter make only passing 
references to diachronic aspects, since their interests lie elsewhere—Louw, 
for example, is concerned with the subliminal role of semantic prosody and 
with irony; Stubbs is concerned with its functional role in discourse. Indeed 
discussions of semantic prosody are as a rule synchronic in nature. What 
is striking, however, is that notwithstanding a prevalently synchronic ori-
entation in terms of the way the analyses are carried out (using synchronic 
corpora), the defi nitions and descriptions of semantic prosody provided 
by authors are often couched in terms which are primarily diachronic. A 
cursory look back at the explanations given in the metaphorical terms of 
attaching, acquiring, imbuing etc. reveals that these are almost all framed 
in diachronic terms, but diachronic analyses of the topic are entirely absent 
in the literature.
This seems to me a theoretical discrepancy and one which is potentially 
disorienting for the reader in search of information on the subject. Whitsitt 
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(2005:287–288) goes so far as to claim that this discrepancy alone would 
be enough to dismiss the concept of semantic prosody as presented by cer-
tain scholars. But let us turn now to other descriptions where this confl a-
tion of diachronic and synchronic elements is not present.
3.2 SEMANTIC PROSODY: SYNCHRONIC ASPECTS
It was noted in 1.1.4 that Sinclair defi nes semantic prosody in pragmatic, 
functional terms, emphasising its quality (i) as a central, obligatory con-
stituent of the unit of meaning, and (ii) its importance for theories of the 
co-selection of elements within that unit of meaning. Sinclair does not, how-
ever, defi ne semantic prosody in diachronic terms. Certainly he makes the 
occasional reference to diachronic factors, notably in Sinclair 1996b (101), 
where he refers to Louw (1993), noting that “left to themselves, the mean-
ings of words change by their frequent association with other words”. And 
later in the same article (Sinclair 1996b:113), it is observed that “through 
the brutal clash of usage over the centuries, words have moved in meaning, 
and units of meaning have been forged consisting of more than one word”. 
Yet he is also careful to point out that even if some of the processes of 
semantic change may seem obvious, “in a synchronic view of language, the 
origins of meaning are not under scrutiny” (ibid.:113).
Tognini-Bonelli (2001) operates very much within Sinclair’s framework, 
offering a number of interesting examples of extended units of mean-
ing, both in English and Italian. Although the author seems happy with 
Louw’s defi nition of semantic prosody (Tognini-Bonelli 2001:111–112), her 
approach to semantic prosody and her examples of the extended unit of 
meaning in general (2001: passim) are entirely synchronic in nature. 
As previously pointed out, almost all analyses of semantic prosody are in 
fact synchronic. Nevertheless, the notion of the ‘unit’ within which seman-
tic prosody operates has been delineated in terms which seem to combine 
the synchronic and the diachronic.
3.3 DIACHRONIC AND SYNCHRONIC 
CONSIDERATIONS IN DESCRIPTIONS OF THE ‘UNIT’
So far in this book several references have been made to Sinclair’s unit of 
meaning. The notion of the ‘unit’, whether it be of meaning, of language 
or of discourse, is another recurrent feature in descriptions of semantic 
prosody. One has the impression, however, that it means different things to 
different scholars, and that its interpretation is contingent upon how much 
weight individual scholars give to diachronic and/or synchronic aspects.
In Chapter 1 it was noted that the term ‘semantic prosody’ achieved cur-
rency in Louw (1993), on the basis of a parallel with Firth’s discussions of 
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prosody in phonological terms, and in particular the way sounds transcend 
segmental boundaries (see also Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1996:154–155 on 
the relevance of phonological prosody to semantic prosody). Firth’s prosodic 
approach, which essentially rejected the phoneme as an adequate basis for 
phonological analysis, was, in the words of Palmer (1968:8), “not confi ned 
to the narrow segments of the phoneme but might extend beyond those seg-
ments to parts of the syllable, the word, or even the ‘longer piece’”. As exem-
plifi ed in Chapter 1, the realisation of the phoneme /k/ is contingent upon the 
sounds which immediately precede and follow it. Thus the /k/ of kangaroo, 
for example, is different from the /k/ of keep, because during the realisation of 
the /k/ the mouth is already preparing for the production of the next sound. 
Therefore the articulation of the /k/ of kangaroo prepares for the production 
of /æ/ rather than /i:/ or any other sound, by a process of “phonological colour-
ing” (Louw 1993:158). This process has been applied by analogy to the area 
of lexical semantics: a word such as UTTERLY, because it habitually appears 
in bad company, prepares the reader/hearer for something unpleasant. Louw 
(ibid.:158–159) adopts this analogy as the basis for his discussion of how the 
meanings of words can be infl uenced by their co-text:
The nasal prosody in the word Amen would be an example: we fi nd 
that the vowels are imbued with a nasal quality because of their prox-
imity to the nasals m and n. In the same way, the habitual collocates 
of the form set in are capable of colouring it, so that it can no longer 
be seen in isolation from its semantic prosody, which is established 
through the semantic consistency of its subjects.
This analogy is refuted by Whitsitt (2005:291):
One can easily see that as long as the vowels appear in the word Amen, 
they will surely be imbued by a nasal sound. But what happens when 
these same vowels appear with other consonants which do not have a na-
sal sound? Will the vowels still be coloured by a nasal sound? Or will the 
vowels, once they have been coloured by nasal sounds, only appear with 
nasal sounding consonants? Clearly the answer to both these questions 
is no. The vowels do not get permanently coloured with a nasal sound. 
This, however, is precisely what Louw claims for semantic prosody.
Moreover, for the analogy to hold, /m/ and /n/ would have to be regarded 
as “habitual collocates” of the vowels in question, in the way that, for 
example, rot and cancer are collocates of the phrasal verb SET IN. Now 
whereas one can accept that rot and cancer co-occur with SET IN more 
frequently than most other words do, it is by no means so easy to accept 
that /m/ and /n/ co-occur with the vowels of Amen more frequently than 
most other sounds do. Consonants such as /p/, /s/, /t/ would appear to be 
equally strong candidates.
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The phonological colouring referred to by Louw is perhaps best described 
synchronically: the production of /k/ may vary according to the sounds 
which precede and follow it, but there would be no need to suggest that /k/ 
undergoes any sort of change in pronunciation over a period of time. Of 
course sounds do change over time (compare the /k/ of Latin caelum which 
has evolved to the /ʧ/ of Italian cielo), but this does not seem relevant to the 
analogy provided, precisely because it is untenable to posit that the vowels 
of Amen get permanently coloured with a nasal sound. Conversely, when 
the argument is switched to lexical semantics, the idea that the habitual 
co-occurrences of SET IN are “capable of colouring it” perhaps makes 
sense only if considered from a primarily diachronic point of view, because 
the process of semantic colouring, as described by Louw, is a gradual one 
which over time would alter the meaning of SET IN.
These observations seem to me particularly important because the infl u-
ence of Louw’s article upon subsequent contributions has been prodigious. 
From the author’s parallel between phonological/semantic phenomena and 
from the process of the transcending of segmental boundaries has emerged 
the notion that semantic prosody is a feature which extends over a unit or 
units (my italics here and in the quotations which follow), and here too meta-
phors are recurrent. Bublitz (1996:9) affi rms that “with prosody we refer to 
the fact that a feature extends its domain, stretches over and affects several 
units”, something which (ibid.:9) “accords with Firth’s idea that meaning is 
regularly dispersed in context”. We have seen that Stubbs (2001a:65) defi nes 
‘discourse prosody’ as “a feature which extends over more than one unit in 
a linear string”, and that Partington (2004a:131–132) defi nes semantic pros-
ody as a type of evaluative meaning which is “spread over a unit of language 
which potentially goes well beyond the single orthographic word”. Accord-
ing to Munday (forthcoming), semantic prosody is “about the way that sense 
and connotation spread surreptitiously across collocates or from the typical 
surrounding co-text”. Also worth noting is Sinclair’s (2003:117) observation 
that semantic prosody “typically ranges over combinations of words in an 
utterance rather than being attached just to one”. 
It thus emerges that semantic prosody is a phenomenon/feature/meaning 
which extends/stretches/ranges/is spread/is dispersed either (i) over / across 
a(n extended) unit of meaning/unit of language/discourse unit, or (ii) over/
across more than one unit/several units. 
This raises two questions: fi rstly, what is the nature of the unit(s) being 
discussed, and secondly what exactly is intended by the metaphors of 
stretching, spreading etc.?
3.3.1 The Nature of the Unit
From the above the resulting impression is that the ‘unit’ in question has 
different interpretations. Particularly noticeable is the confl ict between 
‘unit’ singular and ‘units’ plural: sometimes the unit appears to comprise a 
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single word, sometimes it represents a longer sequence, perhaps correspond-
ing more closely to the sequences variously described in the literature as 
chunks, as multi-word items or as multi-word units (see Schmitt and Carter 
2004:2–3, as well as Pawley and Syder 1983, Moon 1998, Hunston and 
Francis 1999:7–8, Wray 2002). As noted in 1.1.4, Sinclair’s unit of meaning 
is certainly a longer sequence (see also Tognini-Bonelli (2002:76–79) for a 
summary of this), but the idea of semantic prosody extending across sev-
eral units, or across more than one unit (see the quotations in the previous 
section), is distracting. Presumably these units correspond to something 
smaller than what Sinclair had in mind—in Bublitz, for example, there is 
an implied equivalence between units and words: after describing semantic 
prosody as a phenomenon which stretches over several units, the author 
adds (1996:9): “Thus, meaning resides not in a word but several words”. 
It should also be noted that semantic prosody has been associated not 
only with units of meaning (very occasionally in the literature one even 
receives the impression that semantic prosody itself is a unit, e.g. Dam-
Jensen and Zethsen 2008:206), but also with units of discourse and units 
of language, something which again raises the question of just how exten-
sive this unit is, and thus how far semantic prosody can ‘stretch’. As Stubbs 
(2001b:460) points out, we need to know how to identify the boundaries of 
‘units’ in texts, and how to defi ne them as units in the vocabulary. In this 
chapter, however, my interest is in the notion of stretching, or extending 
over units, in relation to the diachronic/synchronic issue.
3.3.2 Spreading and Stretching: A Diachronic 
or Synchronic Phenomenon? 
The fi rst part of this chapter discussed the overlapping metaphors of attach-
ment (taking on, acquiring, attaching etc.) and transfer (infection, conta-
gion, staining, spilling over) commonly used to describe semantic prosody. 
The overlap is created by the common element of the movement of some-
thing from A to B, be it by acquisition or infection, and in the context of 
semantic prosody these metaphors are intended to represent the movement 
of meaning from one word to another. These are perforce to be construed 
as having diachronic relevance, i.e., such transfers of meaning presumably 
take place over a period of time.
However, with the metaphors referred to in the previous section—those 
of spreading, stretching, extending and ranging (over a unit or units)—
the diachronic/synchronic question is less clear. Although they too, like 
the metaphors of attachment and transfer, would seem to entail in some 
way the idea of movement, and more specifi cally the movement of mean-
ing, they are perhaps to be interpreted in a different way. It would per-
haps make more sense to give these a synchronic reading, i.e., representing 
the idea that semantic prosody is distributed over, or better, characterises 
or belongs to a unit of meaning/language/discourse, with no particular 
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emphasis on the idea of movement. With this reading there would be no 
need to posit the idea of words changing meaning over time, or of meanings 
shifting or being passed on from one word to another. Thus when Stubbs 
(2001a:65) talks of “a feature which extends over more than one unit in 
a linear string”, this would be interpreted as a feature which characterises 
a group of elements rather than a single element, and the metaphors of 
extending, spreading etc. would sit happily with the general observation 
that “meaning can be said to belong to whole phrases rather than single 
words” (Hunston 2002:142). The diachronic question would be another; it 
would lie upon a different axis.
To some readers this might seem self-evident, but establishing the presence 
or absence of the notion of movement is essential to the understanding of these 
metaphors. If one has the patience to check the defi nitions of the verbs spread, 
stretch, extend and range in dictionaries, one fi nds that the element of move-
ment or shifting, so crucial to the diachronic interpretation, may be either 
present or absent. Spreading, stretching, extending or ranging over something 
may be read as ‘occupying’ or ‘being distributed over’ the area of that some-
thing, with no particular suggestion of movement. But they can also corre-
spond to the idea of ‘gradually moving over something’, both spatially and, 
intriguingly, temporally—data in the Collins Cobuild Advanced Dictionary 
tell us that people or things can spread, stretch, extend or range both (i) over 
an area—whether this means occupying an area (‘an artifi cial reef stretching 
the length of the coast’ (Cobuild 2009:1548)) or moving around that area 
(‘if something spreads or is spread by people, it gradually reaches or affects a 
larger and larger area or more and more people’ (Cobuild 2009:1514)), and 
(ii) over a period of time (‘if an event or activity extends over a period of time, 
it continues for that time’ (Cobuild 2009:548)).
For a more concrete illustration of this let us extract relevant meanings 
and examples of the entry spread in the Cobuild (2009:1514):
Meaning 5: If something spreads or is spread by people, it gradually 
reaches or affects a larger and larger area or more and more people. 
The industrial revolution which started a couple of hundred years ago 
in Europe is now spreading across the world. . . . the sense of fear 
spreading in residential neighbourhoods . . . He was fed-up with the 
lies being spread about him.
Meaning 6: If something such as liquid, gas or smoke spreads or is 
spread, it moves outwards in all directions so that it covers a large area. 
Fire spread rapidly after a chemical truck exploded . . . A dark red 
stain was spreading across his shirt.
Meaning 7: If you spread something over a period of time, it takes place 
regularly or continuously over that period, rather than happening at 
one time. There seems to be little difference whether you eat all your 
calorie allowance in one go, or spread it over the day.
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Meaning 5 suggests greater and greater extension over an area, and thus 
the notions of both ‘occupying’ and ‘moving’; meaning 6 involves the idea 
of ‘moving outwards’; meaning 7 suggests greater and greater extension 
over time.
Why is it important to distinguish the meanings of ‘occupying’ and ‘mov-
ing’ within the framework of descriptions of semantic prosody? I shall try 
to answer this question by examining extracts from a specifi c description, 
that of Partington (2004a:131–132). The author tells us that semantic pros-
ody is “spread over a unit of language which potentially goes well beyond 
the single orthographic word” and that (1998:68) “the term ‘prosody’ is 
borrowed from Firth (1957), who uses it to refer to phonological colouring 
which spreads beyond segmental boundaries. Semantic prosody refers to 
the spreading of connotational colouring beyond single word boundaries”. 
These observations, if one considers the nature of Partington’s work in 
general, are probably synchronic in nature, i.e., the idea is that semantic 
prosody belongs to or is distributed over a unit of language. However, it 
would be unsurprising if readers attempting to garner information about 
semantic prosody were not to appreciate this immediately. This is in part 
because the notion of spreading recalls precisely those metaphors adopted 
to describe diachronic phenomena. Firstly, as the Cobuild defi nitions con-
vey, ‘spreading’ can describe a gradual movement or transfer of something 
from A to B over a period of time; secondly, things that spread spatially are 
typically liquid, gas or smoke, for example, stains spreading across shirts. 
Each of these call to mind the metaphors of imbuing, colouring and rubbing 
off privileged by diachronic considerations. Further, although the Cobuild 
entry makes no mention of this, the notion of ‘spreading’ is often associated 
with infection and contagion (SPREAD as verb or noun co-occurs 73 times 
(span 6:6) with infection/infections in the BNC), further metaphors recur-
rent along the diachronic axis. Indeed Partington’s remark about words 
‘tainting’ each other (3.1.2) must be diachronic in nature.
This is not to imply that the use of such metaphors is always ambigu-
ous in works on semantic prosody. When Sinclair (2003:117) writes that 
semantic prosody “typically ranges over combinations of words”, the risk 
of ambiguity is practically absent because the author’s unit of meaning, so 
central to his descriptions of semantic prosody, is meticulously explained 
and is placed fi rmly within a synchronic framework. But many descrip-
tions of semantic prosody, as implied earlier in this chapter, hover uneasily 
between the diachronic and the synchronic, with the result that metaphors 
of spreading, extending etc. may not help to clarify the situation.
3.4 METAPHORS IN LANGUAGE DESCRIPTION
In this chapter there has been abundant reference to the consistent presence 
of metaphors in descriptions of semantic prosody. It should be stressed that 
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no general objection is being made here to the use of metaphor in descrip-
tions of language phenomena, of which there is a rich and successful history 
in linguistic theory, or indeed to the pervasiveness of metaphor in general. 
Yet what is so striking in the literature on corpus linguistics is that the 
mere mention of semantic prosody suffi ces to trigger a cluster of metaphori-
cal allusions to auras, imbuing, colouring, contagion, spreading, stretching 
etc., which would themselves appear to be the outcome of some form of 
infectious proliferation, since they are passed on from one contribution to 
the next. So much so that it is something of a rarity to run across descrip-
tions of semantic prosody which do not include such metaphors (Fox 1998, 
for instance, does not include them). 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, most descriptions of semantic prosody in 
the literature are relatively brief, just a short section in works devoted to 
broader themes such as corpora in the classroom, corpora in discourse 
analysis, or corpus linguistics tout court, but some of these brief descrip-
tions are presented almost exclusively in terms of such metaphors, with 
scarce reference to the language phenomenon underlying them. Now while 
it is perfectly true that unexplained metaphors are everywhere in language 
(newspaper articles regarding, for example, sport and fi nance are full of 
them), it should be borne in mind that semantic prosody is a relatively new 
concept and as such requires careful elaboration. Hoey (2005) exploits met-
aphor liberally in his account of lexical priming (nesting, drifting, cracks 
in the priming, as well as priming itself), but ensures that the reader stays 
with him all the way by explicating each of these in turn. His metaphors, I 
believe, fulfi l their function, which is that of clarifi cation. Whether this is 
the case in certain descriptions of semantic prosody is debatable.
3.4.1 Semantic Prosody: A Coat of Many Colours
A central claim in this chapter is that readers confronted with the meta-
phors of infection and spreading associated with semantic prosody may 
be wrong-footed by them, uncertain as to whether such metaphors are 
intended to denote diachronic or synchronic phenomena, but other exam-
ples of equivocal metaphors could be cited. For instance, we have seen that 
within Sinclair’s framework semantic prosody is absolutely primary and 
central to the unit of meaning, and can represent the reason for making the 
utterance, and that other authors favour the notion of semantic prosody 
as an ‘aura’, ‘halo’, ‘shade’ or ‘hue’ of meaning. To me such metaphors 
suggest that the meaning in question is essentially secondary to the basic 
meaning of a word, and this would be in marked contrast with Sinclair’s 
description. Yet I may have misconstrued the metaphors, and indeed I was 
once pulled up by a corpus linguistics colleague who did not regard ‘aura’ 
as suggesting secondary meaning at all. Hence one could argue that these 
metaphors are ambiguous—and from this derives the intentional ambigu-
ity of the metaphor contained in the title of this paragraph. Is a ‘coat’, i.e., 
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the way one dresses, absolutely central to the understanding of the wearer, 
or is it purely secondary, only partly connected with the wearer’s principal 
character traits?
3.5 DIACHRONY AND SYNCHRONY: 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It seems important to keep diachronic and synchronic considerations sepa-
rate, though of course semantic prosody may legitimately be approached 
along either of the two axes. Within a synchronic framework, the Firthian 
notion of the crossing of segmental boundaries provides a springboard for 
the hypothesis that meaning is distributed across units or groups of words 
rather than in single words. A diachronic approach, on the other hand, 
could try to establish how the meaning of the unit changes over the years 
or centuries, or it could investigate how words bestow meanings upon each 
other over time within that unit. An undeclared confl ation of the two is per-
haps best avoided, as is the widespread method of briefl y introducing and 
defi ning semantic prosody as the result of a diachronic phenomenon, and 
then actually analyzing it in synchronic terms with synchronic corpora.
3.6 SUMMARY
The main claim in this chapter is that in the literature the concept of seman-
tic prosody has been associated with two processes, one diachronic in 
nature, the other synchronic in nature. Sinclair describes semantic prosody 
using synchronic criteria, while most other authors approach the subject 
using both diachronic and synchronic criteria, with scarcely any acknowl-
edgement that a single appellation (semantic prosody) has been adopted to 
denote distinct phenomena. Diachronic explanations tend to have a predi-
lection for metaphorical language, and to favour the folkloristic notion of 
good being contaminated by evil. The corpora used to provide evidence of 
semantic prosody, however, have always been synchronic. 
A confl ation of diachronic and synchronic is manifest in the way some 
authors (for instance Ooi 1998:62, Cotterill 2001:292) take both Louw 
and Sinclair as the main ‘voices’ in the area of semantic prosody, without 
calling attention to the fact that the two scholars have dealt with this topic 
in very different ways. Of critical importance in this context is the nature of 
the ‘unit’, which appears to have been explained within both a synchronic 
and a diachronic framework.
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4 Semantic Prosody and 
Lexical Environment
No word is an island
4.0 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 considered two characteristics of semantic prosody (its evalua-
tive quality and its hidden quality) which would appear to be common to 
all accounts of it. Chapter 3 examined features of relevance to diachrony 
and synchrony whose presence and emphasis vary substantially from one 
contribution to the next. The latter part of Chapter 3 concerned itself 
with the notion of meaning spreading and stretching across a unit or 
units, something which ties in directly with the question of the range of 
action of semantic prosody, i.e., how far can it ‘stretch’ and how large 
is the unit in question? With this in mind, in the current chapter I shall 
identify a further difference among studies on semantic prosody—the 
question of whether it characterises a longer sequence such as Sinclair’s 
unit of meaning, or whether it belongs to a unit which is no broader than 
the word.
4.1 LEXICAL ENVIRONMENT
Arguably the most compelling argument in favour of semantic prosody as 
presented in the literature is its powerful dependence upon lexical environ-
ment. As we have seen, the striking aspect of the lexical surrounds of, for 
instance, SET IN and BREAK OUT is the undesirable nature of the vast 
majority of their (grammatical) subjects, and this is why these two verbs 
are considered to be associated with unpleasant prosodies. The prosody of 
‘reluctance’ assigned to the unit of meaning containing TRUE FEELINGS 
is directly contingent upon its habitual co-occurrence with expressions such 
as will never reveal, prevents me from expressing, less open about showing 
(Sinclair 1996a:89). It might be argued that no other discourse phenom-
enon hinges so critically on the immediate lexical environment. Louw is 
well aware of the importance of this characteristic as a determiner of the 
distinctness of semantic prosody, and in particular as a way of differentiat-
ing it from connotation (see also 2.1.2):
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They [semantic prosodies] relate more directly to what literary critics 
call authorial tone and are supported by a series of collocates such as 
those mentioned earlier in Stubbs’ analysis of cause. These are suf-
fi ciently monolithic ally negative for the introduction of a positive col-
locate, e.g. joy, to make a powerful adjustment to the tone: it becomes 
ironic if the choice of joy was deliberate or insincere if it was inadver-
tent. The force behind SPs is more strongly collocational than the sche-
matic aspects of connotation. Most SPs accumulate and concentrate 
their power within the nine-word window of acknowledged colloca-
tional force [my italics].
(Louw 2000:50)
The argument is a persuasive one (even if, as mentioned in 2.1.3, one might 
have reservations about the use of the term ‘tone’); indeed it may be semantic 
prosody’s major selling-point. However, if we wish to contend that seman-
tic prosody is crucially dependent upon habitual lexical environment, then 
we need to defi ne the nature of this dependence, and in order to do that 
we need in turn to examine exactly where item, habitual environment and 
semantic prosody stand in relation to each other.
4.2 THE LINK BETWEEN SEMANTIC PROSODY 
AND HABITUAL LEXICAL ENVIRONMENT
The main issue to be addressed here is whether semantic prosody is a feature 
of (i) the word alone, or (ii) word + co-text, i.e., the broader environment. 
(As pointed out in 1.1.4, I use respectively ‘word’ and ‘unit of meaning’ to 
distinguish the two.) I wish to consider these two alternatives by starting 
from some formulations typically used to describe semantic prosody in the 
literature.
Let us begin with the fi rst alternative: that semantic prosody is a feature 
of the word alone. Consider the phrasing used in the following:
“• utterly has an overwhelmingly bad prosody” (Louw 1993:160)
“• affect has a clearly negative prosody” (Stubbs 1995:45)
“the lemma • cause has a strongly unfavourable prosody . . . the word provide, 
on the other hand, had a favourable prosody in the Cobuild corpus material” 
(Partington 1998:68)
“we know that the English equivalent of • forårsage, namely cause, has an over-
whelmingly negative prosody” (Dam-Jensen and Zethsen 2007:1618)
“The negative semantic prosody of • cause has been widely observed”
 (Xiao and McEnery 2006:114)
Stewart 6th pages.indd   57 8/11/2009   9:03:10 AM
58 Semantic Prosody
T&F Proofs: Not For Distribution
Cotterill (2001) refers to “the SP of a word” (291) and to “the semantic 
prosodies of words” (293), though later (297) she assigns semantic prosody 
to “lexical items”.
Although most of the authors who adopt this type of wording make at 
least some reference to the idea that semantic prosody ‘extends / stretches 
etc. across a unit’ (see 3.3), the way the previous statements are formu-
lated—basically corresponding to ‘word x has a prosody y’—gives the 
impression that semantic prosody belongs to the word alone rather than 
to the word and its co-text, i.e., an unpleasant prosody is a feature of, for 
instance, the word UTTERLY, but not of the phrase utterly disgraceful or 
a longer sequence. Partington (1998:67), commenting upon the lexical envi-
ronment of COMMIT (in the sense of perpetrate, though this is not stated), 
writes: “The unfavourable connotation can be seen to reside not simply in 
the word commit but over a unit consisting of commit and its collocates 
(offences, serious crime, foul etc.)”. However, in the following line we fi nd: 
“Another word [my emphasis] which has an unfavourable semantic prosody 
is the adjective rife”. The reader may be ‘thrown’ by the juxtaposition of 
these two observations because in the fi rst, semantic prosody is projected as 
belonging primarily to a multi-word unit, whereas in the second the formu-
lation adopted suggests that it belongs to the (node) word alone, and indeed 
it has been claimed (Hunston 2007:250) that Partington’s discussion of 
the concept as a whole gives the impression that the latter view is prior-
itised. Contrast Partington’s comments on RIFE with those of Schmitt and 
Carter (2004:8), according to whom “the formulaic sequence in which rife 
is embedded typically has the following structure: SOMETHING UNDE-
SIRABLE is/are rife in LOCATION/TIME”, where the reference is to the 
entire sequence in which RIFE appears rather than to RIFE alone.
The formula ‘word x has a prosody y’ is supported by the assertion in 
McEnery, Xiao and Tono (2006:85) to the effect that that “semantic prefer-
ence can be viewed as a feature of the collocates while semantic prosody is 
a feature of the node word”. 
It is my (probably controversial) view that ‘word x has a prosody y’ 
subtly rests on diachronic assumptions, because in the literature on seman-
tic prosody this formula seems to entail that the meaning of the co-text 
has fi ltered through to the node word—a phenomenon which clearly does 
not happen overnight but over a considerably longer period of time. If we 
are informed—or at least if we receive the impression—that UTTERLY 
(alone) has an unpleasant prosody, if we are told that this word keeps and 
has kept consistently grisly company, and if we are confronted with meta-
phors of infecting, staining, tainting etc., then it may be only natural that 
we establish a connection between all these aspects, even where that con-
nection is not made explicit, and to do that we are forced to posit a trans-
mission of meaning from UTTERLY’s unpleasant company to UTTERLY 
itself. (Unless of course we take the view that UTTERLY has always been 
‘bad’, but in that case there would be no point in introducing the concept of 
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prosody, i.e., we could just as well claim that UTTERLY has always had a 
bad basic meaning, not a bad prosody.) In so doing we also conclude that 
the prosody in question, though described as belonging to the word alone, 
must have its origins in the word’s co-text. 
This would appear to be supported by many of the prosodies identi-
fi ed in the literature, for example, those associated with: BREAK OUT, 
HAPPEN, SET IN, BENT ON, SOMEWHAT, UTTERLY, PROVIDE. 
All these have been assigned pleasant (PROVIDE) or unpleasant (the rest) 
prosodies, but in the actual descriptions of these prosodies barely any men-
tion is made of the meaning of the node word. It is important to underline 
this: these prosodies of (un)pleasantness have been described with reference 
to the semantic traits of the respective co-texts but without any conspicu-
ous reference to the basic meaning of the node itself, which proves to have 
scarcely any relevance to the description of the prosody. 
Now let us turn to the second alternative: that semantic prosody is a fea-
ture of both the node and the co-text. Within this framework a formula, for 
instance, of the type ‘SIT THROUGH has a prosody of frustration’ would 
need to be re-stated as something along the lines of ‘SIT THROUGH is 
often part of a unit of meaning with a prosody of frustration at having to 
sit through something long and boring’, and this type of formulation would 
move closer to that generally privileged by Sinclair, who more than anyone 
else has stressed the role of the unit of meaning. In the course of his analysis 
of TRUE FEELINGS, Sinclair does not make assertions to the effect that 
‘TRUE FEELINGS has a prosody of reluctance-inability’, preferring to 
assert (1996a:90) that this expression 
is the core of a compound lexical item which has the following inherent 
components:
a semantic prosody of reluctance-inability
a semantic preference of expression (and a strong colligation of 
a verb with the semantic preference)
a colligating possessive adjective
the core.
So, not only are our true feelings our genuine emotions, but we use this 
particular collocation when talking about our reluctance to express 
them, even to ourselves. The collocation is almost never used except as 
part of this compound lexical item.
Notice that Sinclair’s formulation (i) clarifi es that the prosody belongs 
not simply to the expression TRUE FEELINGS but to the entire “com-
pound lexical item” in which the expression occurs, and (ii) describes the 
prosody in terms which include both the meaning of the core item (“not only 
are our true feelings . . . ”) and of the co-text (“ . . . about our reluctance to 
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express them”). Elsewhere Sinclair formulates his observations along simi-
lar lines. With reference to HAPPEN as base form, he writes (2003:124) 
that “the main orientation of happen is the prospection of an unfortunate 
event happening; this often goes with expressions of doubt or vagueness”. 
Once again the concept of ‘happening’ is an integral part of the prosody, 
the author does not confi ne himself to stating that HAPPEN has a bad 
prosody. This accords with his view (1996a:87–88) that “semantic prosody 
has a leading role to play in the integration of an item with its surround-
ings” [my italics]. Along the same lines is Sinclair’s analysis (2004:175–176) 
of the unit of meaning containing EFFORTS TO. He explains that we talk 
of ‘efforts to’ do something
when someone appears to be very unlikely to succeed, to be heading 
for failure, or already unsuccessful. In other words, the prosody that 
appears in almost every example is the speaker/writer’s prejudgement 
of the efforts, that they are heading for failure (ibid.:175).
See also Sinclair’s description of the prosody he associates with BUDGE 
in 4.3.1. Tognini-Bonelli (2001, 2002—see her description of PROPER, 
again in 4.3.1) also prefers this type of formulation in describing semantic 
prosody, generally avoiding the formula ‘word x has a prosody y’.
In these cases both node and co-text play a critical role in the description of 
the prosody, which appears to rest primarily upon synchronic assumptions: 
simply, semantic prosody belongs to the entire unit of meaning, and that unit 
is selected by the speaker / writer en bloc on the basis of its global meaning. 
There is no suggestion here of the notion that semantic prosody belongs to 
the node but can be traced back to the co-text, or of the notion that meaning 
has passed during the course of time from the co-text to the node.
Some may take the view that with this identifi cation of two different 
types of description I am simply splitting hairs, because in the end it all 
amounts to the same thing. An initial objection might be that although it is 
true that in the fi rst type (semantic prosody belongs to a word rather than a 
sequence) the prosody derives from the meaning of the co-text and not from 
the meaning of the node word, it is equally true that the co-text is not left 
semantically empty after its meaning has been transferred. For this reason 
the prosody could still be considered a feature of both node and co-text, 
just as it is in the second type.
A second objection could be that my comments on the fi rst formula—
‘word x has a prosody y’—constitute little more than a digression. After 
all, if a given scholar uses this formula, but at the same time specifi es more 
generally that semantic prosody ‘goes beyond’ the node, or ‘extends across’ 
a broader unit, then it could be argued that the formula adopted simply 
represents a convenient abbreviation of a more cumbersome formula such 
as ‘the combination of node x + its co-text has a prosody y’, or ‘the unit of 
meaning containing node x is characterised by a prosody y’. 
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A third possible objection is that it not necessarily the case that scholars 
adopting the formula ‘word x has a prosody y’ state or imply the relevance 
of transfers of meaning over time. Baker (2006:86–120) often uses this for-
mula (e.g. (p.107), “the word day . . . holds a somewhat negative discourse 
prosody for being tired”), but makes no allusion to the idea of a transition 
of meaning from one form to another, though he does surmise the shifting 
of discourses over the years (e.g., p.91).
All this may be true, but if it is, one cannot help feeling that rather 
too much is being asked of the reader, who might struggle to make the 
appropriate distinctions. And the reader is not helped by the fact that, as 
noted in 1.1.4, the term ‘lexical item’ commonly refers both to a single 
word and to a sequence of words. Be that as it may, whether semantic 
prosody is considered to characterise word + co-text or the word alone, 
there are some awkward side effects, which will be dealt with in the sec-
tions which follow.
4.3 SEMANTIC PROSODY AS A 
FEATURE OF WORD + CO-TEXT
4.3.1 PROPER and Company
A genuinely interesting discovery in the fi eld of semantic prosody is that some 
lexical items are associated with prosodies whose meaning is in marked con-
trast with the basic meaning of the node / core item in question. In 2.2.3 
a brief reference was made to the analyses of PROPER by Tognini-Bonelli 
(2001:106–110) and Stubbs (2001a:156–159). In this case corpus data would 
suggest a prosody of what one might call an ‘annoying absence of properness’, 
because PROPER is often part of a unit of meaning which is a “complaint 
for the absence of something that we all think should be present or available” 
(Tognini-Bonelli 2001:110). So PROPER would appear to connect with, curi-
ously, states of affairs which are unsatisfactory or, so to speak, ‘improper’. 
Stubbs (2001a:107) includes another example of this, though he does 
not label it as such. From his data the most frequent co-occurrences of 
the word CREDIBILITY are lost, restore, gap, lack, problem, dam-
aged, lose, undermine. The impression from this is that credibility is 
more often than not impaired or absent, and needs to be regained. From 
this it could be hypothesised that CREDIBILITY typically appears in 
units of meaning involving ‘lack of credibility’, or ‘no credibility’. Also 
of considerable interest in this respect is Sinclair’s (1998:16–22) analysis 
of BUDGE (apparently as base form alone, though this is not stated). He 
provides (p.17) all 31 occurrences of BUDGE from a corpus of 20 mil-
lion words (Table 4.1).
As the author points out (ibid.:16), “it would be diffi cult to fi nd an 
instance of this word which is semantically positive”. In this context 
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‘positive’ is presumably an evaluative epithet (see, however, 5.3.1.2 for a 
discussion of the meanings of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ in studies on seman-
tic prosody), but it is also true that there are consistently non-affi rmative 
structures in the immediate environment of the node: not, words ending in 
-n’t, neither . . . nor, as well as a strong collocation with the verbal lemma 
refuse. As a result Sinclair (ibid.:20) concludes:
We consider why people use this word, why they do not just use the 
common verb move, with which any use of budge can be replaced. 
Something does not budge when it does not move despite attempts 
to move it. From the perspective of the person who wants something 
moved, this is frustrating and irritating, and these emotions may 
fi nd expression, because this is the ‘semantic prosody’ of the use 
of budge.
Table 4.1 Concordance to ‘budge’ in Sinclair 1998
 1. ight be out of his mind and refuse to budge. In that case, the Vice-President
 2. ergencies. But Mr Volcker has yet to budge on changing his controls over domest
 3. off scrubbers’ hands before it would budge. It was rumoured to be make-work to
 4. to do so, but she knew she could not budge me from my view. We spent several v
 5. he recognizes it, he’ll refuse to budge off that stool where he’s sitting n
 6. side, but still the snake will not budge. He keeps banging it on the head wi
 7. away louder than ever. I wouldn’t budge either, or come back, till a boy w
 8. now. We won’t none of us be able to budge tomorrow’. They sat at their tea
 9. blow. The virus fanciers refused to budge. Whatever the diagnosis, my recove
 10. sat in a corner; I determined not to budge from it until closing-time . I also
 11. hen neither death nor ? disease could budge her. She wrote a cheque for more th
 12. it with my shoulder, but it will not  budge. I go to the backdoor. I fi nd that
 13. ng the following months and would not budge —‘What’s done cannot be undone
 14. ooden door of the museum. It didn’t budge. Hastily, I looked round for a bel
 15. another snail near him he refused to budge, even in the mating season. I ofte
 16. me into the dining room, refusing to budge, so that no-one else budged, and s
 17. It was a dismissal. Bonasera did not budge. Finally, sighing, a good-hearted
 18. 9° caliber pezzonovante. You can’t budge him, not even with money. He has b
 19. fternoons when the thermometer won’t budge above minus twenty’. ‘And those
 20. be so heavy that two horses could not budge it even in moist earth. Although Wa
 21. between the duellists and refuse to budge. Often to everyone’s great relief
 22. the coroner himself are gawn’t’ budge on that. In the fi rst place, d
 23. omise up to a point but he refuses to budge on design principles he knows to be
 24. The humanity here just refuses to budge’. ‘That’s ridiculous’, says
 25. out of the packet. When it did not budge he shook it more fi ercely like ‘a t
 26. ed at the doorknobs the doors didn’t budge or even rattle. ‘Oh my God!’
 27. and hesitated. He knew he couldn’t budge Ben Canaan. He walked to the alcove
 28. at they might, the British would not budge from their immigration policy. In m
 29. pressure any delegation. They won’t budge from that position’. ‘What a ti
 30. the wings of the eagle and refused to budge. After three thousand years of wait
 31. tried the idea on him. He wouldn’t budge. He seemed to have already faded aw
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Therefore (ibid.):
we can claim that in the case of the use of budge the user wishes to 
express or report frustration (or a similar emotion) at the refusal or in-
ability of some obstacle to move, despite pressure being applied.
These are invaluable and very precise observations, and we note once again the 
methodology of describing the prosody in terms which include the meaning of 
both node (budge, moved, move) and co-text (refusal, frustration). However, 
in considerably poorer terms one might be justifi ed in translating such observa-
tions into a simpler, and certainly more succinct prosody of ‘refusing to budge’. 
(See Stubbs 2006:25 on the question of reducing the “intricate assumptions” 
of certain prosodies—including the one Sinclair associates with BUDGE—to 
“simple semantic primitives”). If this move is in any way defensible, then we 
are confronted with three analogous cases: PROPER, associated with a pros-
ody of ‘properness/credibility being absent’, CREDIBILITY, associated with 
a prosody of ‘credibility being absent’, and BUDGE, associated with a pros-
ody of ‘refusing to budge’. To these many others could be added. As described 
by Fox (1998:35–36), the expression PLAIN SAILING is used predominantly 
when things are anything but plain sailing (i.e., anything but straightforward). 
Compare also the expression FIT STATE: of the 44 occurrences in the BNC, 
only four or fi ve appear to refer to an actually achieved state of fi tness. 
All this may seem surprising inasmuch as the potential prosodic meaning 
in these cases might be to all intents and purposes the opposite of the basic 
meaning of the core item, but it fi ts seamlessly within the framework of con-
struing semantic prosody as characterising both word and co-text. Note that if 
in these cases we were to privilege the fi rst type of description outlined in 4.2, 
whereby prosodies are described with reference to the meanings of the co-text 
but without any conspicuous reference to the basic meaning of the node itself, 
then these moves would be impossible: PROPER and CREDIBILITY might 
be assigned a prosody of ‘irritating absence’, but not ‘properness/credibility 
being irritatingly absent’, and BUDGE would be assigned a prosody of what 
might loosely be called ‘frustrating refusal’, but not one of ‘frustratingly refus-
ing to budge’.
4.3.2 HARNESS and Company
Let us now examine some words which have not been analysed in studies 
on semantic prosody but which are also of interest in the context of describ-
ing semantic prosody in terms of the meaning of both node and co-text.
The verb HARNESS is defi ned in the Collins Cobuild Advanced Dic-
tionary (2009:724) as follows:
If you harness something such as an emotion or natural source of 
energy, you bring it under your control and use it. Turkey plans to 
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harness the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers for big hydro-
electric power projects.
A BNC concordance to HARNESS as a verb produces 449 occurrences. A 
selection of these is reproduced in Table 4.2 (in lines 15, 21 and 22 the noun 
has been wrongly tagged as a verb).
Table 4.2 constitutes only one sample, but the analysis of several samples 
suggests that somewhere in the region of 70% of the occurrences of HAR-
NESS are present in longer sequences indicating or appearing to indicate 
that the harnessing has yet to be done, or that it may or may not have been 
done. There is a correspondingly smaller percentage of cases where the 
Table 4.2 BNC Concordance to ‘harness/ harnesses/ harnessing/ harnessed’ as 
Verb (Random Selection of 30/449)
 1. of renewable energy must be harnessed in future, our long-standing service
 2. for Orc warriors. They can also be harnessed to pull chariots. Thanks to these
 3. In the former, nuclear power can be harnessed by splitting the nuclei of  atoms that
 4. the multinationals’ power has been harnessed have substantial gains in  income-
 5. of our number, Master Dratslinger, harnesses ghosts by means of vibration. We
 6. away. It was like trying to push a fully harnessed plough horse. Isabel  abandoned
 7. a loft conversion, say. Solar water heating Harnessing the natural radiant energy of
 8. no doubt continue to be inventive in harnessing the insights of teachers  and the
 9. the technique being performed. A kiai harnesses the body’s energy and  allows it to
 10. dependent upon senior management harnessing the social forces of  organization
 11. The snag is—fi rst you must harness the fi sh. However, using a method
 12. provide an effective way of harnessing sentencing policy to the broader
 13. recognized the vital importance of harnessing employee commitment to  company
 14. was recruited and given the task of harnessing the club’s talent. Steve  Lewis, who
 15. with sunscreens. Replace any belt or harness after an accident. GET A  SET OF
 16. dismissed as a kitchen maid, she harnesses her poetry to her teapot. She is an
 17. practice. He says that we should harness the expertise of the various agencies
 18. Walter Lang as its chairman, so harnessing Long’s vindictive powers and
 19. teachers be met and their strengths harnessed within the broader concerns
 20. control and industrial inspection. The system harnesses the power of up to 48
 21. it is being executed. ‘You need a test harness for testing stuff dynamically. That’s
 22. assessments it is possible to write test harnesses that check whether the  program
 23. more philosophical might say that harnessing the power of the elements brings
 24. thinks he ought to be able to harness the lighting,’ said the picture-imp
 25. facing personnel management: the need to harness the ability of the  computer was
 26. be that management should seek to harness the informal organisation to operate
 27. hydro-electric scheme has been developed to harness this great natural  resource.
 28. can use his riding art and physique to harness and master each new step in GP
 29. one director was doing his best to harness the new realism to a more  rewarding
 30. of time and whose power, when harnessed, as now by the poet, renders all
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harnessing has incontestably been carried out. This ratio is supported by 
the Cobuild example quoted previously. 
Unsurprisingly, further investigations reveal that the non-factual use 
is particularly associated with the base form HARNESS which, like 
the base forms of verbs in general, lends itself in particular to repre-
senting states of affairs which have not taken place (see also Hunston 
2002:61), inasmuch as base forms contribute massively to tense forms 
in the future (they’ll harness, are they going to harness?), the condi-
tional (they would(n’t) harness), as well as to negative and interroga-
tive structures in the present and past tenses (do they harness?, they 
didn’t harness). In passing it may be noted that this appears to be a 
general truth about base forms, and may be briefl y illustrated (Table 
4.3) with the concordance to the far less frequent verb SHOEHORN 
(but see also 5.3.1 on the base form of UNDERGO), whose base form 
in the BNC tends to be associated with attempts to shoehorn or the need 
to shoehorn (exceptions are lines 3 and 5). The form SHOEHORNED, 
on the other hand, occurs four times and has a more factual quality 
(Table 4.4).
For the purposes of comparison the reader may also wish to check 
the expression BREAK THE DEADLOCK, initially using all forms of 
BREAK. Of the 70 occurrences in the BNC, by my calculations 37 of them 
are used non-factually and 31 factually, with two cases where the situation 
is less clear. Yet when we analyse the base form alone, the percentage of 
non-factual occurrences is much higher (30 non-factual against 8 factual), 
Table 4.3 BNC Concordance to ‘shoehorn’ (All 7 Occurrences)
 1. day? Heaven forbid, but the urge to shoehorn into the calendar as much  of it as
 2. criminals. The danger with trying to shoehorn the IRA into this cat- egory is that
 3. the high cost was because we had to shoehorn the suite into a diffi cult- shaped
 4. critics’ cavils concerned the attempt to shoehorn a plot around Myers’  modest
 5. Prendergrass, Kaye managed to  shoehorn the material into two CDs,  utilising
 6. be seen, of course, as an attempt to shoehorn information technology  into old
 7. our own, different talents to work, not shoehorn ourselves into men’s  positions.
Table 4.4 BNC Concordance to ‘shoehorned’
 1. elusive enemy of freedom, originally shoehorned into power to guard American
 2. onto the prestigious site, the facility is shoehorned into a very narrow tract, and the
 3. as a mock Tudor shopping arcade, are shoehorned into a tight complex of
 4. rather than the expected two. We shoehorned in the jeep, and the rest of our
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and it may well be that the choice of the base form is driven primarily by 
the (non-factual) prosody. Typical usage includes in an attempt to break the 
deadlock, in an effort to break the deadlock, failed to break the deadlock. 
An analogous case is SHRINK FROM, whose percentage of non-factual 
occurrences as base form in the BNC is vastly more frequent than the per-
centages for SHRINKING FROM, SHRINKS FROM, SHRANK FROM 
and SHRUNK FROM.
In consideration of the above, and in accordance with the approach 
whereby prosodies are described in terms which include both node and co-
text, we might therefore be justifi ed in attributing to the unit of meaning 
containing HARNESS in all its forms—but in particular as base form—a 
description such as ‘desiring or needing to harness’, or more simply of ‘not 
(yet) harnessing/being harnessed’. Equally we might wish to propose for the 
unit of meaning containing the base form SHOEHORN a formula such 
as ‘not (yet) shoehorning/being shoehorned’. And we may be justifi ed in 
attributing to the units of meaning containing FIT STATE and BREAK (as 
base form) THE DEADLOCK descriptions such as ‘not being in a fi t state’ 
or ‘not (yet) breaking a deadlock’.
4.3.3 The Case of MORE FLEXIBLE
If one supports the view that semantic prosody is to be described in terms 
which embrace both node and co-text, but if at the same time one is pre-
pared to accept a number of points raised in Chapter 2, i.e., (i) that not all 
the instances of semantic prosody described in the literature could be said to 
have attitudinal function, (ii) that all units of meaning are potential candi-
dates for semantic prosody, and (iii) that semantic prosody is not necessarily 
hidden, then there is a risk of circularity, or at least of reaching conclusions 
through corpus analysis which were highly predictable from the outset.
Note that the prosodies suggested in the previous section were not 
particularly predictable. The claim that (the base form of) BREAK THE 
DEADLOCK generally appears in units of meaning with a prosody cor-
responding to something like ‘not (yet) breaking a deadlock’ is not a 
statement of the obvious, precisely because positing the element of non-
factuality requires either some earnest introspection or corpus investiga-
tions (though it is argued in Chapter 7 that corpus investigations cannot 
be divorced from introspection). Having said that, there are cases where 
the prosody is totally predictable.
As a fi rst step let us take a look at the lexical profi le of FLEXIBLE repro-
duced by Tognini-Bonelli (2001:23). The author’s concordance data reveal 
that in many cases the lexical environment includes expressions such as keep-
ing future options as fl exible as possible; how fl exible are you prepared to be; 
are simplifi ed and made more fl exible; would enable us to be more fl exible; 
urged the UNITA rebels to be more fl exible; private heads urged to be “fl ex-
ible” on pupil drug use; committee has stressed the need for fl exible planning 
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decisions; Rowell’s plan to develop a fl exible style suited to all conditions. 
Overall the author concludes that several expressions in the lexical pro-
fi le of FLEXIBLE “give a very positive evaluation of fl exibility”, but one 
could go further and posit that her data would also suggest that FLEX-
IBLE tends to occur in units of meaning characterised by a prosody of 
‘needing or desiring fl exibility’, which in its turn would imply a state of 
insuffi cient fl exibility. Having said that, there are other occurrences in the 
concordance reproduced by Tognini-Bonelli where this element of need 
or desire is not particularly manifest, and searches for FLEXIBLE in the 
BNC indicate that although the ‘need / desire’ element is certainly a recur-
ring feature, it is perhaps not salient enough to warrant the positing of a 
prosody. 
However, if we take the expression MORE FLEXIBLE as our node, 
we fi nd that in its co-text the ‘needing / desiring’ element is much more 
pervasive (Table 4.5). Notice co-text such as was needed, with a view to 
developing, there may be, if our society began to move towards, I think 
these could be, is designed to make, he wanted to create, should be, to 
make available, it may be, are becoming. In combination with the node, 
many of these indicate a need, desire or plan for greater fl exibility, and 
there is in any case the suggestion that the fl exibility is not quite in place, 
that it may not yet be a reality. In other words, there is a non-factual 
element which, although it does not by any means characterise all the 
co-texts of MORE FLEXIBLE in the BNC, does however characterise 
a substantial percentage of them. The concordances to MORE FLEX-
IBILITY and GREATER FLEXIBILITY have similar patterns.
If this interpretation of the BNC data is tenable, then the follow-
ing could be inferred: ‘MORE FLEXIBLE is associated with a unit of 
meaning which describes a need, plan or wish for greater fl exibility’. Or, 
more generally, ‘MORE FLEXIBLE is associated with a unit of mean-
ing which describes states of affairs where desired greater fl exibility is 
not yet in place’. However, this would not cover a notable slice of ‘fac-
tual’ occurrences in the concordance, i.e., cases where greater fl exibility 
was required but is now in place, for example:
Malaysia has subsequently become • more fl exible in the application of its
lusty singing. In its place there are • more fl exible forms of worship and much 
doomed to failure. ‘Science’ became rather • more fl exible around 1870, when 
Therefore the formulation could be extended to accommodate the factual 
element too:
‘MORE FLEXIBLE is associated with a unit of meaning which de-
scribes states of affairs where greater fl exibility is not yet in place, or 
more rarely, is in place’.
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This solution, however, remains unsatisfactory because it does not stress 
suffi ciently that the situations of achieved fl exibility are clearly bound up 
with a previous condition of relative or total infl exibility. Notice the co-text 
in the three lines: Malaysia has subsequently become; ‘Science’ became; in 
its place, each of which suggests a transition from a situation of lesser fl ex-
ibility to a situation of greater fl exibility. Consequently it could be hypoth-
esised that if MORE FLEXIBLE—and indeed MORE FLEXIBILITY 
and GREATER FLEXIBILITY—connect with a condition of less fl ex-
ibility or infl exibility, whether past or present, then we can infer that the 
unit of meaning containing MORE FLEXIBLE might be accounted for as 
follows: 
‘MORE FLEXIBLE is associated with a transition, whether simply 
desired or actually achieved, and whether past or present, from a situ-
ation of less fl exibility to a situation of greater fl exibility’.
Table 4.5 BNC Concordance to ‘more fl exible’ (Random 30/425)
 1. with classical dance because it is more fl exible and expressive and many
 2. areas, was rapidly eroding. A much more fl exible and pro-active strategy was
 3. phased out with a view to developing more fl exible training arrangements for a
 4. For the dominant, there may be a more fl exible perimeter, depending upon the
 5. a method of selection that is both more fl exible and more discriminating than
 6. This trend for library guides to be more fl exible, to be better designed
 7. began to move towards more fl exible cycles, in which different communities
 8. available. I think these could be more fl exible. Using the ME-6 through a
 9. of years have forced a much more fl exible approach to budgeting,  management
 10. or auxiliary activities, which is more fl exible, at least in principle, and the
 11. best liner to work with because it’s more fl exible, and you can expect many
 12. as the query and reporting tool, a more fl exible version of the Cognos  software
 13. Undoubtedly, the labour market is more fl exible. Non-standard types of  work
 14. of lymphocyte recruitment more fl exible and selective. We and others have
 15. designed to make software licensing more fl exible for the user and easier for the
 16. change in the self were to generate a more fl exible response to morality,  and one
 17. has subsequently become more fl exible in the application of its procedures
 18. of the new coop, his markets are more fl exible and are more than likely to
 19. in the new play he wanted to create a more fl exible and less ostensible  verse line
 20. print or broadcasting, should be more fl exible, to attract and encourage  suitable
 21. access to training are becoming more fl exible, on paper if not always in
 22. singing. In its place there are more fl exible forms of worship and much smaller
 23. chronic cases, and to make available a more fl exible range of community  services
 24. To be honest. Okay. It’s certainly more fl exible, because you can then We’ve
 25. be, thirdly, that the gains from more fl exible forms of employment contracts
 26. that the position is now becoming more fl exible —has ignored.
 27. Advanced Courses structure which is more fl exible and responsive and which
 28. last year or two have become more fl exible. To build up a more stable  relationship
 29. to failure. ‘Science’ became rather more fl exible around 1870, when  organised
 30. (see Chapter 11) is a faster and more fl exible process where internal
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At this point the whole thing becomes ludicrous, because the rather com-
plicated prosody which might attend upon this description is suggested 
by the meaning of the core item anyway. Yet in spite of the absurdity, if 
the meaning of the core item is allowed to contribute to the meaning of 
the prosody, there may be no theoretical reason not to uphold the for-
mulation supplied. As pointed out in 2.2.3 in connection with SNOB-
BISH, it may be misguided to bar words or units of meaning entry to the 
semantic prosody club simply because their prosody does not appear to 
disclose anything new or unexpected.
The drawback is that if we do grant, however circular it may appear, 
that MORE FLEXIBLE could be associated with a prosody of ‘desired 
and/or achieved transition from less fl exible to more fl exible states’ or 
something along those lines, and if we do argue that semantic prosody is 
to be described across the board in terms which include both node and 
co-text, then the fl oodgates open.
4.3.4 THE CASE OF FROM BAD TO WORSE
Examples of core items such as MORE FLEXIBLE associated with pre-
dictable or at least unrevealing prosodies may be just the tip of the ice-
berg, but the reader may feel dissatisfi ed with my analyses of MORE 
FLEXIBLE and other core items, because although I have argued that 
not all the prosodies identifi ed in the literature could really be said to 
express attitude, the fact remains that the unit of meaning I have sug-
gested for MORE FLEXIBLE does not correspond with Sinclair’s model, 
primarily because the attendant prosody—something like ‘desired and/
or achieved transition from less fl exible to more fl exible states’—is not 
clearly or necessarily informed by the attitudinal function which is so 
crucial to Sinclair’s descriptions. With this in mind, let us turn to a fur-
ther expression—FROM BAD TO WORSE—this time trying to adhere 
more closely to Sinclair’s model of the unit of meaning, i.e., in terms of 
collocation, colligation, semantic preference and semantic prosody. The 
sequence FROM BAD TO WORSE, which will constitute our core item, 
occurs 41 times in the BNC (Table 4.6).
With reference to this concordance, I provide a detailed examination of 
it adopting four constituents of Sinclair’s model:
collocation: there is a strong collocation with all forms of the verb • 
go, which precedes the core item and is almost always present, 
and with things (as the grammatical subject of go) which occurs in 
around 50% of the lines. Other subjects of the verb preceding the 
core item are matters (3), and situation (2).
colligation: there is clear preference for verb forms referring to past • 
time. These generally precede the core item (went (18), tumbled (1), 
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have gone (4), were going (2), was getting). The present progressive is 
also reasonably common, while future forms and the present simple 
are rare. It will also be noticed that around 80% of the time the core 
item FROM BAD TO WORSE is immediately followed by a full stop 
(23 times) or a comma (10).
Table 4.6 BNC Concordance to ‘from bad to worse’ (All 41 Occurrences, 
Alphabetical Sorting at L1, L2)
 1. She spoke in subtitles. Not on. From bad to worse. The ambulance whinged all the way
 2. it happens under Chapter 11. From bad to worse Judge Lifl and’s decision may have been.
 3. and the evening went generally from bad to worse, with Sebastien the only one with any
 4. because it was just getting from bad to worse. What happened to your word processor?
 5. suggests that things could go from bad to worse,’ Miss Baxter said. Parents who abuse
 6. crisis in nursing could go from bad to worse as industry, the United States and
 7. into the boy, or watch him go from bad to worse’. David’s answer had been to bring
 8. otherwise Ay! It’s just gonna go from bad to worse isn’t Yeah, it? She’s been better this
 9. not get better and better, they go from bad to worse. The onward march of racism is traced
 10. When Cecilia appeared to go from bad to worse, Brian had advertised for a housekeeper
 11. Thus the situation goes from bad to worse. In this way a crack is really a mechanism
 12. think that things are going from bad to worse. This is not going to disappear overnight,
 13. BARNES. Things are going from bad to worse. Defeats for Swindon and Hereford.
 14. of the Day BBC really are going from bad to worse. They fall over themselves to show.
 15. fl oor fl at and things are going from bad to worse. They just keep taking money away
 16. Ham? That they are going from bad to worse. Successive home defeats, this one by
 17. that things were really going from bad to worse, were deteriorating. And it concerned him
 18. ith him. Things were going from bad to worse. He wasn’t just attractive, damn him, he
 19. feel that things have gone from bad to worse, that you get a shake-up and change in
 20. lost it thinks they have gone from bad to worse. On the other hand, though, we do in
 21. But while the British have gone from bad to worse, the Games have become a Chinese
 22. to his Super—‘ . . . matters have gone from bad to worse . . . Today, service, seniority and
 23. would agree it was a movement from bad to worse. What you say is very plausible,
 24. when Wales stumbled, they tumbled from bad to worse. There was the simple failure to
 25. sorted out. Things, though, went from bad to worse, and the following January I tried to 
 26. defi ed his own name and went from bad to worse, the former United star had pellets
 27. piously. The conversation went from bad to worse. Nigel told Eleanor that he despised
 28. that point on the debate went from bad to worse. We were lambasted by a bellicose
 29. over Things for Gloucestershire went from bad to worse. Hodgson went in the 5th over for
 30. well and all credit to him. I went from bad to worse. Nothing was right with my game at 
 31. on the place. But things just went from bad to worse. Ferguson refers to a club and pub
 32. local competition, matters went from bad to worse. William Denny recommended that
 33. by an understudy. Matters went from bad to worse. Drew left the company and joined
 34. for much longer. The mines went from bad to worse and during 1579 Höchstetter
 35. casualties. As the situation went from bad to worse, the people living near the volcano
 36 .turned to horror . . . and then went from bad to worse. FIRST thieves stripped their room
 37. to sidefoot a second. Things went from bad to worse in the second half. Smith and Steve
 38. back into the lead . . . things went from bad to worse then as United defender Colin
 39. which Event became. Things went from bad to worse. Branson was not able to inspire the
 40. this mate of his and his wife—things went from bad to worse, seems he met this woman
 41. was tremendous. As war went from bad to worse in Europe, many well-known
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semantic preference: the idea of movement is overwhelming, and is • 
usually expressed verbally (forms of go, tumbled), but trip and move-
ment itself are also present. In most cases it is things, rather than 
people, that move from bad to worse, and these ‘things’ generally 
refer to situations or circumstances. One notices also the presence of 
unfavourable-sounding states of affairs, for example: war, crisis, dis-
tressed, failed bid, disaster, horror, psychologically impaired, commit 
suicide, got sent off, deteriorating, depression, great depression, ten-
sions, anxieties.
semantic prosody: the concept of movement suggests a change of • 
state, a transfer from one situation to another. In the specifi c case, this 
change of state is from an undesirable circumstance to one which is 
even more undesirable. A melancholy attitude of unresolvability and 
hopelessness is suggested (a) by the lexical environment (anxieties, 
great depression, disaster, suicide), (b) by the grammar of the co-text 
(the situation belongs to a past time) and (c) by the punctuation of 
the co-text (the depressing fi nality implied by the unusual frequency 
of the full-stops which close off the unit if meaning as if to foreclose 
a solution).
At this point I am no longer sure whether I wish the reader to take this 
prosody seriously or not. On the one hand it is highly interpretative and 
deliberately controversial, while on the other it comes across as redundant 
or even risible, because the idea of a depressing change of state from an 
undesirable circumstance to one which is even more undesirable is spelt out 
by the meaning of the core item anyway.
In a recent oral exam in Linguistics, during which the allegedly covert 
nature of semantic prosody was being discussed, I rather unkindly asked a 
student if she could predict a semantic prosody that might be associated with 
the verb KILL. After refl ecting carefully upon this zany question, she replied 
that KILL was not associated with a prosody, “because the negativity is all 
in the verb”. As a non-attending student, she had been required to read up on 
semantic prosody, and it could be that her answer was a reasonable reaction 
to how it had been presented and discussed in the reading list I had compiled. 
At this point I changed tack somewhat by asking her simply to predict the 
typical co-text of KILL, and although she made a valiant attempt, she was 
unable to see the relevance of the question to semantic prosody.
Perhaps I should heed more closely the signals my students send me, but 
I shall pursue the point nonetheless. Predictably enough, in the BNC con-
cordance to KILL (or better in a selection—there are almost 15,000 hits), 
there does not appear to be any specifi c semantic preference as such, but the 
concordance is predominantly characterised by people or things that kill, 
will kill, have killed, want to kill etc., and/or by people or things that are 
killed, will be killed, have been killed, were nearly killed etc. Is this inter-
pretable in prosodic terms? Is it legitimate to describe the unit of meaning 
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containing KILL as approximating to ‘a sad situation whereby people or 
things kill or are killed’?
So in a sense my student’s demurral was perfectly justifi ed. Perhaps the 
negativity really is “all in the verb”. And perhaps the prosodic potential of 
MORE FLEXIBLE and FROM BAD TO WORSE is almost all in the core 
item, however much support it may receive from the co-text.
I am aware that some of the prosodies identifi ed in this chapter may 
come across as out of kilter with most of the prosodies discussed in cor-
pus linguistics so far. Certainly (i) not all of them possess obvious evalua-
tive features or indeed any pragmatic function at all, but then, as argued 
in 2.1, the prosodies which have been ascribed to, for example, SET IN, 
CAUSE, COMMIT and NAKED EYE are not overtly evaluative or prag-
matic in nature either (though the boundaries of pragmatics are slippery), 
and (ii) they are not all hidden, though as suggested in 2.2ff, it is far from 
clear that the hidden element is a defi ning feature of semantic prosody 
(see also Chapter 7), and of course it has been argued that all lexical items 
have prosodic potential. 
Nevertheless one cannot help feeling that positing prosodies such as 
those suggested for FROM BAD TO WORSE would rather make a mock-
ery of the whole notion of semantic prosody. As we have seen, studies on 
the subject have thrown up some fascinating facts and ideas, from Sin-
clair’s lexical profi le of SET IN, to Louw’s (1993) observations regarding 
DAYS ARE (see 5.3.3), to both Tognini-Bonelli’s and Stubbs’ revelations 
about the prosody of PROPER, to Sinclair’s insights concerning BROOK, 
BUDGE etc. Can all these seriously be coupled with the hypothesis that 
the prosodic force of MORE FLEXIBLE connects with a transition from 
a situation of less fl exibility to a situation of more fl exibility? Can they be 
coupled with the hypothesis that FROM BAD TO WORSE is associated 
with a prosody such as ‘a state of melancholy following a change of state 
from an undesirable circumstance to one which is even more undesir-
able’? It would, to say the least, be anticlimactic.
4.4 SEMANTIC PROSODY AS A 
FEATURE OF THE WORD ALONE
It is worth emphasising that the risk of circularity or of stating the obvious 
described in the previous section is fairly negligible if semantic prosody is 
considered to belong to or to be a feature of the node alone, albeit inferred 
from the meaning of the co-text. If BREAK THE DEADLOCK, for 
instance, were analysed in terms of this approach, then its prosodic meaning 
might include ‘frustrated attempt/effort’ or ‘failure’, and MORE FLEXI-
BLE might be described in terms of ‘change of state’, but since the meaning 
of the node would not be part of the meaning of the prosody, the danger of 
describing a full and unrevealing circle would be less immediate. 
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Having said that, if the prosody is not informed by the meaning of the 
node, then there are perils of a different nature, which will be outlined in the 
sections which follow.
4.4.1 ALLEVIATE and Company
It was mentioned in 2.2.3 that an important discovery in the area of seman-
tic prosody would be if one were to fi nd words with a transparently positive 
basic meaning but a negative prosody, or vice versa, words with a transpar-
ently negative basic meaning but a positive prosody. As mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, some of the words and expressions analysed in the literature, 
for instance CREDIBILITY, PLAIN SAILING, PROPER, might already 
lay claim to this up to a point, but there are other words which appear to 
fi t the bill perfectly. 
It is beyond dispute that verbs such as ALLEVIATE, HEAL, EASE, 
SOLVE, RESOLVE, RELIEVE and CURE would be considered to have a 
favourable basic meaning, but they habitually co-occur with words which 
indicate conventionally undesirable things or states of affairs.1 Consider the 
concordance to ALLEVIATE in Table 4.7.
Here we fi nd a word of incontrovertibly good denotational meaning 
with a lexical profi le which might be considered to contain even more con-
sistently undesirable elements than that of SET IN. Within the framework 
of a description whereby semantic prosody is inferred from a node’s co-text 
alone, this is in a sense an extraordinary discovery. A negative prosody 
could be assigned to ALLEVIATE, just as a negative prosody was assigned 
to SET IN, in view of the fact that its co-text is peppered with seriously 
undesirable elements. In one fell swoop a compelling distinction could at 
last be made between the overlapping notions of semantic prosody and 
connotation: ALLEVIATE, RELIEVE etc. could be associated with a 
negative prosody, whereas we could not by any stretch of the imagination 
argue that they have negative connotations. The semantic prosody of these 
words, though a feature of the node, is strongly contingent upon their co-
text, while their favourable connotations cannot be considered to have a 
similarly close relationship with that co-text. On account of its total con-
tingency upon a word’s co-text, semantic prosody might fi nally emerge as a 
unique semantic phenomenon.
The downside of this solution is that there is something overtly coun-
ter-intuitive about it. Although the term semantic prosody was coined 
only recently, and is therefore relatively free of the shackles of a tradition 
which might hamper its theoretical development, it nonetheless seems 
instinctively unsatisfactory to assign any negativity whatsoever to a group 
of words which are so unchallengeably positive in meaning. Of course it 
could be done, but it is no easy task because, in my view, there is among 
other things a certain reluctance to prise semantic prosody and connota-
tion apart. As Munday (forthcoming) underlines, semantic prosody, “while 
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being strongly collocational, may be said to blend collocation and conno-
tation”. As a result it might be condemned as unacceptable to ascribe an 
unfavourable prosody to ALLEVIATE and company, precisely because it 
seems problematic to ascribe to them an unfavourable connotation.
A further hitch is that since ALLEVIATE, RELIEVE and the rest seem 
impervious to the pernicious infl uences of their habitual co-occurrences, 
i.e., they remain good despite their undesirable company, any theories about 
meanings being attached or transferred are considerably debilitated. The 
point is that we would need to establish why HAPPEN, BREAK OUT etc. 
have proved vulnerable to the evil infl uence of their bad co-occurrences 
and have thus acquired a bad ‘aura’, while ALLEVIATE and RELIEVE 
are to all intents and purposes incorruptible. Some might counter that 
Table 4.7 BNC Concordance to ‘alleviate/alleviates/alleviating/alleviated’ 
(Random 30/547. Alphabetical Sorting at R1,R2)
 1. into a program which could alleviate a lot. Yes I know, I know of the work,
 2. Mary and Rose. And rather than alleviating any muddle we might get into they
 3. and animal crops that could help alleviate food scarcity problems in  developing
 4. while at home, she made no efforts to alleviate her lot. She sought no  friends; she
 5. all. This problem of balance can be alleviated if students are left to make their own
 6. the past 13 years, and which can be alleviated only by the immediate election of
 7. from becoming actual ones; to alleviate or solve the actual problems; or to
 8. horrors, then don’t. My role in life is to alleviate pain, not cause it. ‘I want to tell
 9. give items like this, you not only help alleviate poverty and hunger overseas, but
 10. of Scottish scones and cookies can alleviate some of the effects of lead. So also
 11. the Creator’s power but also alleviate suffering. To study the book of nature
 12. beginning of the following chapter. It alleviates the burden of costs by providing
 13. an adequate fl ow of resources’ to alleviate the debt burdens of the most needy
 14. very uncomfortable experiences; to alleviate the discomfort they induce some
 15. in the River Forth. In order to alleviate the fears and objections associated
 16. and regional infrastructures to alleviate the fi nancial expense and cost in
 17. much can be done to overcome or alleviate the handicap. The concerns of older
 18. there was nothing that they could do to alleviate the hardship of Legion life, so it
 19. Nursing Home end, which should alleviate the parking problem. The new Alarm
 20. The 1982 PSOE government tried to alleviate the problem of knowledge by
 21. and that the drugs will be able to alleviate the symptoms of this memory loss
 22. was infectious. Her new partner alleviated the terrible loneliness caused by 
 23. currency earnings. The project will alleviate the USSR’s internal energy problem,
 24. They invited friends to stay, to alleviate their couple-loneliness. Liz came,
 25. or so she hoped: she had tried to alleviate their suspicions by explaining that
 26. parents who keep rushing in, trying to alleviate their teenager’s suffering, can
 27. Amnesty International seeks to  alleviate, there are many other innocent people
 28. eastern guises, had been designed to alleviate this dependence, to keep Canadian
 29. aged 62 and 63. It is intended to ‘alleviate unemployment among younger
 30. which gives guidance on how to alleviate your problems. For most of us,
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the strongly positive meaning of the latter prevents them being ‘contami-
nated’, but this does not change the fact that with ALLEVIATE and com-
pany the notions of colouring, rubbing off, infecting, etc. run up against 
a brick wall.
Moreover, the assignment of a prosody of unpleasantness to ALLEVI-
ATE and company would be once again (like SNOBBISH in 2.2.2 and 
MORE FLEXIBLE in 4.3.3) in confl ict with all the propensities of current 
studies on semantic prosody, so concerned as they are with subliminality, 
with what goes on beneath the surface of text, with how covert meaning is 
conveyed, and above all with how people transmit bad ‘vibes’ through lan-
guage without apparently saying anything bad. Any suggestion that ALLE-
VIATE has a subliminal prosody of, for example, ‘sadness resulting from 
suffering’ would no doubt be considered inane.
Note that if we return to the interpretation whereby prosodies charac-
terise a longer sequence rather than the word alone, then the outcome is 
quite different. The unit of meaning associated with ALLEVIATE might 
be described as ‘reducing or trying to reduce physical or psychological 
problems’, which of course repeats the risk of circularity characterising 
cases such as MORE FLEXIBLE and FROM BAD TO WORSE, but 
avoids the theoretical diffi culties of the prosody belonging to ALLEVI-
ATE alone. 
4.5 HABITUAL LEXICAL ENVIRONMENT: 
SEMANTIC PROSODY AND CONNOTATION
I would like to complete the current chapter by returning momentarily to 
a comparison fi rst drawn in Chapter 2, that between semantic prosody 
and connotation. So far in this chapter I have tried to demonstrate that 
the link between semantic prosody and lexical environment is a problem-
atic one in view of the differing approaches to semantic prosody adopted 
in the literature. It is perhaps worth underlining, however, that even if it 
could be proved that semantic prosody were inescapably dependent upon 
habitual lexical environment, in reality such a link would not necessarily 
be exclusive to semantic prosody. It would be hazardous to suggest, for 
example, that connotation and lexical environment are completely disas-
sociated. McEnery, Xiao and Tono (2006:85) move towards this position 
when they state: “In our view, connotation can be collocational or non-
collocational whereas semantic prosody can only be collocational”.
Louw (2000:50), on the other hand, as noted in 2.1.2, regards connota-
tion as schematic rather than collocational (“knowledge of connotations is 
often a form of schematic knowledge of repeatable events, e.g. what urchins 
do, where they live, their fi nancial means or lack of it and how they behave, 
etc”), whereas, he claims, the force behind semantic prosody is colloca-
tional rather than schematic. He continues:
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the reversal of schematic knowledge is insuffi cient to identify a seman-
tic prosody. For example, all weddings are meant to be happy and all 
funerals sad. Hence, when Philip Larkin describes The Whitsun Wed-
dings as being ‘ . . . like a happy funeral . . . ’, he is reversing a connota-
tive pattern and not a semantic prosody.
In other words, the term funeral does not have happy connotations, 
and as a result the expression happy funeral is unexpected and strik-
ing. Yet for this argument to be complete we must also recognise that 
happy does not have funereal connotations, or more generally that happy 
has happy connotations, however redundant or contradictory this might 
seem (because as noted in 2.1.4, connotations are usually intended as 
describing ‘second-order’ or peripheral meaning rather than primary 
meaning).
This is all very well, but what also needs to be recognised is that the 
sequence happy funeral is extremely rare. In the BNC the term FUNERAL 
(singular) does not have especially unpleasant co-occurrences—there are 
perhaps sombre elements such as undertakers, coronary, coroner, coffi n, 
as well as isolated occurrences such as bomb, agony, dirge, riot police, 
but most of the co-occurrences seem fairly neutral, i.e., neither pleasant 
nor unpleasant (limousine, arrange, was over, attended, director(s), pro-
cession). Be that as it may, one thing is certain: the habitual co-text of 
FUNERAL could not by any means be described as pleasant or cheerful, 
with the possible exception of (funeral) games. 
With this in mind, the unusuality of happy funeral could be con-
sidered just as much a co-occurrence phenomenon as a connotational 
phenomenon. FUNERAL does not have a happy lexical environment, 
and in fact HAPPY does not have a sombre or funereal lexical envi-
ronment—the more pleasant-sounding co-occurrences of HAPPY in 
the BNC, e.g., blessed, approbation, love and peace, joyous, triumph 
of togetherness, laugh, warm feelings, would seem to outweigh the less 
pleasant ones (bored, problems, depressed, no laughing matter). There-
fore, when the two words join company, one could argue in favour of 
a prosodic clash. Indeed, seen in this light it might be legitimate to 
place happy funeral in the same bracket as other unusual combinations 
such as utterly good, our marriage set in or peace has broken out, all 
of which have been introduced in this book as examples of prosodic 
clashes.
Whether this move is defensible or not, it once again seems hard to tear 
semantic prosody and connotation asunder. Even if we were to accept the 
view that semantic prosody is always inferred from habitual lexical envi-
ronment, it would nonetheless remain diffi cult to pursue the idea that 
this dependency is unique to semantic prosody. Connotation, it would 
appear, is also tied up with habitual lexical environment. The neutral-
sober environment of FUNERAL must connect in some way with the 
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sombre connotations of FUNERAL, while the more upbeat environment 
of HAPPY must connect with its cheerful connotations.
On the subject of funerals, consider as a further example the fl ower chry-
santhemum. During my fi rst year of residence in Italy, towards the end of 
October, I decided to purchase some fl owers for my wife, fi nally plumping 
for chrysanthemums. On the way home I stopped at our local bakers, and 
as I bought some bread I proudly waved the fl owers at the baker, a gushing, 
robust, in many ways rather forbidding woman with whom I was (fortu-
nately) on good terms. Foolishly, I told her that the fl owers were for my wife 
and asked her if she thought they were nice, at which she muttered some-
thing unsavoury before disappearing to the ovens at the back of the shop. 
I was both puzzled and mildly distressed by this, but as usual things were 
clarifi ed by my wife, who explained to her ingenuous husband that in Italy 
chrysanthemums are the fl owers people typically take to the cemetery on the 
feast of All Souls, which happened to be imminent. To my immense relief she 
accepted the fl owers anyway, perhaps because it was such a rare event.
It does not seem controversial to state that in Italy chrysanthemums are 
associated with, or have connotations of, graveyards and departed souls. 
It seems equally uncontroversial to state that in the country where I was 
brought up, England, chrysanthemums do not have such connotations. The 
question is as follows: are these connotations ‘corroborated’, so to speak, 
in a large corpus of English, and in a large corpus of Italian? In the BNC a 
search for CHRYSANTHEMUM (singular and plural) produces no trace 
of a reference to death, even with expanded context (paragraph mode). In 
an Italian corpus of ten years of La Repubblica, a major daily newspaper 
in Italy, a concordance to the singular form CRISANTEMO contains very 
few references to anything concerned with graveyards or death. The plural 
form CRISANTEMI, however, is quite different. Although the classic ten-
word concordance window contains some references to death, when each 
occurrence is expanded to paragraph mode we fi nd that around half the total 
number of occurrences contain words connected with death and cemeter-
ies: defunti (the deceased), morti (the dead), morte (death), tombe (graves), 
loculi (burial niches), cimitero (cemetery), rito funebre (burial rite), corteo 
funebre (funeral procession), bara (coffi n), feretro (coffi n), camera ardente 
(funeral chamber), reliquia (relic), tentato omicidio (attempted murder). I 
shall spare the reader the more violent and depressing occurrences. And that 
is not counting several instances of the polysemous term corona, which in 
combination with chrysanthemums would mean ‘wreath’, but whose core 
meaning is ‘crown’.2
According to this contrastive example, connotation, as well as seman-
tic prosody, may be closely intertwined with habitual lexical environ-
ment. This does not mean that this is always the case; this does not mean 
that connotation is as dependent upon lexical environment as semantic 
prosody. But it might suggest that the two cannot systematically be torn 
asunder using the criterion of co-occurrence.
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4.6 SUMMARY
In the current chapter it was initially hypothesised that the one characteristic 
attributed to semantic prosody which might effectively distinguish it from 
other analogous phenomena, particularly connotation, is its close depen-
dence upon lexical environment. In order to test this hypothesis I examined 
the relationship between semantic prosody and lexical environment.
It was argued that in the literature semantic prosody is sometimes con-
sidered to be a feature of the word alone, and sometimes a feature of the 
word and its co-text. However, whichever of these approaches is prioritised, 
certain problems arise. If semantic prosody is taken to be a feature of the 
word, it becomes problematic to account for verbs such as ALLEVIATE 
and EASE, which have not been ‘infected’ by their consistently unpleasant 
co-occurrences. If, on the other hand, semantic prosody is taken to be a 
feature of the word + co-text, for example the unit of meaning containing 
MORE FLEXIBLE or FROM BAD TO WORSE, then there is a danger 
of circularity, or at least of reaching conclusions which were transparent 
from the outset. At this stage it is diffi cult to predict just how many lexical 
items there are like ALLEVIATE on the one hand and FROM BAD TO 
WORSE on the other, but one is entitled to suspect that they are not simply 
a recalcitrant minority.
Finally, it was noted that connotation, as well as semantic prosody, may 
connect powerfully with lexical environment.
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5 Semantic Prosody and Corpus Data
For what a man would like to be true, that he more readily believes
5.0 INTRODUCTION
So far in this book I have focused on features of semantic prosody (i) which 
are shared by all descriptions of it (Chapter 2), and (ii) which are not shared 
by all descriptions, receiving differing degrees of emphasis from one account 
to the next (Chapters 3 and 4). In the next three chapters I shall consider 
semantic prosody in connection with the broader issues of the use, role and 
infl uence of corpus data. The current chapter considers the link between 
semantic prosody and corpus data as envisaged by scholars who have con-
tributed to the subject. Chapter 6 also discusses this link, but with particu-
lar reference to data supplied by the concordance. Chapter 7 takes up the 
question of the role of intuition and introspection in corpus analyses.
It may seem surprising that, despite my broad division into attributes 
of semantic prosody which are (i) common and (ii) not common to con-
tributions on the topic, I have reached Chapter 5 of this book without yet 
fully discussing a feature which would appear to achieve unanimity in all 
descriptions: the dependence of semantic prosody upon data retrieved from 
electronic corpora. I have delayed discussion of this until now because it 
seemed appropriate to deal with the relationship between semantic prosody 
and corpus data separately, once other issues had been addressed.
Semantic prosody is almost always presented as inextricably linked 
with corpus data. In the fi rst part of this chapter I shall discuss the claim 
that semantic prosody is best revealed, or indeed only revealed, by corpus 
investigations. This will be followed by a brief survey of the main meth-
ods used to retrieve and assemble corpus data, and by some considerations 
concerning how we approach the data in terms of collocation and semantic 
consistency. It is then claimed that the conclusions we reach about seman-
tic prosody are strongly infl uenced by our personal judgements about the 
world, in particular how we distinguish good from bad, and by the nature 
and length of the textual sequence we choose to analyse in order to identify 
the prosody. A central claim running through both this chapter and the 
next is that the way in which texts are arranged by corpus software may 
have signifi cant bearing upon the way analysts interpret the data, to the 
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point that we may ‘see’ certain elements and relationships which in reality 
are absent.
5.1 A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP: SEMANTIC 
PROSODY AND CORPUS LINGUISTICS
The link between semantic prosody and corpus linguistics is incontestable. 
There are scarcely any studies on semantic prosody outside the domain of 
corpus linguistics. Semantic prosody, it would seem, is contingent upon 
concordancing and lexical profi les, apparently depending upon them for its 
recognition. Bublitz (1996:9) argues that the relationship, crucial to seman-
tic prosody, between an item and its environment “is best, and, arguably, 
only revealed by applying computational methods to large corpora of dis-
course”, while for Louw (1993:159), semantic prosody is “a phenomenon 
that has been only revealed computationally, and whose extent and devel-
opment can only be properly traced by computational methods”. In Louw 
(1997:247), the author states that semantic prosody “can only be perceived 
using computers and corpora”. Adolphs and Carter (2002:7) echo these 
sentiments when they state that the study of semantic prosody “has only 
become possible with the advent of large corpora and suitable software”, 
as does Hunston (2002:142), who asserts that “semantic prosody can be 
observed only by looking at a large number of instances of a word or phrase, 
because it relies on the typical use of a word or phrase”. Tognini-Bonelli 
(2004:20) writes that thanks to the computer “the connotation pervading 
the vast majority of the uses of a word like face [as verb] has now become 
tangible and observable”, and the glossary defi nition supplied by Baker 
et al. (2006:58) under ‘discourse prosody’ (see 1.1.5) reads: “A term . . . 
relating to the way that words in a corpus can collocate with a related set 
of words or phrases, often revealing (hidden) attitudes”. Berber-Sardinha 
(2000:93) observes that “semantic prosody is the connotation conveyed by 
the regular co-occurrence of lexical items, as revealed by the exploration of 
a computer-readable corpus”.
These are only a few of many analogous remarks in the literature, but 
even from this small selection some important points emerge.
Firstly, there is a clear desire to forge an unbreakable chain between 
semantic prosody and corpus data, to bestow an empirical dimension upon 
the whole issue, to make semantic prosody an observable phenomenon. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the more traditional roles of intuition 
and introspection are played down, and the importance of tangible data is 
stressed. This is understandable, but I think caution is required, because, 
contrary to what is affi rmed in the quotations cited earlier, semantic pros-
ody cannot be “observed” or “revealed” as such. Concordances are observ-
able, co-selection patterns are observable, but semantic prosody is not. 
Semantic prosody is, within corpus linguistics, the result of the analyst’s 
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interpretation of corpus data, and although corpus data may well suggest 
the existence of prosodies, this does not mean that prosodies are an observ-
able phenomenon. Xiao and McEnery (2006:124) state that “semantic 
prosody and semantic preference are as observable in Chinese as they are 
in English”, and Partington (2004a:131–132) defi nes semantic prosody as 
similar to connotative meaning but “much less evident to the naked eye” 
(see also Partington 2004b:17), yet we should bear in mind that, since pros-
ody is a type of meaning, we should not expect to ‘see’ it, either “with the 
naked eye” or with corpus assistance.
For similar reasons it is disorienting when Bublitz (1996:9) writes that 
“words can have a specifi c halo or profi le, which may be positive, pleas-
ant and good, or else negative, unpleasant and bad”. The wording of this 
would imply that the “halo” and the “profi le” are one and the same thing. 
As I understand it, the profi le of a lexical item concerns the frequency and 
type of its co-occurrences, which are observable, while the “halo”—the 
prosody itself—which is the result of conclusions drawn by analysts about 
those co-occurrences, is not (though some authors do merge the concepts of 
prosody and profi le in the same way as Bublitz). The situation is captured 
by Stubbs (2001b:449), who writes that discourse prosody “is not directly 
observable, but recurrent collocates often provide replicable evidence of 
evaluative connotations”.
Just as unobservable as auras, halos and semantic prosody itself are the 
mental operations controlling analysts’ interpretation of corpus data. This 
point will be taken up again in 5.3.
Secondly, the scholars quoted at the beginning of this section either 
give the impression or state unequivocally that semantic prosody can be 
observed or revealed by computational methods alone. I have already 
objected to the use of the term ‘observed’, and I believe ‘revealed’ is not 
entirely satisfactory either (the revelation is indirect, since once again, it is 
strictly speaking the item’s environment which is ‘revealed’, and from this 
environment the analyst makes inferences about the presence or absence of 
a prosody), but what is worrying here is the exclusivity of such comments, 
i.e., that semantic prosody is concerned solely with “words in a corpus” 
(see Baker et al. 2006:58), and can be observed / revealed “only” by com-
putational methods. 
It certainly is a high-risk claim. To my knowledge no fi ndings have been 
produced to demonstrate that semantic prosody cannot be inferred by non-
computational methods, i.e., by elicitation or introspection, so it is puzzling 
that this eventuality should be so summarily dismissed. When discussing 
the typical (unpleasant) co-occurrences of CAUSE, Stubbs (1995:26) writes: 
“Some native speakers (but not all) that I have informally tested do produce 
one or two examples of such unpleasant collocations, but native speaker 
data are very sparse and unreliable indeed”. Yet if the research methods are 
as informal as this, and the data so sparse, then it is diffi cult to imagine 
how the fi ndings could be anything but unreliable. Among other things, 
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we do not know who these native speakers are, nor how Stubbs framed his 
questions, two factors which would bear hugely upon the results. Sinclair 
(1997:29) writes that “from the impromptu reactions of hundreds of fl uent 
speakers, we can deduce that the intuitions about language which they can 
access are substantially at variance with their own language behaviour”, 
but once again no data are produced to substantiate this, and no informa-
tion is offered as to how the impromptu reactions in question were elicited, 
tested, analysed or collected, or even what these reactions were. This is 
important because it would seem that the testing of intuition can be car-
ried out successfully if appropriate methodologies are adopted. Hoffmann 
(2006:167) remarks: “Informal methods of introspection data elicitation 
[sic] might fail to be reliable, but several studies have shown that judge-
ments elicited via carefully constructed experiments are in fact intra- and 
inter-subject consistent”.
Much has been made, in studies on semantic prosody and on corpus lin-
guistics in general, of the supposed poverty of intuitions. Further, it is not 
uncommon to fi nd references to retrievable and non-retrievable intuitions, 
though once again there is little indication of how one might go about retriev-
ing those which are retrievable, or how one might verify the irretrievability of 
non-retrievable intuitions. See Chapter 7 for further discussion.
Of course there is no doubt that word environment is ‘laid bare’ or 
‘exposed’ by corpus searches much more effi ciently than by elicitation or 
introspection. As Widdowson (2000:6) notes: “Corpus analysis reveals 
textual facts, fascinating profi les of produced language, and its concor-
dances are always springing surprises. They do indeed reveal a reality 
about language usage which was hitherto not evident to its users”. There 
is also no doubt that the revealing of such realities can help us surmise 
the presence of a prosody, and no one would dispute that humans can-
not retrieve co-selection patterns with the same degree of effi ciency as a 
computer (see Stubbs 1995:24–25). Certainly the computer’s capacity to 
highlight typical co-occurrences is immensely useful, perhaps above all 
to lexicographers (see Teubert 2004:91). However, to conclude from this 
self-evident difference between humans and machines that co-selection 
patterns, and therefore prosodies, cannot be identifi ed by elicitation or 
introspection represents a hazardous leap. It is no coincidence that Wid-
dowson refers to language usage which was hitherto not evident, i.e., the 
existence of certain language patterns (and therefore prosodies) may sim-
ply not have occurred to us before. This is very different from saying that 
they could not be inferred upon refl ection. Tognini-Bonelli (2004:20) lists 
a number of co-occurrences of FACE as verb, concluding that they suggest 
that FACE is associated with an unfavourable prosody. She then states 
that “this type of information had not been available to the linguist until 
the advent of corpora. It is the sheer quantity of the evidence that makes 
this kind of insight possible”. Here one would need to establish what “this 
type of information” actually refers to. If the reference is to the notion that 
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we as language users would be unable to identify co-occurrences of FACE 
in the manner that retrieval software does, then the claim that this type 
of information was not previously available is no doubt justifi ed, but if the 
claim is that, before the advent of computers, introspection or elicitation 
were never able to pick up on the fact that FACE typically co-occurs with 
‘problematic’ company such as grim, dilemma, obstacles, problems, dif-
fi culties, then the argument is considerably more diffi cult to uphold.
It will be noticed that the current section has close links with the sections 
on hidden meaning in Chapter 2. The argument that semantic prosody is 
revealed by computational methods alone loses a good deal of its strength 
if we take the view that prosodies are not necessarily hidden. I argued in 
Chapter 2 that a transparently negative item such as SNOBBISH, because 
of its unpleasant co-occurrences, is just as eligible for a prosody as a less 
transparently negative item such as PAR FOR THE COURSE, and I have 
argued that the negative prosody associated with SNOBBISH is anything 
but hidden. It follows that if we acknowledge that SNOBBISH is charac-
terised by a negative semantic prosody which is not in any way covert, then 
we have to acknowledge that there is a fair chance that it will be arrived 
at by introspection or elicitation. At that point it becomes much harder to 
pursue the argument that prosodies cannot be identifi ed by methods which 
are not exclusively computational. See again Chapter 7 on intuition and 
corpus data.
5.2 APPROACHING THE CORPUS DATA
There may be said to be two macro-stages in identifying a prosody by means 
of corpus investigation: (1) choosing a relevant and appropriate search, and 
(2) scanning the corpus data retrieved and then ‘translating’ these into a 
prosody. Stage 1 is clearly very important, since the data examined derive 
directly from the type of search the analyst decides to make in the fi rst 
place. If the data produced by a given search do not result in anything 
relevant for the analyst, then s/he may conclude that no clear prosody can 
be identifi ed for the item under analysis. However, it could be that there is 
something interesting in the data which the analyst has simply not noticed, 
or that shrewder searches would have provided greater insights. I shall not 
pursue this question now, since my intention in this chapter is to focus on 
how we relate to corpus data once the search has been made, but I shall 
return to it in Chapter 7. There are two main ways of accessing corpus 
data: via concordances or via what are known as collocational profi les or 
collocate frequency tables. 
When scholars use collocational profi les within investigations of seman-
tic prosody, they usually weed out elements in the profi le that seem irrelevant 
to the investigation (these often include grammar words), and then supply 
a list of co-occurrences. This is a method often used by Stubbs (2001a), 
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who notes, for instance, that POTENTIALLY (p.107)—co-occurs with 
dangerous, explosive, lethal, fatal, damaging, serious, disastrous, harm-
ful. Collocational profi les have the advantage of being able to draw useful 
information from often large amounts of text and convert it into conve-
nient, readable, statistical lists (see Baker 2006:100ff). Collocational pro-
fi les come into their own, so to speak, when the habitual co-occurrences 
of an item are, to adapt Louw’s term (2000:50), ‘monolithic’, i.e., when a 
conspicuous pattern characterises a high percentage of the concordance 
lines in question. For example Hoey (1997:5) found that in his 100-million 
word corpus there were 292 occurrences of the string TRAIN AS A, of 
which 262 were followed by “an occupation or related role”, and this is a 
clear semantic preference. When the profi le is less ‘monolithic’, the situa-
tion is less clear. For example, Tognini-Bonelli (2001:23) supplies the most 
frequent co-occurrences of FLEXIBLE (see also 4.3.3) in the Birmingham 
Corpus she uses, which are as follows. I have eliminated very high-fre-
quency grammar words:
more (1304 occurrences), as (387), can (226), than (183), working 
(169), very (166), enough (163), labour (148), hours (142), response 
(137), system (126), approach (125), less (114), market (103), strategy 
(60), allow (60), markets (56), arrangements (52).
The profi le in question does not suggest a semantic preference of FLEXI-
BLE—aside, perhaps, from the world of work, though this is a broad cat-
egory. Despite the fact that Tognini-Bonelli attributes a favourable prosody 
to FLEXIBLE, she points out that collocational profi les may prove to be of 
little help in identifying semantic preferences (and therefore in identifying 
prosodies):
With fl exible we fi nd that the positive evaluation is realised in a variety 
of ways which are not picked up by a computer program that focuses on 
the recurrent co-selection of individual words. A collocational profi le 
is best read as a confi rmation of observations in the concordance, after 
the analyst has familiarised him/herself with the repeated patterns.
(Tognini-Bonelli 2001:24)
In other words, number crunching can only take you so far. Indeed fre-
quency lists alone can be misleading (see Baker 2006:71). The BNC profi le 
of NAKED EYE, for instance, contains verb forms such as detect, spot, 
spotted, appear, perceived, viewed, recognised, read, studied, judged, and 
adjectives such as apparent, obvious, evident, visible, which despite sug-
gesting semantic preferences, on their own do not convey the prosody of 
diffi culty proposed by Sinclair (1996a:87–88). If anything they suggest 
the opposite. However, the profi le also features a signifi cant percentage of 
negative particles, as well as words such as barely, just and rarely. It is not 
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until we make the move from the collocational profi le to the concordance 
itself, or at least to a cluster analysis, that we see that combinations such as 
barely visible to, was not obvious to are frequent and would indeed appear 
to convey some type of diffi culty. 
A concordance, on the other hand, provides lines of text, one below 
the other, with the search word along the central axis. The concordance, 
as will be argued in Chapter 6, presents text in a way which is at once 
innovative, fascinating and bewildering, and which has strongly infl uenced 
descriptions of semantic prosody.
Stage 2 of a corpus investigation concerns more specifi cally the way 
corpus analysts identify collocations and semantic preferences—whether 
accessed via profi les or concordances—and then ‘translate’ these into 
semantic prosody, i.e., how they convert data into evidence. This is a deli-
cate, mercurial moment because it is highly interpretative, involving sub-
jective judgements about fragments of text which have been removed from 
their natural habitat and forcibly juxtaposed with other fragments of text 
to which they may have no discernible link aside from the keyword. Indeed, 
as will be suggested later, the very fact of juxtaposing fragments of text 
within a concordance may suggest links which are simply not there.
This interpretative stage will be the focus of the following sections. 
First of all, let us consider the fact that semantic preference, and therefore 
semantic prosody, rests heavily upon the notion of semantic sets, and/or 
semantically consistent collocates.
5.2.1 Semantically Consistent Collocates
5.2.1.1 Collocates and Collocations
According to Firth (in Palmer 1968:181), the collocations of a given word are:
statements of the habitual or customary places of that word in collo-
cational order but not in any other contextual order and emphatically 
not in any grammatical order. The collocation of a word or a ‘piece’ 
is not to be regarded as mere juxtaposition, it is an order of mutual 
expectancy [original italics].
This implies that collocation is basically quantitative, entailing statistical 
signifi cance and not “mere juxtaposition”. Hoey (1991:7) notes that “col-
location has long been the name given to the relationship a lexical item has 
with items that appear with greater than random probability in its (textual) 
context”, while Baker (2006:95–96) affi rms that 
All words co-occur with each other to some degree. However, when a 
word regularly appears near another word, and the relationship is sta-
tistically signifi cant in some way, then such co-occurrences are referred 
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to as collocates and the phenomena of certain words frequently occur-
ring next to or near each other is collocation.
According to McEnery, Xiao and Tono (2006:82–83), the idea that colloca-
tion is contingent upon habitual co-occurrence is widely accepted by corpus 
linguists. However, the application of this within the domain of semantic 
prosody is not systematic. As reported in earlier chapters, Louw (1993:157) 
defi ned semantic prosody as a “consistent aura of meaning with which a 
form is imbued by its collocates”, and, years later (2000:60), as “a form of 
meaning which is established through the prox imity of a consistent series of 
collocates”, while for Bublitz (1996:9) semantic prosody is contingent upon 
the identifi cation of a “semantically consistent set of collocates”. Although 
both authors—like many others—use (the noun) ‘collocate’ very frequently, 
it becomes clear that they do not construe it in any sort of statistically signifi -
cant way, or better, for Louw and Bublitz collocates do not appear to depend 
upon relationships of habitual co-occurrence between the node and its co-
text. Certainly the data they use to identify semantic prosody would suggest 
that the ‘collocates’ referred to are no more than simple co- occurrences, i.e., 
there is no mention of any frequency of co-occurrence between node and 
collocate. Bublitz (ibid.:20–21), for example, reproduces a concordance to 
SOMEWHAT from the London Lund Corpus (Table 5.1). 
Although Bublitz advises caution in identifying semantic prosody on 
the basis of such limited data (only 15 occurrences of SOMEWHAT in 
a corpus of half a million words of spoken discourse), it is clear that the 
author is not concerned here with habitual co-occurrence: the ‘collocates’ 
upon which the (unfavourable) prosody of SOMEWHAT is based are all 
Table 5.1 Concordance to ‘somewhat’ in Bublitz 1996
 1. a somewhat nasty pretty reasonable
 2. a somewhat lengthy hearing her charges
 3. a somewhat analogous footing to the
 4. being somewhat dirty and slightly
 5. being somewhat different on the teaching
 6. a somewhat indiscreet observation referred to
 7. homes somewhat occasionally and very occasionally
 8. I somewhat took Stalker’s part
 9. is somewhat predictable well now if
 10. is somewhat of a madman in
 11. myself somewhat at sea when it
 12. perhaps somewhat extravagant living I think
 13. being somewhat older and yet at
 14. wet somewhat bleak not very warm
 15. you’ve somewhat less the probability of
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different from each other, with no suggestion whatsoever that any of these 
co-occurs signifi cantly with the node. Earlier in his article (ibid.:10) Bublitz 
makes a reference to Sinclair’s observations regarding the phrasal verb SET 
IN: “Without using the term semantic prosody, Sinclair observes that, 
overwhelmingly, the collocates (rot, disillusion etc.) ‘refer to unpleasant 
states of affairs’ (1991:74)”. Yet in reality Sinclair, advisedly, does not use 
the term ‘collocates’ here, preferring “the subjects of set in” and the more 
general “the main vocabulary” (Sinclair 1991:75).
Now it might be objected that this is simply splitting hairs, that basically 
what is being discussed here is the phenomenon of co-occurrence, whether 
the relationship between the node and the single co-occurrences is signifi -
cantly frequent or not. Yet it is a distinction worth making, because the 
very raison d’être of semantic prosody, and perhaps its greatest strength, 
rests upon the fact that it is not, or not only, a collocational phenomenon. 
This crucial aspect is stressed by Hoey (1997:5), who comments on Sin-
clair’s discussion of semantic prosody within the framework of the idiom 
principle:
this [the idiom principle] is not a satisfactory categorisation, since there 
is no requirement that a semantic-prosodic association should be in the 
case of any particular item a regular association. When a new disease 
is found, it can immediately be added, for example, to the list of things 
that can be caused; we do not have to wait until it has become common 
enough for it to fi gure in calculations of collocations.
The author continues (ibid.): “Of course . . . semantic prosody will include 
many items that are also collocations but what makes the notion so useful 
is that it cannot be subsumed by its collocations”.1 As noted in 5.2 above, 
Hoey discusses the example TRAIN AS A, whose co-occurrences in the 
corpus he uses include a number of “strong collocates” (teacher, nurse, 
lawyer), but also a plethora of co-occurrences which would not qualify 
as collocates in the statistical sense (cobbler, concentration-camp guard). 
Indeed they may simply be one-offs. 
A further objection might be that I am unfairly assuming (partial) syn-
onymy between the terms ‘collocate’ (as a noun) and ‘collocation’, i.e., I am 
assuming that both terms should equally embrace the notion of habitual co-
occurrence, whereas in reality—the objection might continue—‘collocation’ 
rests upon habitual co-occurrence, but ‘collocate’ (as noun) does not. In 
other words, the latter is used to indicate the immediate juxtaposition of 
words and nothing more. This distinction would seem to be borne out by 
Stubbs (2001a:29), who having defi ned collocation as “frequent co-occur-
rence”, later remarks that in the immediate environment of HITHERTO 
“there is one recurring but variable phrase [hitherto unknown], plus a wide 
scatter of other collocates, none of which are individually frequent” (cf. 
Bernardini and Aston 2002:286–287). 
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My counter-objection to this would be that it is simply not the case that 
‘collocates’ as noun always corresponds to ‘mere co-occurrences’, or, for 
that matter, that ‘collocation’ infallibly denotes habitual co-occurrence. For 
confi rmation of the former one need only re-read the defi nition from Baker 
(2006:95–96) above, in which collocates are defi ned as statistically signifi cant 
co-occurrences, and for confi rmation of the latter it suffi ces to have a look 
at Partington (1993:188–190), and in particular his reference to “the sheer 
novelty of a collocation” (188). It would seem if anything that the respective 
semantic boundaries of ‘collocate’ and ‘collocation’ are rather misty.
My argument, therefore, is that although it may well be the case that 
Louw and Bublitz do intend a distinction between ‘collocation’ as habitual 
co-occurrence and ‘collocates’ as mere juxtaposition, I am not convinced 
that their readers could realistically be expected to be sensitive to this 
distinction which in any case is not applied consistently across works on 
semantic prosody. Further, even if readers were sensitive to it, they would 
still be left to work out the meaning of ‘collocate’ as verb and perhaps in 
particular of the adjectives ‘collocational’ and ‘collocative’; it seems to me 
that when Louw talks of a “collocative clash” (1993:157—see 1.1.2 for the 
full quotation) he is not concerned only with (habitual) collocation. Yet the 
distinction is an important one, precisely because semantic prosody might 
come across as a rather feeble notion if it were to be restricted to (habit-
ual) collocation.2 As Hoey (2005:16ff) underlines, semantic association / 
semantic preference is precisely what collocation cannot account for. And 
it is principally semantic preference which ‘feeds’ semantic prosody.
I shall argue in Chapter 6 that those misty boundaries of ‘collocation’ 
and ‘collocate’ may have weighty implications for the way we read and 
interpret corpus data.
A fi nal point. A potential rejoinder to the above is that what is really 
meant by ‘collocation’ in studies on semantic prosody constitutes a broad-
ening of its traditional interpretation in order to accommodate the rela-
tionship between an item and its semantic preferences, i.e., lexical items 
can ‘collocate’ with semantic sets just as much as they can ‘collocate’ with 
words/expressions. This is certainly the impression one recurrently receives 
in the literature on the subject, as exemplifi ed by the comments on seman-
tic prosody quoted in Chapter 1 (for example in 1.1.5 and 1.3). Now some 
might feel that this is stretching the conceptual boundaries of collocation 
a little too far, though in the context of semantic prosody it might even be 
defended—it could with justifi cation be argued that what semantic pros-
ody is primarily contingent upon is semantic preference, and that whether 
the item has a relation of habitual co-occurrence with any of its co-text is 
something of an irrelevance. The prosody ascribed to SOMEWHAT dis-
cussed earlier in this section rests upon the unpleasantness of most of its 
co-occurrences, but whether SOMEWHAT enters into a relationship of 
typicality with, say nasty or bleak is a purely secondary consideration. If 
one were to make this radical move, however, it would make more sense to 
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simply remove collocation from the semantic prosody equation altogether 
and give more weight and scope to the category of semantic preference, in 
part because broader interpretations of the term ‘collocation’ might con-
found the uninitiated.
Such a move would, however, fl y in the face of Sinclair’s model of the 
unit of meaning (see 1.1.4 and 4.2), since it would collapse his distinction 
between collocation and semantic preference. Although it is true that Sinclair 
has defi ned collocation as (1991:170) “the occurrence of two or more words 
within a short space of each other in a text”, he is always careful to differenti-
ate the relationship ‘item to item’ from ‘item to semantic set’. For instance, in 
his analysis of the unit of meaning containing the core item NAKED EYE, 
in the category ‘collocation’ he lists see, seen, visible, invisible, and these are 
fi rmly based on individual relationships of frequency between the core item 
and its co-occurrences, whereas the category ‘semantic preference’ includes 
all sorts of words indicating visibility which do not co-occur frequently with 
the core item, e.g., spot, perceived, viewed, as well as the collocates see, seen, 
visible, invisible (Sinclair 1996a:86). Thus if we wish to broaden the meaning 
of ‘collocation’ to include the relationship between item and semantic prefer-
ence, it would seem advisable to acknowledge the degree to which this move 
departs from Sinclair’s model.
5.2.1.2 Semantic Consistency
It would thus be more accurate to state that semantic prosody is contingent 
upon the broader phenomenon of co-occurrence rather than collocation 
alone. But what type of co-occurrence? In Chapter 1 it was noted that 
defi nitions and explanations of semantic prosody often have recourse not 
only to the notion of typical co-occurrence but also to those of semantic 
sets and semantic consistency. As reported in 5.2.1.1, Bublitz (1996:6) tells 
us that semantic prosody (my italics in the following quotations) “is based 
on a semantically consistent set of collocates”, and Louw (2000:57) writes 
that “semantic prosody refers to a form of meaning which is established 
through the prox imity of a consistent series of collocates”. Stubbs (1995:25) 
notes that “it is becoming increasingly well-documented that words may 
habitually collocate with other words from a defi nable semantic set”, while 
according to Hunston and Francis (1999:137), “a word may be said to have 
a particular semantic prosody if it can be shown to co-occur typically with 
other words that belong to a particular semantic set”. 
Such notions, however, are perhaps more complex than they seem. What do 
we understand by (particular) semantic sets, semantic consistency, and typical 
co-occurrence? It seems safe enough to postulate that NAKED typically co-
occurs with eye, but with what does PROVIDE, often cited as an example of 
a word associated with (favourable) semantic prosody, typically co-occur? In 
the 200-million word corpus used by Stubbs (2001a:65), some of its top col-
locates were information, service(s), support, help, money, protection, food, 
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care. And perhaps this answers the question: PROVIDE typically co-occurs 
with information, service(s), support etc., since these are its most typical co-
occurrences. Yet these do not constitute an obvious semantic set, they do not 
manifest any obvious semantic consistency. Does money belong to the same 
semantic set as food? Is information semantically consistent with protection? 
Clearly not, unless we propose that these words all belong to the semantic set 
of ‘being provided’, in which case the argument starts chasing its tail.
Of course PROVIDE is of interest to analysts of semantic prosody because 
it appears to have a strikingly large percentage of co-occurrences denoting 
conventionally favourable states of affairs. So, the response to the above 
question ‘With what does PROVIDE typically co-occur?’, could be (aside 
from a list of the co-occurrences themselves) words and expressions repre-
senting conventionally favourable states of affairs. This is, however, a might-
ily broad category with thousands upon thousands of possible members, and 
does not mean that these co-occurrences belong to a semantic set as such, 
any more than it means that they are semantically consistent. Therefore ‘sets’ 
of collocates, or of co-occurrences in general, which have been identifi ed 
as either favourable or unfavourable may have no other semantic feature 
in common than this, i.e., ‘favourableness’ or, so to speak, ‘unfavourable-
ness’. When Stubbs (1995:29), having listed some common co-occurrences 
of CAUSE (accident, alarm, concern, confusion, damage, death, delay, fi re, 
harm, trouble), writes that “it is obvious to the human analyst that these 
words are semantically related”, he presumably posits a common element of 
negativity (though even this seems controversial), since any other semantic 
link between, say, delay and death, would not be obvious at all.
All these are interesting developments if we consider that back in 1987 
Sinclair, when discussing the co-occurrences of the verb SET IN, had 
confi ned himself to the observation that they “in general, refer to unpleas-
ant states of affairs” (1987:155)—he did not imply (as previously noted) 
that such co-occurrences possessed the status of collocates, nor did he 
imply that they belonged to a specifi c semantic set. Subsequently Sinclair 
pointed very strongly to the idea of co-occurrences within semantic sets 
(such as, for example, a set corresponding to the notion of ‘visibility’) in 
his description of the unit of meaning, but most of the prosodies which 
have been identifi ed in the literature are labelled simply positive (good, 
pleasant, favourable, desirable) or negative (bad, unpleasant, unfavour-
able, undesirable), and are not based in any real sense on semantically 
consistent sets of co-occurrences. We may thus note a further discrep-
ancy between the methodology adopted by Sinclair, where the category of 
‘semantic preference’ connects directly with the notion of specifi c seman-
tic sets, and that adopted by many other authors, for whom ‘semantic 
preference’ is no more than a preference for either pleasant or unpleasant 
states of affairs.
The question is discussed by Whitsitt (2005:290), who underlines that, 
though many studies of semantic prosody avail themselves of the notion of 
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‘habitual collocates’, “what is ‘habitual’ is not the repetition “of the same 
word, or the same form, or the same material signifi er” but the repetition of 
what is interpreted as being “the same immaterial signifi ed, or meaning, or 
content”. In such studies very often the only “same immaterial signifi ed” of 
the co-occurrences resides in their pleasantness or unpleasantness.
5.3 INTERPRETING THE CORPUS DATA
In the following sections it will be argued that inferring prosodies from 
corpus data is a delicate process, not only because different analysts have 
different views of the world, but also because the identifi cation of prosodies 
leans heavily upon the way the analyst approaches the network of rela-
tionships and interactions existing between the various constituents of any 
given concordance.
5.3.1 Pleasant and Unpleasant Co-occurrences
It was observed earlier that most of the prosodies discussed in the literature 
are classifi ed as simply good or bad, pleasant or unpleasant, favourable or 
unfavourable, and that the assignment of such prosodies rests upon the fre-
quency of an item’s pleasant / unpleasant co-occurrences. Yet classifying co-
occurrences as favourable or unfavourable is anything but straightforward, 
in part because what is one analyst’s meat is another analyst’s poison. With 
regard to the co-occurrences he listed for SET IN, Sinclair had pointed out 
that “not one of these is conventionally desirable or attractive” (1991:75), 
and indeed they are a decidedly grisly bunch (see 1.1.1). Nevertheless it 
seems clear that reaching any sort of unanimity about what is convention-
ally favourable or unfavourable is a mammoth task, though earnest attempts 
have been made—see, for example, Osgood et al. 1957, Dilts and Newman 
2006. The categories of evaluation supplied by Appraisal theory can also be 
of assistance in this respect, e.g., Martin (1999), Kaltenbacher (2006), Coffi n 
and O’Halloran (2006). Bednarek (2008) provides an important model of 
evaluation comprising ten evaluative parameters: comprehensibility, emotiv-
ity, expectedness, humorousness, importance, possibility/necessity, reliabil-
ity, evidentiality, mental state, style, and then goes on to emphasise how these 
often overlap to create sometimes complex “evaluative interplay”.
Let us imagine, for instance, that during a corpus search we fi nd the 
words exam and exams as co-occurrences of our keyword. Are exams to be 
considered conventionally favourable or unfavourable? Even if we narrow 
this concept down to ‘end-of-year exams at university level’, there is still no 
simple answer. For students, they might be favourable because they provide 
a passport to graduation and an important qualifi cation, or because the stu-
dents know all the answers, but they might equally be unfavourable because 
they involve hard preparatory work, feeling uptight, and being stooped over 
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a desk for three or four hours if the exam is a written one; not to mention 
how teachers feel about them. Similarly, Thompson and Hunston (1999:1) 
note that the combination practically deserted can be very favourable or very 
unfavourable, depending on the context. What makes the phrasal verb SET 
IN stand out is that most of its subjects seem unremittingly grim, whichever 
way you look at them (see again, however, Section 2.1). But other words and 
expressions examined in the literature are not like this. I have already consid-
ered the case of BENT ON (2.2.2). Now let us examine a BNC concordance 
for UNDERGO (Table 5.2), a verb which has been associated with a bad 
prosody (Stubbs 2001a:89–95, Partington 2004a:150):
Table 5.2 BNC Concordance to ‘undergo’ in All Its Forms (Random 
30/2,434, Alphabetical Sorting at R1, R2)
 1. similar short term outlook to those undergoing ‘elective’ transplantation.  The
 2. to political democracy, this country underwent . . . no inner conversion. She
 3. any raid I know’. The CCO’s position underwent a fundamental change in  March
 4. organ proper to each sense’—has undergone a good deal of refi nement.  Within
 5. Right Hon. Jeremy Thorpe recently underwent a new and innovative neurosurgical
 6. proper time interval between A and B undergoes a strain of amplitude. Thus the
 7. and hepatocytes of liver allografts undergoing acute rejection. In previous  reports
 8. series of gross acting characters undergoing all manner of grotesque facial
 9. equivalent of the death in the desert undergone by Foucauld. It shows  Christianity
 10. equally important for patients who have undergone cardiac surgery or sufer  from
 11. Excluded because they had previously undergone colectomy for refractory colitis.
 12. forward the nature of the game has undergone considerable changes. For a  time
 13. illumination that he himself has undergone. Despite reviewers’ complaints to
 14. ether therapy. Forty four patients underwent extracorporeal shockwave  lithotrips
 15. socialization experiences the child underwent in its family circumstances. 
 16. Britain and France are currently undergoing major changes, and in both countries
 17. Aspdin’s day cement manufacture was undergoing relatively rapid development 
 18. North American plate boundary had undergone signifi cant changes over  the past
 19. Conservative political thought has also undergone some changes in recent
 20. appreciate that with time both parties underwent some degree of ideological
 21. The central print department has undergone some re-organisation, resulting in
 22. Crisis. Nevertheless, the parties did undergo some transformation as  they adapted
 23. members of a fi rm, these rules will undergo some variation. Thus, when a partner
 24. CRIME, TOOK THE POWDER AND UNDERWENT THE CHANGE IN THE
 25. the target languages themselves are undergoing. The need continually to monitor
 26. destined for a life in isolation before she underwent the operation. Three more
 27. before going into hospital in July to undergo the postponed operation upon his
 28. appearance and even sex, the patient undergoing the regression is none the less
 29. follow up of severely ill patients who underwent cardiac transplantation.
 30. in controls and in patients who had undergone vagotomy and pyloroplasty
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I shall not go into any great detail here, since Stubbs (2001a:89–95) 
makes a thorough analysis of the lexical environment of UNDERGO in 
the corpus he uses, though his observations appear to be based upon the 
base form of the verb alone. He identifi es an unfavourable prosody, point-
ing out (ibid.:92) “characteristic examples from the concordance lines”:
he was forced to • undergo an emergency operation
his character appeared to • undergo a major transformation
each operative had to • undergo the most rigorous test
will • undergo extensive skills and fi tness training
forced to become refugees, to • undergo further migration and further suffering
In these examples it will be noticed that of the things or states of affairs 
which are undergone, only one, it seems, can be unequivocally identifi ed as 
conventionally unfavourable, and that is further suffering. Expressions such 
as major transformation and fi tness training may be favourable or unfa-
vourable, and clearly cannot be labelled without further context. The same 
goes for all the various surgical operations which are ‘undergone’. In Table 
5.2 we fi nd elective transplantation, cardiac surgery, colectomy, the opera-
tion, the postponed operation, urgent cardiac transplantation, vagotomy 
and pyloroplasty. Are these conventionally unfavourable? It goes without 
saying that we would all rather be healthy and not require any sort of hospi-
talisation at all, and seen from this angle a surgical operation is indeed unfa-
vourable. However, ill health is part of life, and many of us need operations 
in order to get better or to save our lives. Now since improved health and 
saved lives are conventionally favourable things, one needs to think twice 
before labelling as unfavourable the surgical operations which can allow 
us to enjoy such things. Stubbs adds (ibid.:90), however, that many of the 
things undergone are “by implication unpleasant, since they are consider-
able, dramatic, drastic, extensive, fundamental, major, profound, radical, 
signifi cant”. Since all of these adjectives can commonly describe positive 
things or states of affairs—for instance IMPROVEMENT or CHANGE 
FOR THE BETTER—the reader might wonder why they are considered 
to contribute to unpleasant implications. It is also observed (ibid.:90) that a 
signifi cant presence to the left of UNDERGO is represented by words and 
expressions conveying the idea of coercion, for example forced to. In the 
concordance supplied by Stubbs, forced to occurs here and there, and might 
be construed as unfavourable, or at least as representing ‘unwillingness’. 
Having said that, it should be borne in mind that the author’s concordance 
concerns only the base form of UNDERGO, which very often corresponds 
to the infi nitive, and the concordance therefore contains a higher percent-
age of left-hand structures requiring the infi nitive than does a concordance 
for UNDERGO in all its forms (the question of the base form of a verb as 
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keyword was discussed in 4.3.2). Indeed in the random BNC selection of 
all forms of UNDERGO in Table 5.2, not only does the idea of coercion 
appear to be absent, but even the instances of incontestably unfavourable 
co-occurrences are few and far between. (See also Bernardini and Aston 
(2002:292–293), who comment on Stubbs’ (ibid.:49) analysis of the co-
occurrences of CAUSE.)
The situation is summarised by Dilts and Newman (2006:233) who, 
with reference to studies on semantic prosody, comment that
the researcher is required to make evaluative judgements in the absence 
of a set of principled criteria to guide the evaluation. Terms such as 
‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ etc. are introduced at will and 
without much care taken to explain the basis for the judgement. This 
aspect of semantic prosody would appear to warrant more attention 
than it has so far received. In fact, the issue is rarely even addressed in 
the typical prosody study.
5.3.1.1 Pleasant and Unpleasant Co-occurrences: Further Examples
Here are some further examples in studies on semantic prosody of con-
testable interpretations of data within a framework of pleasantness and 
unpleasantness.
Tognini-Bonelli (2001:19–21) examines the word FICKLE, citing the 
decision by the Cobuild team in their 1995 dictionary to assign to it 
a prosody of disapproval. The author supports this decision, though 
her support appears to rest upon the fact that FICKLE co-occurs with 
“people, whether women (she, Marianne, mistress), unreliable men/
people (foreigners, young men, new-found friends) or masses (the mass 
favour, voters, opinion polls, public approbation, fans); things that have 
to do with fortune and luck (National Lottery, fortunes, appetites); the 
world of fashion and pop music; and the weather” (19). It cannot be said 
that the various groups of co-occurrences have much to do with each 
other (mistresses or foreigners are not normally associated with opinion 
polls or the National Lottery), and despite a preference such as ‘large 
numbers of people’, no other immediately identifi able preference springs 
to mind.
Tognini-Bonelli (ibid.:20) then states that “we can conclude that to be 
defi ned as FICKLE is a criticism in the English language”. It is undeniable 
that FICKLE does indeed come across as a criticism. It may correspond to 
the (vast) group of terms defi ned by White (2004:231) as “specifi c words or 
fi xed phrases which explicitly carry a negative or positive sense in that the 
positivity or negativity would still be conveyed even if the wordings were 
removed from their current context” (see also 2.2.1). Yet the connection made 
by Tognini-Bonelli between the criticism conveyed by FICKLE and the lexi-
cal environment of FICKLE is not transparent. Later (2001:20) the author 
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records that notoriously “fi gures very prominently in the collocation profi le, 
and exemplifi es the very negative semantic prosody associated with fi ckle”. 
Notoriously would certainly appear to be a ‘bad’ word, and again seems to fi t 
the bill in terms of White’s defi nition, but it is the only recognisably bad word 
in the profi le supplied, while one would expect an unfavourable prosody to 
be based on a more recurrently unfavourable environment. Perhaps the sug-
gestion is that co-occurrences of FICKLE such as foreigners, fans, fortunes, 
public approbation and pop music could be construed as unfavourable too, 
but this is not in any way an obvious step.3 Whereas it may well be true that 
in the concordance for FICKLE these words appear in an unfavourable light, 
this seems to be due more than anything to the fact that they have been quali-
fi ed as fi ckle, whose basic meaning is far from complimentary. Along similar 
lines see Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1996:169), who construes bath, water, 
night, winter, silence, blood, station for a train, response, comfort and legal 
doctrine as being some of the typically negative co-occurrences of COLD.
A fi nal example. Partington (2004a:150), commenting on Stubbs’ dis-
cussion of the semantic prosody attributed to UNDERGO, underlines that 
right-hand co-occurrences of this verb often include the semantic fi elds of 
medicine, tests and change, and then observes that “these words are often 
qualifi ed in less than favourable ways, e.g., rigorous test, dramatic changes”. 
Since rigorous is defi ned in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as ‘extremely 
thorough, exhaustive or accurate’, and ‘strictly applied or adhered to’ 
(though ‘rigorous weather’ is defi ned as ‘harsh weather’), and dramatic as 
‘of or relating to drama’, ‘sudden and striking’, ‘exciting or impressive’, the 
less than favourable element is not objectively or conventionally obvious. It 
seems possible that it is not so much the individual words rigorous and dra-
matic which convey the unfavourable element as the phrases rigorous test 
and dramatic changes, but this would require empirical support, since once 
again it is by no means self-evident (though Partington (ibid.:150) observes 
that “the semantic fi eld of change is often associated with unfavourable 
prosody”).4 Alternatively it could again be argued that any unfavourable 
element attendant upon rigorous and dramatic derives from their juxtapo-
sition with the unpleasant meaning of UNDERGO, which would ensure 
that rigorous and dramatic are interpreted in an unfavourable light.
The question that emerges here is with what procedures and param-
eters do we assess the semantic qualities of a given word’s co-occurrences? 
If we make introspective, context-free considerations, for example, about 
transformations, training, exams, cardiac surgery, young men and fans, or 
about rigorous and dramatic, we may have no sound reasons for evaluating 
them as unfavourable, but if we assess them in relation to the phrases in 
which they appear, whether the node in question is (i) part of that phrase 
(UNDERGO cardiac surgery, FICKLE young men) or (ii) not part of it 
(rigorous test, dramatic changes), then they may come across as unfavour-
able, though it may be primarily the node word itself which is responsible 
for the unfavourable meaning. 
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5.3.1.2 Ambiguous Negativity
Before going any further a brief parenthesis is in order. It needs to be 
underlined that the situation regarding the evaluation of the favourable 
or unfavourable attributes of co-occurrences is further complicated by 
ambiguity attendant upon the terms ‘negative’ and ‘negativity’. It has been 
noted in this book that certain words / units of meaning are recurrently 
described in the literature as being associated with a ‘negative’ semantic 
prosody, something which in turn is directly related to the ‘negativity’ of 
the lexical environment. In these cases ‘negative’ has been adopted as a 
synonym of ‘unfavourable’, but this is not always the case. Tognini-Bonelli 
(2004:15–16), for example, reports that during her corpus investigations 
she found that the word LARGELY typically co-occurred (15) “with a set 
of adjectives and verbs which had negative ‘semantic fi elds’, that is, they 
carried negative semantic meanings”. This reference to negative semantic 
fi elds might initially give the reader the impression that the author is refer-
ring to unfavourable meanings. However, a concordance to LARGELY is 
then supplied, with the R1 occurrences highlighted. These are:
absent, dismisses, dried up, eliminated, extinct, ignored, illiterate, 
overlooked, shunned, toothless, unaudited, unconcerned, unforeseen, 
unknown, unread, unruffl ed, untested.
The author comments (ibid.:16) that 
the negative semantic fi eld is realised at the level of the word by a 
negative prefi x like un- as in unconcerned, unforeseen, unknown, etc. 
or simply by a word with a negative meaning like absent, ignored, 
extinct, etc.
Indeed this combination of morphological and semantic factors is captured 
by the heading supplied for the concordance, i.e., “Morphological and 
semantic negatives in the context of largely”. Thus, if my interpretation 
of this is correct, Tognini-Bonelli is stating that the signifi cant presence, 
immediately to the right of LARGELY, of (i) the privative prefi x un- and 
(ii) words indicating that—loosely defi ned—something is absent or miss-
ing (absent, overlooked, extinct) serves to create an “aura of negativeness” 
(ibid.:16). Whether an aura is created or not, Tognini-Bonelli’s other obser-
vations seem perfectly defensible: “the morphological and semantic nega-
tives” to the right of LARGELY, or at least the majority of them, may well 
be identifi able in terms of something being absent.
Note that the author has not claimed, at least not explicitly, that this 
quality of ‘absence’ is unfavourable, and indeed it would be controversial 
to do so. The absence of something (for example cancer) may of course be a 
good thing, and clearly the favourableness or ‘unfavourableness’ of the situ-
ations described by words such as unruffl ed, unconcerned and unforeseen 
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is impossible to judge without greater knowledge of the contexts in which 
they are used. Nevertheless, Tognini-Bonelli’s use of the terms ‘negative’ and 
‘negativeness’ (again, if I have construed them correctly) is in marked con-
trast with that of most other authors (including myself) commenting upon 
co-occurrence phenomena, who, as noted earlier, use these two terms—as 
well as ‘negativity’—in connection with words and expressions describing 
unfavourable qualities. Personally I would feel more at ease with Tognini-
Bonelli’s use of these terms as described earlier, though the inevitable hazard 
of her reference to LARGELY’s “aura of negativeness” is that she risks being 
misunderstood, especially since later in the article (ibid.:20) she uses ‘nega-
tiveness’ in the ‘unfavourable’ sense when she writes that the co-occurrences 
of FACE as verb would suggest a “semantic prosody of negativeness: what-
ever you are likely to face is usually a very undesirable thing or event”. 
The danger is that the potential ambiguity of ‘negative’, ‘negativity’ and 
‘negativeness’ may induce readers to construe co-occurrences like unruffl ed 
and unconcerned as necessarily describing something unfavourable, some-
thing which may result in a misinterpretation of the prosody. 
The link between grammatical (rather than morphological) and seman-
tic negativity is mentioned by Adolphs and Carter (2002:12), who discuss 
the “negative shading” of semantic prosody in a concordance to POSSI-
BLY in the 5-million word CANCODE corpus they adopt:
In these propositions the negative attitude of the speaker is expressed 
which comes across through negation (‘I couldn’t possibly aspire to 
that’) or by means of a syntactical question (‘Can you possibly move 
your car?’).
The posited connection between the grammatical negative / interrogative 
on the one hand, and the “negative attitude” of the speaker on the other 
seems tenuous, though investigation of the context and broader co-text of 
the two concordance lines in question would help to test the link hypoth-
esised by the authors.
5.3.2 Co-occurrences: Lone Rangers or Socialites?
The arguments put forward in this chapter leave us in something of a 
quandary concerning the way we are to assess the semantic qualities of 
co-occurrences, something upon which semantic prosody depends for its 
lifeblood. For the sake of simplicity I shall for the present continue to 
focus upon the favourable / unfavourable dichotomy. Are we to evaluate 
the meaning of any given co-occurrence (i) on its own (e.g., test) with no 
explicit reference to its relationship with the node in question, or (ii) in 
terms of its relationship and interaction with the node (UNDERGO a 
test), or (iii) in terms of its combination with other co-occurrences of the 
node in question (rigorous test)?
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Stated more simply, the issue at stake is whether co-occurrences are to 
be judged ‘on their own merit’ or on their relationship with other elements 
present in the broader unit of meaning, and this relates back to the question 
discussed in Chapter 4 of whether semantic prosody belongs to the word or 
to the unit of meaning. Louw (1993), whose infl uence on subsequent inves-
tigations was so extensive, apparently favours the former method. To take 
just one brief example, the author’s conclusion that a negative prosody is to 
be inferred for SYMPTOMATIC OF (p.170) appears to rest upon the con-
ventionally unfavourable nature of its co-occurrences (e.g., something deeply 
wrong, parental paralysis, deeper and endemic tensions, numerous disor-
ders, clinical depression), with no mention of their interaction with other 
elements present in the phrase, and the same approach is implied when Sin-
clair analyses SET IN. However, as a rule Sinclair makes judgements which 
are based upon the semantic link between the co-occurrence in question and 
other elements present in the extended unit. In the author’s analysis of pro-
sodic features of REGIME (Sinclair 2003:17–21), the word changes in the 
following line (note 16 of the concordance) is classifi ed as “good” (p.19):
changes if his twenty-year old • regime is to survive. This month marks the
The explanation for this (p.19) is that “changes have to be made, which 
implies that the regime is not good”, i.e., if changes need to be brought 
in, then they are presumably designed to improve something which is bad 
(the regime). Therefore the proposed changes are a good thing, or at least 
a good idea. This is important, because if one were to consider whether 
changes were conventionally favourable or unfavourable with no reference 
to specifi c co-text or context, I daresay the most obvious intuitive answer 
would be neither one the other, that one has to consider the case in question 
(cf. Section 5.3.1.1 and note 1).
Line 27 of Sinclair’s analysis of REGIME is:
the Bush administration to blast the • regime publicly, in terms clear enough for
The co-occurrence blast is classifi ed by the author as “bad” (p.19), though 
in this case there is no accompanying explanation. Analysed in general 
terms, blast might be considered conventionally unfavourable because it 
entails strong and perhaps hostile criticism, but analysed in relation to 
REGIME, one would imagine—according to the argument used by Sin-
clair for changes—that it should be interpreted as good, because, to para-
phrase Sinclair’s words, ‘blasting has to be done, which implies that the 
regime is not good’, i.e., the blasting is a good thing because it involves 
the stigmatising of something bad, and therefore might eventually help to 
get rid of the badness. Compare also Sinclair’s (ibid.:119) concordance to 
HAPPEN as base form, where both the positive-sounding compensation 
(line 9) and miracle (line 15) on the one hand, and the negative-sounding 
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nightmare (line 5), tragedies (line 18) and abuse (line 22) on the other, are 
classifi ed as contributing to prosodies which are “bad—defi nitely”. 
Stubbs (2001a:107–108) also appears to adopt the method whereby 
co-occurrences are judged in terms of their interaction with the node, 
when he describes trade, fi re, success, laughter as “positive collocates” of 
ROARING. Bernardini and Aston (2002:291) point out that fi re “would 
not always seem positively connotated”, its most frequent co-occurrences 
in the BNC being brigade, extinguishers, extinguisher, machine-gun, log, 
lit, brigades, chariots, anti-aircraft, sniper, opened, blazing, fi re, embers, 
crackling, electric, caught, gas, burned, engine. Certainly on an intuitive 
level fi re comes across as neither exclusively positive nor exclusively nega-
tive, so why should it be listed as a positive co-occurrence of ROARING? 
Because, as Bernardini and Aston note, a favourable meaning for fi re is 
inferred from the collocation roaring fi re rather than from the conven-
tional meaning of the collocate fi re (just as, for Stubbs, an unfavourable 
meaning of fi re is inferred from the collocation cause a fi re—see 5.2.1.2). 
The same may apply to the word trade, which generally speaking need not 
be construed as having an unswervingly positive conventional meaning. 
Compare also a concordance line reproduced by Louw (1993:164–166) 
as part of a concordance to BENT ON, reproduced and discussed earlier 
(Section 2.2.2):
seen seems hell • bent on expiating the great Fascist guilt. H
For me the word Fascist does not have favourable associations, and I’m 
not sure guilt has either, though a state of guilt may imply a (good) wish to 
repent. Similarly I do not automatically link Fascist guilt with favourable 
situations, but there may again be the suggestion of a commendable desire 
for atonement. The phrase expiating the great Fascist guilt brings out the 
element of atonement more clearly, and may be interpreted as favourable, 
while being hell bent on something could suggest either favourable or unfa-
vourable tenacity. At the same time, the line taken as a whole may well 
refl ect a healthy initiative. Thus our judgements about the line in question 
will depend not only upon our personal view of the world but also upon 
which chunk of the line we prioritise in our analysis.
The different approaches adopted may all be cogent in their own way, 
but it is clear that if contrasting procedures are applied across studies on 
semantic prosody, or even across single contributions, then the interpreta-
tive stage referred to in 5.3 becomes problematic, because a single piece of 
data may give rise to two diametrically opposed conclusions. The co-occur-
rence miracle, discussed earlier in this section, represents a conventionally 
favourable idea, and therefore might contribute to creating a favourable 
prosody, but if we take the view that miracles are required only when situ-
ations are bad enough to require a miracle, then miracles could be regarded 
as contributing to an unfavourable prosody.
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Finally, to return momentarily to the co-occurrences of REGIME dis-
cussed earlier in this section, is the Bush administration to be considered 
good or bad in the concordance line quoted earlier? In relation to the node, 
presumably good, because it makes / will make / made a public condemna-
tion of REGIME, which Sinclair describes as something bad. Whether the 
Bush (senior) administration is generally or conventionally favourable is 
a consideration I shall leave to the reader, though responses might reveal 
how personal such considerations are, and how subjective our judgements 
can be. As stated earlier, what is one analyst’s meat is another analyst’s 
poison.
5.3.3 Interpreting the Corpus Data: 
Co-occurrences and their Meanings
The assigning of a semantic prosody is thus contingent upon the way the 
corpus analyst forges semantic connections, both on the paradigmatic axis, 
i.e., from one concordance line to the next, and on the syntagmatic axis, 
i.e., in terms of the relationships existing between the various constitu-
ents of single lines. Yet forging semantic connections can be complicated, 
even when it looks easy, because so many words/expressions are polyse-
mous. I would like to illustrate this—and the diffi culties attendant upon the 
interpretation of corpus data in general—by considering the brief analysis 
by Louw (1993: 161–163) of a word combination in Philip Larkin’s poem 
Days. Louw focuses on the line ‘Days are where we live’, claiming that 
despite the fact that the line “purports to offer happy associations”, the 
reader is left “with inexplicable feelings of melancholia” (162), anticipat-
ing the theme of death later in the poem. Louw’s claim is based upon his 
discovery that, in the original 18-million word Cobuild corpus he adopted, 
around two thirds of the co-occurrences immediately to the right of the 
node DAYS ARE consist in over, gone and past. This, it is suggested, tells 
us that “days are not so much where we live as where we have lived and 
where we are likely, possibly sooner rather than later, to die” (ibid.). Louw 
supplies the 21-line concordance from the corpus, stating that the profi le 
which emerges from it is similar to that of a later 37-million word written 
(Cobuild) corpus (Table 5.3).
Louw’s fi ndings are extremely interesting, but need to be handled with 
care. Firstly, the co-text supplied for the 21 lines reproduced is extremely 
restricted, consisting of an average of 5 words to the left and 4 words to the 
right. As a result, Louw’s claim that according to his data it is the prosody 
associated with DAYS ARE which gives rise to the sense of melancholia 
is far from straightforward: although it is undeniable that over and gone 
are the most frequent R1 occurrences in the concordance (past occurs just 
once), it is actually extremely diffi cult to determine from the limited data 
supplied whether or not the various occurrences can justifi ably be grouped 
around the idea of melancholia, or around the related notions of regret, 
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nostalgia, sadness (Louw does not specify explicitly the nature of the pros-
ody in question). Indeed only two (10 and 11) of the 21 lines suggest such 
associations unequivocally:
it was before. Those good old • days are over because trout fi s
Lourenco Marques. Alas those • days are over. What did he die
At fi rst glance there is also an expression of regretful melancholy in 
line 14:
ade me regret that my dancing • days are over. Rudolph couldn’t
though if this were preceded by, for example, ‘ . . . has never m(ade me 
regret) . . . ’ then such an interpretation would be less obvious.
Others are very hard to interpret without expanding the text, e.g., 12 
and 14:
o walk means that his babying • days are over. The stroking cea 
fate of Czechoslovakia. These • days are over, and that is what 
Table 5.3 Concordance to ‘days are’ in Louw 1993 (Alphabetical sorting at R1)
 1. t it yourself the prices those days are absolutely astronomica
 2. ite ‘The world is wide, no two days are alike, nor even two ho
 3. ays are gone whenel. But those days are almost twenty years go
 4. gless extinction when the grey days are done but who are reaso
 5. o men for unequal pay. But the days are gone whenel. But those
 6. or do I. The big beer drinking days are gone. They drank becau
 7. nd cry for peace. My political days are good and over. I’m not
 8. ople making these things these days are making money out of th
 9. erage trawler when its fi shing days are over – as the Morning
 10. it was before. Those good old days are over because trout fi s
 11. Lourenco Marques. Alas those days are over. What did he die
 12. o walk means that his babying days are over. The stroking cea 
 13. ade me regret that my dancing days are over. Rudolph couldn’t
 14. fate of Czechoslovakia. These days are over, and that is what
 15. ng after me Granddad’s working days are past walk along with m
 16. a black black sky. But those days are rare and usually to be
 17. f I had a striking clock. The days are stretching out again a
 18. ness and constancy of country days are the very qualities tha
 19. e the only movies I see these days are these nights, on the l
 20. fi nances of old people these days are very much better than
 21. rate that situation. The hard days are with us and they are c  
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or are incomprehensible (5): 
o men for unequal pay. But the • days are gone whenel. But those 
In the absence of more co-text, we are required to give the author the benefi t 
of the doubt, and assume that he checked the expanded concordance lines 
(the 37-million word corpus no longer exists as such, since it had already 
been incorporated into the Bank of English when Louw wrote the article) in 
order to reach his conclusions. Yet there remains the question of the seman-
tic consistency of the co-occurrences, raised in Section 5.2.1.2. Louw’s con-
clusions rest squarely not only upon the notion that over, gone and past are 
synonyms, or at least that they possess common semantic features, but also 
upon the notion that in this concordance it is the common semantic feature 
of melancholia which prevails. But why should this attitudinal meaning 
prevail over other possible attitudinal meanings of these terms? The fact of 
something being over, gone or past may constitute, among others, a threat, 
a warning, an expression of relief (‘Thank Heaven that’s over!’), a promise, 
or an expression of joy (imagine a person just discharged from prison after 
5 years, who is celebrating in the pub and yelling, beer in hand, ‘my prison 
days are over!’, or soldiers at the front jubilantly embracing and exclaiming 
‘The war’s over’!). The element of melancholia construed by Louw would 
seem to hinge upon the notion that generally speaking whatever is ‘over’ or 
‘gone’ must be something pleasant and that we therefore have feelings of 
nostalgia about it, but this need not be the case at all.
The analyst’s interpretation of the data constitutes a subjective angle 
on what is empirically present in the corpus, and in consideration of the 
old adage tot homines, tot sententiae, a fair number of interpretations are 
possible. In the case in point, the analyst has to decide (i) whether the three 
terms over, gone and past may be placed in the same semantic bracket, 
(ii) whether the various occurrences of each of these terms taken singly, 
e.g., the various occurrences of over, may be placed in the same semantic 
bracket, (iii) which of their ranges of meanings apply to the analysis being 
undertaken. 
A fi nal remark about corpus investigations in Louw’s 1993 article. Free-
man (1995), cited by Tognini-Bonelli (2001:129, note 8), writes:
I fi nd excessive Louw’s claim that ‘semantic prosodies have, in large 
measure and for thousands of years, remained hidden from our percep-
tion and inaccessible to our intuition’ (p.173). Rather, Louw’s (quite 
sound) intuition found candidate semantic prosodies only confi rmed 
by the corpus data.
Louw’s rejoinder to this might be that Freeman is guilty of (vicarious) 
“twenty-twenty hindsight”, i.e., “the tendency to claim that one ‘felt’ the 
presence of a form which was inaccessible to one’s intuition until it was 
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revealed through research” (Louw 1993:173). However, this would leave 
wide open the question of why Louw made his DAYS ARE search in the 
fi rst place. The question of what mechanisms trigger corpus searches will 
be taken up in Chapter 7 within a more general discussion of the role of 
intuition in corpus studies.
Although one sympathises with Freeman’s reaction to the hyperbolic 
nature of Louw’s claim, my angle on this is that Louw’s “(quite sound) 
intuition” was not suffi ciently confi rmed by the corpus data (or at least 
not by the data supplied), and that the former simply overruled the latter. 
Note that the question of whether DAYS ARE really is associated with a 
prosody of melancholy or regret is for present purposes a secondary one. 
Certainly Louw’s insights are fascinating, but my principal concern con-
nects with how the author presents his data and the interpretation that 
arises therefrom.
5.4 SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the relationship between semantic prosody and 
corpus data, arguing that the link between them is perhaps not as inex-
tricable as has been claimed. A brief review was offered of the ways cor-
pus searches are carried out, and this was followed by a discussion of the 
notions of collocation and semantic consistency, both of paramount impor-
tance in the process of identifying prosodies.
It was then claimed that the interpretative methods used in the litera-
ture to identify semantic prosody may be very different from one author to 
the next, because (i) frequently hasty categorisations such as ‘pleasant’ and 
‘unpleasant’ are the outcome of personal and potentially arbitrary points 
of view, because (ii) there are discrepancies concerning the extent of the 
textual chunk analysed, and because (iii) the relevant meaning of words 
appearing near the keyword in a concordance may not be clarifi ed by the 
immediate lexical environment. In any case, it is argued, introspection may 
well prevail over what is actually observed in the corpus.
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6 Semantic Prosody and 
the Concordance
The evidence of things not seen
6.1 CONCORDIA DISCORS: FEATURES OF THE CONCORDANCE
In this chapter I want to pursue the argument that many of the assertions 
made about semantic prosody in the literature are strongly infl uenced by 
the way corpus data, and more specifi cally concordances, are arranged for 
the user by the attendant software.
The concordance is quite unique. Its visual impact is extraordinary. It is 
hard to think of any other situation in which you would fi nd the same word 
or expression positioned line after line down the middle of a screen or page, 
with text all around it. Or any other situation where you would view 20 or 30 
snapshots of unrelated texts juxtaposed in such close proximity. Or any other 
situation where you would fi nd text presented with such fearful symmetry.
The concordance is in a sense the jewel in the corpus linguistics crown, 
capable of assembling large, sprawling amounts of text(s) into neat rows, 
ready for inspection. It has fi nally given linguists the chance to put substan-
tial quantities of text(s) under the microscope, with typical co-selection 
patterns being exposed and rendered analysable. In large general corpora, 
texts from all walks of life, produced by all sorts of different people of 
different ages, languages, breeds and religions, with varying intentions, 
agendas and objectives, are brought together in the corpus melting pot and 
given visibility by the concordance. The concordance has, one might go so 
far as to say, gone some way to taming parole, in the past so elusive and 
insubordinate. It really is a unique invention, allowing us privileged ana-
lysts to view text as it has never been viewed before. The concordance is 
the glorious epitome of abundance, of symmetry, of balance, of modernity. 
And, as its very name suggests, of harmony.
Yet the concordance is, in some respects, a methodical madness.
In the fi rst place, it is extremely diffi cult to read. Sentences have the irk-
some habit of starting off-screen to the left and fi nishing off-screen to the 
right, and we are thus presented with text fragments, interrupted not only 
mid-sentence but often mid-word. This can be particularly off-putting and 
frustrating for the reader who is presented with the concordance on a printed 
page, e.g., as an illustration in an academic article. In this situation there is 
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not much readers can do, unless they take the trouble to fi nd the corpus in 
question and gain permission to use it, something which may be far from 
straightforward.1 If the concordance is on-screen, then it suffi ces to shift the 
cursor to the left or right, or to expand the text, for example by shifting to 
sentence or paragraph mode. This seems simple enough, but after shifting 
left and right between line mode and sentence / paragraph mode around 50 
times, it becomes a toil, above all because we are simply not accustomed to 
reading text in this way. We are used to the traditional method of repeat-
edly reading from left to right and then down, and we are not used to seeing 
sentences lopped at the beginning and end of the line, nor to seeing the same 
word occurring repeatedly down the middle of the page.
Secondly, the sheer number of concordance lines produced by a given 
search can prove too discouraging for proper analysis. Notwithstanding the 
assistance of alphabetical sorting, and the methodology countenanced by 
Sinclair (2003:xiv) of using repeated, manageable selections of concordance 
lines in order to accumulate evidence, analysts may feel that they cannot 
achieve a clear overall ‘picture’ of the concordance. Hunston and Francis 
(1999:20) note more generally that the question of “how to investigate the 
large amounts of data available in a corpus is a crucial one to corpus linguis-
tics, and one that no-one as yet is in a position to answer fully”.
Thirdly, however much one is prepared to check the co-text, this over-
all picture remains fragmentary. Even a paragraph may be no more than 
a fragment of a much larger text with its own unique network of textual 
relationships. Unless one spends a prodigious amount of time examining 
co-text and context in the corpus, the effect might be that of operating 
within a contextual vacuum. Once again, as readers we fi nd this unusual. 
Traditional reading methods almost always involve knowledge of source 
and context. Readers of a newspaper column, for example, usually have 
a clear idea of these: they will know the newspaper, how popular it is, 
whether it is regional or national, its political leanings, its rival newspapers, 
the section of the paper containing the column in question, the average 
length of the column, its typical language and register. They may recognise 
the style of the columnist, any topical references, any in-jokes, any rejoin-
ders to other columnists etc. They will also expect the column to have a 
recognisable beginning, middle and end. Readers are comforted by familiar 
context. Where that context is absent, the effect can be perplexing. (This is 
by no means to imply that a newspaper column will mean exactly the same 
thing to all its readers. As Sinclair (1996b:110) points out: “An artefact like 
a book or newspaper will have as many interpretations as readers”.)
Tognini-Bonelli (2001:3) provides an important summary of the main 
differences between a single text and a corpus. A text is (i) read whole, 
(ii) read horizontally, (iii) read for content, (iv) read as a unique event, (v) 
read as an individual act of will, (vi) an instance of parole, (vii) a coherent 
communicative event, whereas a corpus (i) is read fragmented, (ii) is read 
vertically, (iii) is read for formal patterning, (iv) is read for repeated events, 
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(v) is read as a sample of social practice, (vi) gives insights into langue, (vii) 
is not a coherent communicative event.
Many of the issues I raise here have been discussed and rediscussed in 
works on corpus linguistics (see, for example, Baker (2006) and Stubbs 
(2007a) for interesting accounts), so I shall confi ne myself to focusing on 
what is my main claim here: that reading a concordance can prove to be 
a disorienting experience, and may distort our view of things. Indeed I 
wish to argue that, although it is often said that the concordance enables 
us to discover patterns which would otherwise be invisible (e.g., Stubbs 
2007a:155), it may also make us see things which are not actually there. 
Our long-standing familiarity with more orthodox text structures (books, 
newspapers, manuals) may result in our misguidedly working on tradi-
tional assumptions when confronted with a concordance. In my view this 
has important repercussions for both the way we interpret data in general, 
something which will be examined in the following section, and for the 
way we theorise about semantic prosody, which will be discussed in the 
subsequent sections. 
6.2 READING CONCORDANCES: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DATA INTERPRETATION
The aspects outlined in the previous section may be considered to have the 
following implications for the interpretation of concordance data:
Implication (i): There is a tendency to focus on the immediate environment 
to the left and right of the keyword. As Kennedy (1998:8) points out:
CL has developed something of a life of its own within linguistics, with 
a tendency to focus on lexis and lexical grammar [ . . . ] This is partly 
a result of using methodologies such as concordancing where the con-
textual evidence available in a single line of wide-carriage computer 
print-out of 130 characters is sometimes too limited for the analysis of 
syntax or discourse.
Indeed the prioritisation of lexis is often taken to be, as Mahlberg (2007:193) 
puts it, one of the “key pillars of a corpus theoretical framework”, and it is 
lexis—particularly its relationship with grammar—which constitutes the raw 
material of much of the theoretical discussion in corpus linguistics (ibid.:192). 
Yet a potential problem of this focus on the immediate environment is that 
in our ‘normal’ reading of single texts we are used to assuming that the text 
in question is actually on the page / screen in front of us, and this may result 
in a certain reluctance to move across to the ‘wings’ of the concordance. The 
human eye naturally alights upon what is more visually manageable in one 
glance, and this will be, above all with the aid of alphabetical sorting, what 
lies immediately to the left and/or right of the keyword.
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Implication (ii): The perfect symmetry of the concordance, with its high-
lighted keyword(s) splitting the screen down the middle and with an equal 
amount of text on either side, may give an illusory impression of balance 
and textual unity. So much so that users might temporarily forget that the 
various lines of text in the concordance may have absolutely nothing to do 
with each other aside from the fact that they share the word under observa-
tion. In other words, we might temporarily fail to recall that we are dealing 
with texts rather than text. As Hunston (2002:110) notes, “corpus search 
and processing techniques [ . . . ] will tend to obscure the character of each 
text as a text”. The consequence of this may be the subconscious creation 
of a false relationship of cohesion between the individual lines visible on 
the screen.
Implication (iii): In a concordance the only unchanging element is the 
keyword. If a corpus is lemmatised, then we can retrieve all the forms of a 
given lemma, e.g., lucky, luckier, luckiest; put, puts, putting, but our key-
word is more or less constant. The word under observation is thus in stark 
contrast with what may be highly varied text to the left and right of it. It 
constitutes the axis of the concordance, with the resulting impression that 
everything ‘revolves’ around it.
Implication (iv): As the axis of the concordance, the keyword is in cen-
tral position. When concordances are reproduced in works on corpus lin-
guistics, the keyword is often set apart from the text around it by means 
of italics, bold type or extra spacing. Notwithstanding the fact that syn-
tagmatic relations between item and environment are certainly highlighted 
by concordancing, the effect may be that of distancing and separating the 
keyword from its syntagmatic environment.
Implication (v): The ‘exposure’ of data in a concordance may give the 
impression that meaning can be seen and observed. Concordances are able 
to lay bare item and close environment so effi ciently that the temptation is 
to assume that meaning is exposed in the same manner, that we can directly 
observe meaning just as we can directly observe lexical environment.
All this may sound abstract, but I feel that each of these suggested impli-
cations actually fi nds support in the methods and observations found in 
studies on semantic prosody. In the next fi ve sections I shall discuss the 
relevance for semantic prosody of each of the fi ve implications above.
6.2.1 Implication (i): A Tendency to Focus on 
the Immediate Lexical Environment
The relevance of this implication to semantic prosody is fairly transpar-
ent. Analyses of semantic prosody tend to be based on observations made 
within the restricted concordance window mentioned by Kennedy above. 
The notions of co-occurrence and co-selection—within the domain of 
semantic prosody—basically correspond to co-occurrence and co-selection 
within a span of fi ve or six words to the left and fi ve or six words to the 
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right. Words and expressions occurring outside this window are rarely con-
sidered. I shall not discuss here whether this is a matter of theoretical rel-
evance or simply convenience, but the fact remains that text to the left and 
right of this window appears to lie outside semantic prosody’s remit. This 
has two major consequences, which are however linked.
The fi rst is that the narrow confi nes of the 5:5 or 6:6 span may restrict 
our understanding of the individual lines, causing us to make hypotheses 
about the broader text and to assume things about the immediate environ-
ment which may not actually be present. This is the claim I made in 5.3.3 
in connection with Louw’s interpretation of DAYS ARE.
The second consequence is that the focus on a restricted span comes 
across as odd if we consider the emphasis of discourse and pragmatics in 
studies on semantic prosody, i.e., it seems inconsistent that a notion which 
purports to prioritise discourse should lose its strength once it steps outside 
the 5:5 window. Koller and Mautner (2004:224), on the subject of the iden-
tifi cation of semantic prosodies as a basis for evaluating authorial stance, 
warn that 
care must be taken to look beyond the chosen collocational span or 
the standard concordance line [ . . . ] one must be careful not to miss 
hedges and distancing devices which may be located just outside the 
narrow frame selected. 
Or, for that matter, several sentences away. When investigating the word 
FEDERAL in a corpus of editorials from The Daily Telegraph, Koller and 
Mautner (ibid.:223) found it better to use a span of 25 words to the left 
and right of the node. See also Dam-Jensen and Zethsen (2008:210) on the 
environment of LEAD TO.
6.2.2 Implication (ii): An Impression of Textual Unity
This implication, concerning how a concordance may give an erroneous 
impression of textual unity and cohesion, is less far-fetched than it might seem. 
Firstly, it was underlined in Chapter 5 that various authors, when discussing a 
word’s co-occurrences, refer to the notions of semantic sets, and the semantic 
consistency of a word’s ‘collocates’. It was also noted that in many studies of 
semantic prosody this semantic consistency is confi ned to whether the co-
occurrences are to be considered conventionally favourable or unfavourable. 
With this in mind, I shall try to illustrate this impression of textual unity with 
a BNC concordance to UTTERLY (Table 6.1), a word to which a negative 
semantic prosody has often been ascribed (e.g., Louw 1993:160–161).
According to the criterion of semantic consistency, UTTERLY has been 
assigned an unfavourable prosody because it has elements in its profi le, 
such as confounded, immature, manic and miserable, which are ‘semanti-
cally consistent’, or belong to the same ‘semantic set’. 
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Table 6.1 BNC Concordance to ‘utterly’ (Random 30/1,251, Alphabetical 
Sorting at R1)
 1. Germany’s political map has changed utterly and it has no one of Strauss’  size.
 2. Ireland, no prison was ever sealed so utterly and so completely that there  was not
 3. the eve of the event and he said: ‘I am utterly and totally hacked off. I’ve spent
 4. looking after. And she was hopelessly, utterly besotted with him. He was  the man
 5. as the ‘top keyboard at the moment’ is utterly beyond me! K-board Described as
 6. ‘do you think?’ Tom Reynolds was utterly captivated with himself. ‘Clever of
 7. desserts can be consumed with an utterly clear conscience when you have
 8. room, but the ‘Rule of Taste’ has been utterly confounded by eclecticism. It is
 9. that period, quite frankly they’re, they’re utterly confused, they don’t understand
 10. If all were clear, undilemmatic and utterly consistent for the members of a
 11. of the Durban Test the pitch was so utterly dead that Peter Pollock, at full
 12. and well-meaning, and so on; but so utterly deadly, my dear! Even Roger . . .
 13. have hindered me much and now so utterly discouraged me that the service I
 14. countries that, until lately, have been utterly excluded from consideration – those
 15. when the collection is launched it is utterly free from criticism by even the most
 16. P A Newton sees fi t to resort to the utterly immature tactic of hiding behind a
 17. enough to see that it would ruin him utterly. In some ways the more temptation
 18. an academic career. Determined to be utterly dependent of Bart, he slowly  worked
 19. about what was a diffi cult, trying and utterly maddening creature Nora  was. It 
 20. faces when they open them. The pace is utterly manic, the bickering relent less and
 21. Liberals and humanists had been utterly misconceived. The New Testament
 22. ankle business had made her feel utterly miserable and vulnerable. She’d
 23. his voice was rising. Charity’s was utterly relaxed and quite level as she posed
 24. Duchamp’s readymades) and some utterly routine panting over the outlandish
 25. him. The image was awesome and utterly seductive. My second memory is of
 26. to apply to the new religion the utterly unalterable condition that the ancient
 27. of adversity arose a hardened hero, utterly uncompromising, a succession of
 28. Deputy Speaker that this government is utterly unconcerned to carry out  an obligation
 29. of use to scientists. It was, of course, utterly useless. Deliberate learning  situations
 30. least one unprovable assumption, it is utterly wrong for any person to  instruct a child
One wonders if there exists any other situation beyond a concordance 
where confounded, immature, manic and miserable would be placed within 
the same semantic set. Yet since they can all be qualifi ed by UTTERLY, 
they may well appear in a concordance within just a short distance of each 
other, perhaps even one below the other, and in the company of many other 
apparently unpleasant words. The next move is as easy as it is false. The 
adjectives mentioned, and other co-occurrences of UTTERLY such as 
deadly and useless, are (i) all conventionally unfavourable, (ii) can all be 
qualifi ed by UTTERLY, and (iii) may all appear together on screen as R1 
co-occurrences of UTTERLY, neatly aligned with other words of unfa-
vourable meaning. Ergo, they all belong to the same semantic set. 
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The drawback, as noted in 5.2.1.2, is that they do not belong to the 
same semantic set. There are millions of conventionally unfavourable 
things, people and states of affairs. Are we to lump all these together under 
the same conceptual heading? Both a mosquito bite and germ warfare are 
unfavourable: are they to be considered members of the same semantic set? 
By making this move we create a paradigmatic relationship of imagined 
semantic proximity between the various co-occurrences of the node.
There is a further pitfall, introduced in 5.2.1.1. Semantic prosody has 
been described in the literature as meaning which results from a form being 
imbued by its collocates, or from the proximity of a consistent series or set 
of collocates, and this again has been applied to UTTERLY. In 5.2.1.1 it 
was pointed out that in linguistics the term ‘collocate’ is usually used to 
describe words which co-occur frequently with the node. However we wish 
to defi ne ‘frequent’, it needs to be remarked that many of the supposedly 
unfavourable co-occurrences of UTTERLY appear with it only once in the 
BNC (confounded, deadly, misconceived, unalterable, and uncompromis-
ing). So, to repeat the question asked in Chapter 5, why would we wish 
to bestow upon these ‘one-offs’ the status of collocates? The answer is in 
my view that we make a further false move. Take the combination utterly 
unalterable, a hapax legomena in the BNC. In other circumstances it seems 
extremely unlikely that unalterable would be considered to have a collo-
cational relationship with UTTERLY. But when unalterable appears in a 
concordance on-screen among a whole ‘pack’ of co-occurrences, one below 
the other, all the way down the screen, it may insidiously ‘convert’ to the 
status of collocate, with the result that an imaginary syntagmatic relation-
ship is established between utterly and unalterable. By making this barely 
perceptible move we create a false syntagmatic relationship of recurrent 
proximity between node and co-occurrence.
The two moves described are thus the result of relationships of imagined 
proximity, whether syntagmatic or paradigmatic, and the impression of 
proximity appears to be the result of the amassing of text fragments within 
a confi ned space.
Further, if we allow (i) that a single co-occurrence, though semantically 
quite different in meaning (aside from its unpleasantness) from the other 
co-occurrences of the same node, can be considered to occupy the same 
semantic set as those others, and if we allow (ii) that a single co-occurrence, 
though it occurs just once with the node in question, can be said to be a col-
locate of that node, then we are only one small step away from a far more 
perilous move, which is that of converting neutral-looking co-occurrences 
into pleasant or unpleasant ones. 
As we have seen (5.3.1), a random selection from a concordance to 
UNDERGO in the BNC contains a number of (apparently) unfavour-
able right-hand co-occurrences such as colectomy, vagotomy and pyloro-
plasty. If we fi nd in a concordance, above or below both these and other 
unfavourable-sounding (whether they are actually favourable or not—see 
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again 5.3.1) procedures within the same ‘column’, expressions such as rig-
orous test or major changes, we may assume that these must be unpleas-
ant too, rolling them together with the more unfavourable co-occurrences. 
And the same may apply to a co-occurrence such as uncompromising in 
the UTTERLY concordance above, a co-occurrence which, when viewed 
among a mass of other words on the vertical axis such as deadly, madden-
ing, misconceived, miserable and useless, may convert to something unfa-
vourable notwithstanding that in the broader co-text in question it actually 
comes across as a positive, heroic attribute. 
I would argue that the tendency to convert neutral-looking co-occur-
rences into pleasant or unpleasant ones (but usually the latter) is not uncom-
mon in contributions on semantic prosody. Hunston (2002:61–62), for 
instance, examines the phrasal verb SIT THROUGH as a base form, not-
ing that “it often follows have to or an expression indicating that pressure 
has been exerted, or an expression indicating that someone does not want 
to do something”. These expressions include he was forced to sit through, 
was unfortunate enough to sit through, even idle curiosity is no reason to 
sit through this sad dud. And these observations would indeed appear to 
support the author’s conclusion that SIT THROUGH is associated with 
a prosody of boredom and discomfort. However, Hunston goes on (ibid.) 
to furnish a separate concordance for all the other forms of the verb aside 
from the base form, reproduced in Table 6.2.
The author then notes (2002:62) that in many of these lines the verb-form
is followed by an indication of a specifi c length of time (lines 1,3,5,7,14) 
or by an indication that the length of time is judged to be uncomfort-
ably long (lines 8,10,20). In line 12, the indication of tedium comes 
before the verb. 
Again these observations seem to me indisputable, but Hunston then con-
cludes that “in over half the lines for sat / sits / sitting through, there is clear 
evidence” of the said prosody of boredom or discomfort, a conclusion which 
I fi nd problematic. I would certainly not contest that SIT THROUGH as a 
phrasal verb has an unfavourable meaning which includes the idea of bore-
dom and/or discomfort, nor would I necessarily take issue with the notion 
that the meaning suggested can be expressed in prosodic terms. Neverthe-
less I am not convinced that the prosody of boredom or discomfort may 
be evinced from anything like over half the concordance lines in question, 
and this is because the indication of a specifi c length of time or frequency, 
e.g., an hour and 20 minutes (line 7), half-hour speech (line 14), many a 
summit (line 13), are not infallible indications of something being too long 
or frequent, and therefore are not infallible indications of boredom or dis-
comfort. Take line 3:
with it. So the prospect of • sitting through a 3- to 4-hour history of
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If we were to replace sitting through in this line with watching, then there 
would be no manifest indication of boredom or discomfort. Certainly we 
fi nd an expression conveying “a specifi c length of time” (3- to 4-hour), but 
taken on its own this does not need to be unfavourable. The word HOLI-
DAY also co-occurs frequently with specifi c periods of time (her two-week 
holiday, a month’s holiday), but I do not think the analyst would necessar-
ily wish to construe these as boring or too long. And if the oral exams at 
my university in Italy lasted 3–4 hours, I might well experience a sense of 
relief, since they can sometimes go on for days. 
Now it might be contended that in line 3 the string the prospect of is 
likely to be followed by something unfavourable, but that would need to be 
stated and is in any case debatable. In reality the only element which incon-
testably ensures the unfavourable reading is sitting through itself, and this 
is true of the majority of the lines in the concordance supplied. I would not 
deny that these forms of SIT THROUGH have semantic preferences which 
include (i) ‘a length of time’ and (ii) ‘boredom’, but these on their own can-
not all automatically convert to a formula such as ‘something long and 
boring’, at least not on the basis of the evidence supplied. Saying that some-
thing lasted a length of time is not the same as saying something was long, 
and certainly not the same as saying something was too long. A 5-minute 
wait, for example, might be quite short. 
Table 6.2 Concordance to ‘sat/sits/sitting through’ in Hunston 2002 
(Alphabetical Sorting at R1)
 1. nth, never mind the year, but having sat through 90 harrowing minutes, I  can
 2. Van de Velde) and Andrew and we sat through a few videos and they  showed
 3. with it. So the prospect of sitting through a 3- to 4-hour history of
 4. that I don’t generally get while sitting through a movie. Simon: Tell
 5. trial places on their clients. Sitting through a six-month trial as a
 6. ggled simultaneously yesterday as he sat through a screening of the low-
 7. already released fi ve titles). Sitting through an hour and 20 minutes of
 8. heading. He later revealed that he sat through boring public zoning
 9. Red Sea, Moses-style. Those who’ve sat through Cecil B de Mille’s epic  fi lm
 10. but his patience was remarkable. He sat through endless negotiating  sessions
 11. Wayne-Katharine Hepburn classic. I sat through it twice and then came  home
 12. nnel should pay its viewers for sitting through live coverage of England
 13. nsen: You know, Dan, you and I have sat through many a summit together and—
 14. UN representative, Abdul Al-Anbari, sat through the half-hour speech,  and
 15. Mr Goldman Sr and his family had sat through the courtroom proceedings
 16. by Domican. Domican, who has sat through the hearing, survived a  mach
 17. went to church with his parents and sat through the service and the  sermon
 18. in the MGM commissary, he not only sat through the following speech  but
 19. our home grown industry and having sat through this delightful, acid,  piece
 20. Yes we we went and sat through to the bitter end you see.
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So why has Hunston claimed “clear evidence” for the prosody she has 
inferred? There would seem to be two possible explanations. Firstly, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, it could well be that the clear evidence in question 
is based not on the co-text alone, which in the concordance supplied (Table 
6.2) is for the most part fairly neutral, but on the longer unit containing 
both the core item and its surrounds. If this is the case, however, the draw-
back is that, within this unit, the unfavourable meaning of the core item 
SITS/SAT/SITTING THROUGH is so dominant that it overwhelms the 
relative neutrality of much of the co-text, which becomes almost irrelevant. 
It would be rather like analysing a sentence (my example) such as We were 
threatened by some lads with sticks, where the sequences some lads, with 
sticks, or some lads with sticks could certainly be interpreted in an unfa-
vourable light (i.e., ‘nasty youths with weapons’), but only because of the 
overriding infl uence of the sense of menace conveyed by the verb.
Secondly, it could be that if the node looks as if it has a number of 
unfavourable co-occurrences (for SITS/SAT/SITTING THROUGH these 
would include harrowing, boring, and endless negotiating), then its more 
‘neutral’ co-occurrences (a few videos, many a summit, hearing, an hour 
and 20 minutes) may involuntarily be ‘converted’ to unpleasant ones for 
reasons of a supposed semantic proximity which may be a direct conse-
quence of their physical, vertical adjacency in the concordance. In the same 
way, the apparently more unfavourable environment of SIT THROUGH as 
base form may have infl uenced the analyst’s judgements.
By amassing large numbers of textual occurrences and arranging them 
in rows and columns, the concordance encourages group power. Strength 
is gained through proximity with the pack, something which perhaps adds 
another dimension to Louw’s assertion that words “usually hunt in packs” 
(1993:172 and 2000:55). But we need to consider whether it might not be 
the very structure of the concordance which encourages this pack mental-
ity, creating a powerful impression of group cohesion and unity. Such cohe-
sion and unity, however, above all within a large general corpus, may be no 
more than an optical illusion.
6.2.3 Implication (iii): The Constancy and Centrality of the Keyword
Implication (iii) focused on the fact that in a concordance the one more 
or less constant element is the keyword, while the text around it can 
vary considerably. The keyword, one might speculate, is apparently solid 
and unwavering, the text around it is not: a constant rock amid a tur-
bulent sea of text. The rock is hit by the waves but does not hit them; 
it is acted upon rather than acting; it receives but does not give. Over 
time, its apparent solidity may gradually be eroded, it may begin to 
change shape as it is subjected to the relentless force of the waves and the 
winds which surround it. It is infl uenced and modifi ed by its immediate 
environment.
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This metaphor may seem bizarre, but it is no more than one metaphor 
among a cluster of others in studies on semantic prosody. It was noted in 
Chapter 3 that semantic prosody appears to attract metaphors, but one won-
ders if it is not the concordance itself which is the magnet. Perhaps it is ulti-
mately the structure of a concordance which makes Louw (1993) suggest 
that a form is “imbued by its collocates”, that makes other scholars suggest 
that a semantically neutral form ‘takes on’ or ‘acquires’ other meanings from 
its environment, or is ‘tainted’ or ‘infected’ by them. Fundamental to lexical 
grammar is that words interact and infl uence each other constantly, but the 
layout of the concordance, with the node on the vertical axis and surrounded 
by its co-text, may subliminally lead us to believe that the node is being acted 
upon rather than acting, an easy prey to the semantic forces around it.
The idea of semantic neutrality is implied by Whitsitt (2005:292–293) 
when he argues, with specifi c reference to Louw (1993), that “semantic 
prosody posits the idea of an empty form, or a word being innocent of 
meaning”. This is ultimately because, Whitsitt argues: “When a word or 
pattern is selected for observation, it is methodologically imperative for the 
observer to suspend all meaning or content concerning that which is being 
observed”. He continues (ibid.):
In other words, what explains why Louw’s form is empty is that it is 
simply the term under observation. As such, that term, according to 
empirical methodology itself, has been emptied, or had its meaning and 
content suspended.
Whitsitt’s comments could be applied to all sorts of search methodologies 
in language study. For example, it could be that when we seek, in a bilin-
gual dictionary, a foreign-language word which we have seen in context but 
whose meaning is not entirely clear to us, we temporarily “suspend” our 
hunches about its meaning and let the dictionary take over. And it may be 
that this suspension of meaning is particularly germane to investigations 
with a concordance—we may suspend our hunches about the meaning of 
the keyword and let the co-text take over. It is then only a short step further 
to hypothesise that the reasonably constant but essentially solitary nature 
of the keyword under observation, at the very centre of its environment, 
makes it an innocent and unreactive prey to the battering of the elements, 
a passive victim of the vicious forces at work all around it—Oliver Twist in 
the swirl of London, infl uenced by the likes of Fagin and the Artful Dodger. 
The ‘pure’, passive node is envisaged as acted upon rather than acting, as 
sinned against rather than sinning.
6.2.4 Implication (iv): The Lone Keyword
Implication (iv) concerns the fact that in a typical concordance the keyword 
is set apart from the text around it—by means of italics, bold or extra 
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spacing—and that this may give the impression it is somehow detachable 
from its co-text. While it is clear that syntagmatic relations between a word 
and its immediate environment can be highlighted by concordancing, the 
physical structure of the concordance may have the effect of distancing 
the keyword from its environment. Indeed this sense of distance may help 
to answer a question which was central to Chapter 4, i.e., why semantic 
prosody so often comes across in the literature as being a property of the 
word rather than of a longer sequence (indeed the ideas put forward in this 
and the previous section would appear to apply more readily to the notion 
that semantic prosody is the property of the word). 
An example of this apparent distancing of a word and its co-text is perhaps 
work which analyses semantic prosody across languages, discussed briefl y in 
section 1.2.2. It was noted that a number of contributions compare prosodies 
of near-synonyms across English and another language (Xiao and McEnery 
2006: English / Chinese; Berber-Sardinha 2000: English / Portuguese; Mun-
day forthcoming: English / Spanish; Partington 1998: English / Italian). One 
might argue that what is implicitly acknowledged in these studies is a fairly 
clean split between a word and its co-text, with the co-text being respon-
sible for the prosody. As explained in 1.2.2, the authors in question depart 
from the premise that certain words belonging to different languages, in view 
of their similar basic meanings, can be regarded as near-synonyms. Hav-
ing established what they believe to be nearly synonymous cross-language 
pairings, they then compare the prosodies of these pairings. Berber-Sardinha 
(2000), for example, compares the respective prosodies he identifi es for SET 
IN as a phrasal verb and its Portuguese dictionary equivalents MANIFE-
STAR-SE and ESTABELECER-SE, amongst others. Let us focus on one 
of these. It is stated that the environment of ESTABELECER-SE does not 
mirror the unfavourable environment of SET IN, and indeed the author con-
cludes more generally that there are no direct equivalents for SET IN in Por-
tuguese. However, since the author has chosen to compare them in the fi rst 
place, he must be operating on the assumption that there is at least a basic 
dictionary equivalence between SET IN and ESTABELECER-SE, in which 
case his conclusion must ultimately be that these two verbs have similar basic 
meanings but are characterised by different prosodies.
However, approaching this from a different direction one could just as eas-
ily claim that SET IN and ESTABELECER-SE have different basic meanings, 
i.e., that despite a common semantic property of something ‘starting / estab-
lishing itself’, the meanings of the two verbs are fundamentally different. The 
same goes for Partington’s (1998:77–78) observations regarding the “look-
alike” words IMPRESSIVE and the Italian IMPRESSIONANTE, which 
“have very different semantic prosodies”. While a componential analysis 
might well reveal a common semantic core such as ‘striking’, one could just as 
well argue that the two adjectives differ not so much in their prosodies as their 
denotational meanings—IMPRESSIVE means good, of good standard, e.g., 
an impressive performance, whereas IMPRESSIONANTE corresponds to 
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shocking or extraordinary (whether for good reasons or bad), e.g., igno-
ranza impressionante—‘shocking ignorance’; velocità impressionante—
‘extraordinary speed’.
Of course Partington’s remarks have important pedagogical implications 
inasmuch as they stress the unreliability of ‘false friends’ across languages, 
but whether the difference between the two words should be expressed in 
prosodic terms is open to question. Compare also a monolingual example 
from Xiao and McEnery (2006:108), who, with reference to Tognini-Bo-
nelli (2001:18–24), classify FICKLE and FLEXIBLE as “near-synonyms” 
with differing semantic prosodies. This classifi cation as near-synonyms 
appears to assume that the core semantic element of these two terms is 
‘changeability’ or something similar, but that the good prosody inferred for 
FLEXIBLE, and the bad prosody inferred for FICKLE, must lie outside 
that core, because otherwise the hypothesis of synonymy would not hold.
It may be only the semantic prosodist—or the componential analyst—
who would wish to consider set in / estabelecer-se, fl exible / fi ckle, as near-
synonyms, but it seems legitimate to propose that criteria of near-synonymy 
should ideally include the respective prosodies in the fi rst place, i.e., the 
decision that words are near-synonyms should be based upon an evaluation 
of both their basic meanings and their prosodies.
In short, behind a number of studies on semantic prosody lies the premise 
that the basic meaning of a word may be uncoupled from its prosody. In view 
of the fact that the notion of detaching basic meaning from semantic prosody 
is a controversial one (certainly within Sinclair’s framework it would be com-
pletely implausible), my very tentative hypothesis here is that any separation 
of this kind may in part be the result of a visual impression created by the 
syntagmatic solitariness of the node within the KWIC facility, with basic 
meaning belonging to the node, and prosody supplied by the co-text.
6.2.5 Implication (v): The Eye of the Beholder, 
or Things Visible and Invisible
This implication concerns the idea that the structure of the concordance, 
which ‘exposes’, which renders visible word and environment, can equally 
expose and render visible semantic prosody. Such is the strength of the 
association between semantic prosody and the empirical world of corpus 
linguistics (see 5.1), that at times semantic prosody itself is apparently 
considered to be an empirical phenomenon which is perfectly amenable 
to direct observation. It was noted in Chapter 3 that some of the meta-
phors in the literature delineate semantic prosody in visual terms, e.g., as 
a type of “colouring”, “hue” or “shade”, or as a “halo”, and as “barely 
visible to the naked eye”. Moreover, as reported in 5.1, according to some 
authors semantic prosody can be ‘observed’ by analysing corpus data or 
be ‘revealed’ by corpus data. Other scholars write that it can be ‘shown’, 
‘manifested’ and even ‘exhibited’ or ‘displayed’ (perhaps in part because the 
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KWIC facility is often referred to as a ‘display’) through corpus searches, 
all of which imply that semantic prosody is plain for all to ‘see’, as if it 
were in a glass case, just as long as one has access to corpus data. Yet the 
notion that semantic prosody is so transparently exhibited or manifested 
by corpus data collides with comments by Sinclair, who is often at pains to 
underline (e.g., 1998:20, 22, 2004:174) that the ways in which a prosody is 
expressed are extremely varied, with virtually no restrictions on its formal 
realisation, thus “making it diffi cult for a human or computer to fi nd it 
reliably” (1998:20).
Many descriptions of semantic prosody are based on the premise that it 
is visible, but this is already to approach meaning from a debatable angle. 
Strictly speaking meaning is understood, construed, grasped, followed, 
acquired, absorbed etc., or conversely misunderstood, misconstrued, 
beyond us etc. The overriding emphasis on the visible seems to be a conse-
quence of the indissoluble link between semantic prosody and the concor-
dance, because concordance analysis requires the intervention of the eyes 
rather than that of the other senses. 
This is not to suggest that generally speaking the appropriation of mean-
ing is never considered in visual terms—language abounds with visual meta-
phors, and English has many expressions such as ‘I see your meaning/point’ / 
‘Do you see what I mean?’ as well as the ‘reading’ of a text in the sense of the 
interpretation of a text. Nevertheless the visual dimension is salient in discus-
sions of semantic prosody. I have already quoted Partington’s (2004a:131–132) 
remark to the effect that semantic prosody is similar to connotative meaning 
but “much less evident to the naked eye”, where the visual metaphor is power-
ful. Now it could simply be that this is just one more metaphor among many 
in descriptions of semantic prosody, with a playful allusion to Sinclair’s cor-
pus investigations into the expression naked eye, and should not be construed 
too literally. Yet perhaps we should be wary of over-prioritising the visual, 
because strictly speaking we should not expect to ‘see’ meaning at all, any 
more than we should expect, say, to hear it. The very idea that the eye is privi-
leged rather than the ear may imply that it is only by looking at something—
rather than hearing something, which in everyday communicative interaction 
is, one imagines, the most usual channel for detecting meanings—that we are 
able to understand a prosody. The impression is that semantic prosody, like 
little children, should be seen but not heard. 
An obvious objection to this argument is that for language analysts it is 
a matter of necessity to prioritise the eye rather than the ear. As Teubert 
(2007:59) reminds us:
The discipline of linguistics presupposes written or otherwise recorded 
language, language archived in whatever form, language that is avail-
able for analysis. Spoken language, language that already fades in the 
instant of its production cannot be subjected to analysis. Even when we 
investigate speech, we have to rely on recordings and transcripts.
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The emphasis on written texts in linguistics is undeniable, whether they 
started life as written or spoken texts, and corpora epitomise this reality. 
Nevertheless, one cannot help feeling that in the present context the ‘naked 
eye’—essentially the eye unassisted by corpus data—is subliminally being 
opposed to the ‘eye’ of the corpus analyst who, with the aid of corpus 
searches that render visible what was previously shrouded in the darkness 
of thought, is now able to ‘see’ unhindered. Cf. Stubbs (2001b) who, hav-
ing stated (see 5.1) that discourse prosody is not observable (449), then 
argues (450) that “Conventionally encoded evaluative meanings are not 
observable in isolated instances, but only in repeated co-occurrences of 
lexis across large corpora”.
Stubbs is right to point out that co-selection patterns can help us infer 
semantic features, but the latent assumption is that certain types of mean-
ing, though essentially invisible, are granted visibility by the corpus. The 
assumption is a risky one, however, especially within the framework of 
something as elusive as evaluative meaning. We might compromise by stat-
ing that “as corpus linguists we can identify the starting-point of what is 
visible of meaning: the words in texts” (Mahlberg 2005:147). However, 
Hunston (2004:159) includes the rider that even with the help of corpus 
investigations “the reliable identifi cation and quantifi cation of evaluative 
meanings remains essentially problematic”, while Partington (2004b:17) 
underlines that “Evaluative meaning is all-pervasive in human communica-
tion, it is interwoven in the very fabric of texts and just how much of it is 
accessible to corpus technology is a vital experimental question”. Indeed it 
is, and such comments might be applied not only to evaluative meaning, but 
to meaning in general.
6.3 A CORPUS CAN PROVE ANYTHING AND ITS OPPOSITE
Over fi fteen years ago Svartvik (1992:10) warned us that in corpus use the 
“greatest risk of all . . . is the distance that may arise between the end user 
of a standard corpus and the primary textual material”. Svartvik’s warning 
was in part a reference to the analysis of spoken corpora, where transcrip-
tions of spoken language may fail to render the speaker’s meaning and 
intentions, but it could just as well be applied to any corpus analysis which 
tries to extract meaning from the data. And this seems to me one of the 
drawbacks of analyses of semantic prosody: the transition from strings of 
words to meaning, a transition which often involves a highly subjective or 
at least not entirely straightforward interpretation of the data. As Bernar-
dini and Aston (2002:293) underline: “Data from corpora, if appropriately 
selected, can be used to support just about any claim, which is why descrip-
tive analyses must strive towards total accountability of the data used”. If 
this accountability is not achieved, then “a corpus can prove anything and 
its opposite” (Tognini-Bonelli 2004:23). 
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As an example of this let us consider an analysis conducted on semantic 
prosody where vastly different conclusions could be drawn from the same 
set of data. Cotterill (2001) examines “the semantic prosodies of some of 
the words and phrases used to describe domestic violence at trial, a key 
issue in the O.J. Simpson double homicide case” (291). The data used are 
the 100,000-word opening arguments for the prosecution and the defence. 
One of the aspects examined by the author is the theme of control, which 
(297) “recurs repeatedly in the prosecution opening argument, the word 
control occurring on no fewer than 66 occasions”. Some textual occur-
rences from the data are reproduced, mostly of CONTROL as noun, with 
one or two of CONTROL as verb. Cotterill then provides a total of 15 
concordance lines containing CONTROL preceded by TO, and notes 
(ibid.:298) that
evidence from the corpus suggests that the kinds of people who typi-
cally control tend to consist of authority fi gures, often representatives 
of offi cial bodies of some kind, for example the police, the army or the 
government [ . . . ] If we now turn our attention to what or who is typi-
cally controlled, it becomes clear that the majority of objects of control 
are generally held to be things that represent a danger or a negative 
infl uence of some kind.
This danger or negative infl uence is then broken down into semantic sets: 
warfare/weaponry, economic problems, medical problems (e.g., outbreak 
of cholera, spread of disease). Thus we have something like:
‘authorities CONTROL dangerous situation’• 
From this Cotterill concludes (299): “In conceptualising Simpson as a con-
troller of his wife, the prosecution presents Simpson’s behaviour as entirely 
unjustifi ed or unreasonable, and constructs Simpson as a man excessively 
obsessed with discipline and authority”.
Whether the prosecution was projecting Simpson as a control freak or 
not, the “corpus evidence” presented by Cotterill requires closer exami-
nation. Firstly, it is not explained why it is the verb which is reproduced 
in the concordance and not the noun, since in the parts of the prosecu-
tion’s argument reproduced by the author it is the substantive use which 
is the more frequent. Secondly, the concordance supplied regards only TO 
CONTROL—always as a verb, even if the sequence is interrupted, e.g., 
to simultaneously control, and apparently excluding any other form of 
the verb such as the base form without to, the third person singular etc. 
(A similar move is made earlier in the article, where the author reproduces 
a passage in which the past tense verb-form encountered occurs three 
times. It is then claimed, on the basis of corpus data, that ENCOUN-
TER “carries a negative semantic prosody” (296), yet the corpus search 
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is apparently limited to the base form ENCOUNTER alone.) Thirdly, 
only 15 of the 66 occurrences of CONTROL are produced as evidence 
for the author’s hypothesis concerning Simpson’s behaviour, so we are not 
advised as to how representative these are (a not uncommon problem in 
corpus studies, i.e., ‘sample concordances’ are sometimes supplied with-
out explanations as to how they have been sampled and thus as to how 
representative they might be), and in any case it is not clear whether the 
total of 66 occurrences are of TO CONTROL or of other forms of the 
verb/noun. 
Aside from these uncertainties, the conclusion drawn from the concor-
dance supplied seems dubious. Cotterill interprets the data as suggesting that 
CONTROL is associated with a fi gure of authority trying to run the show 
in some way, yet CONTROL also co-occurs with dangerous situations, dis-
eases etc., which one might well be justifi ed in attempting to control. Thus 
we could just as easily posit—from the corpus data—that ‘control’ is both 
justifi able and laudable, because it endeavours to keep in check unpleasant 
things or scenarios. Ergo, Simpson’s controlling behaviour was understand-
able because his wife was in some way dangerous, as dangerous as a weapon 
or a disease. But of course this conclusion would be the complete opposite 
of the one Cotterill appears to support. Clearly what I am saying here is not 
to be construed in any way as a comment on the legal case in question—it 
is simply a comment on the multifarious ways we can interpret the data we 
extract from a corpus. As Baker (2006:18) underlines:
because corpus data does not interpret itself, it is up to the researcher 
to make sense of the patterns of language which are found within a 
corpus, postulating reasons for their existence or looking for further 
evidence to support hypotheses. 
What is clear is that we need to give data their due, and deal with them as 
objectively as possible. Corpus linguistics is potentially a giant step forward 
for the discipline of linguistics because it has fi nally given us something con-
crete, i.e., language patterns, to examine under the microscope. Yet within the 
framework of semantic prosody, unless we agree upon consistent procedures 
with which to evaluate the data then there is not much of the empirical at all. 
Phenomena such as semantic sets, collocates, and by consequence semantic 
prosody itself, will remain all things to all men, and the concordance will be 
no more than a hall of mirrors, or worse the magic mirror in the Harry Potter 
books, able to show its users whatever they wish to see.
6.4 SUMMARY
I have argued in this chapter that the arranging of textual data in the form 
of concordances may signifi cantly affect our reading of such data, to the 
Stewart 6th pages.indd   120 8/11/2009   9:03:15 AM
Semantic Prosody and the Concordance 121
T&F Proofs: Not For Distribution
extent that we may perceive features, such as syntagmatic and paradig-
matic cohesion, which in reality are absent. The typical presentation of the 
concordance may also be responsible for the fact that so many studies on 
semantic prosody (i) have privileged the word rather than the unit of mean-
ing, and (ii) give the impression that semantic prosody is amenable to direct 
observation. It is argued that, in part as a consequence of the above, the 
inferring of semantic prosody from corpus data is a mercurial, complex and 
very subjective process.
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7 Intuition, Introspection and 
Corpus Data
Tis a consummation devoutly to be wished 
7.0 INTRODUCTION
In the present chapter my intention is to examine the role and status of 
intuition and introspection as presented in studies on semantic prosody, 
and then to examine their role and status in specifi c corpus searches. By 
so doing I hope to point out a discrepancy between the perceived impor-
tance and the actual importance of intuition and introspection in corpus 
studies in general. I shall begin by considering the notion of intuition.
7.1 INTUITION: KEEPING BAD COMPANY
In very general terms it does not seem too hazardous to state that the abil-
ity or attribute we call ‘intuition’ is a positive, favourable one. The Shorter 
OED entry for this term includes ‘immediate apprehension of the mind 
without the intervention of reasoning; direct or immediate insight’, which 
sounds like a desirable outcome. In the BNC (Table 7.1) the lexical environ-
ment of ‘intuition/intuitions’ seems to be mostly neutral, perhaps leaning 
towards the favourable rather than the unfavourable.
The reader might be surprised, therefore, by a further concordance for 
INTUITION in Table 7.2.
It will be noticed that in this concordance INTUITION occurs in 
the company of, amongst others, unreliable, wrong, stranglehold, not 
reliable and accurate, chancy and unreliable, fail to pick up, unreliable 
guide, even poorer guide, degraded, notoriously thin, not always accu-
rate and outright lies. This is a fairly disreputable bunch, from which 
we may wish to conclude that despite the favourable basic meaning of 
INTUITION, it is to be assigned a thoroughly unfavourable prosody. 
Therefore, on the basis of the data supplied by this second concordance, 
INTUITION might be classifi ed as another of those words like ALLE-
VIATE and company (4.4.1), which have a positive basic meaning but 
mix with bad company.
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The ‘corpus’ from which the concordance in Table 7.2 is drawn com-
prises quotations regarding intuition from a number of different authors 
who have written about semantic prosody and corpus linguistics. The work 
in which these quotations are gathered is the book you are reading. If this 
collection is in any way representative, then in books on semantic prosody 
and corpus linguistics, the word INTUITION would appear to be associ-
ated with an unfavourable prosody. 
How can we account for this in prosodic terms? We could take a dia-
chronic view, postulating that INTUITION, basically a good word, has 
fallen into the bad company supplied by the domain-specifi c area of works 
on semantic prosody, and that the said bad company has attached itself to a 
victim who was vulnerable enough to be contaminated by its evil infl uence 
and who has acquired a bad halo of meaning as a result. Alternatively we 
could adopt a less controversial line of thought within a more synchronic 
Table 7.1 BNC Concordance to ‘intuition/intuitions’ (Random 30/547)
 1. meticulously noted, she argues, empathy and intuition can be invaluable in interpreting it
 2. explicit in a written assessment so that intuitions can be further refi ned on the basis of
 3. the designer draws upon a knowingness, an intuition either subconscious or superconscious
 4. a level of commitment and a willingness to act on intuition which today’s businesses need
 5. happiness is only possible if you follow your feeling, your intuition, your real desires
 6. remembered that his other, earlier, intuitions about heteracy pulled in the opposite direction
 7. There is, to put it crudely, a fi rm intuition that the self we can identify with our  immediate
 8. who are disinclined to appeal to intuition sometimes adopt an attitudinist view of ethical
 9. Surely Poulantzas is simply relying on the intuitions of social theorists, assuming that they
10. experimental painter, dictated less by logic than by intuition, and pursuing a development
11. is for teacher initiative, knowledge and intuition once the scheme is in operation.
12. describe certain dilemmas, impulses, intuitions, or decisions as moral ones is notoriously
13. foot in foot the bill—: there is a strong intuition of meaningfulness; for others, like cran—,
14. where knowledge depended so much on intuition, and also about how much he earned 
15. those whom Gladstone’s political intuition told him were the natural leaders of the nation
16. there is no doubt that our prevailing intuitions about ourselves as agents, and a number of
17. gulping down his own potent brew of intuition and prejudice mixed with available 
18. may be carried out on the basis of (i) intuition techniques and product and interpretation
19. love and sympathy with strong practical intuition and the north London motto she chose
20. The answer is to elicit not intuitions OF meaning, but intuitions ABOUT meaning, which,
21. speakers of the language) have positive intuitions concerning which items belong together
22. systems he was pre-eminent, through intuition, experience and dogged persistence
23. fi lm would have led him there even if intuition had not, for the next picture on it was
24. accused Rune of lying, some deep intuition told her that he had spoken nothing but the 
25. members, they cannot have reliable prior intuitions as to the social meanings conveyed
26. There is no reason to think that their intuitions about /a/ are necessarily better than those
27. to managers, they have to rely on intuition, judgement by analogy and the informed
28. episode had nothing to do with Puddephat’s death, her intuition had not led her astray.
29. Roosevelt only confi rmed his realist’s intuition that, beneath its idealistic rhetoric, the 
30. teaching a subject where your insights and intuitions as a native speaker are positively
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framework: that INTUITION may well as a rule be a paragon of probity 
but that in studies on semantic prosody it is associated with an unfavour-
able local prosody (see Section 1.2.1).
Whichever of these two paths one wishes to follow, it is clear that 
intuition is not portrayed in a particularly favourable light in research on 
semantic prosody, and perhaps in corpus linguistics as a whole. Sinclair 
(1991:7), for instance, talks of the “stranglehold of intuition”, while Hoey 
(2005:133) writes that “if there is one thing a corpus linguist quickly 
learns it is that their intuitions almost always simplify the picture or tell 
outright lies”. The reason for this is perhaps that, when all is said and 
done, intuition is considered unable to withstand the competition from 
corpus data. What chance does the unwieldy, unbound Pandora’s box of 
instinctive, intuitive feelings have when confronted with the observable, 
tangible domain of empirical data, with the fearful power and symmetry 
of a concordance?
It must be by virtue of this contrast that in discussions of semantic 
prosody, and indeed of corpus studies in general, intuition comes across 
as something to be eschewed. Fox (1998:25) urges corpus researchers to 
“start afresh, where possible laying aside their intuitions and looking at 
what the data tells them”, almost as if intuitions were an umbrella to be 
hung on a hat stand when not required. It could, however, be objected that 
this is a travesty of justice: that intuition is in reality the nerve-centre of 
corpus linguistics, since so many aspects and criteria of corpus work feed 
off our intuitive reactions. 
Table 7.2 Concordance to ‘intuition/intuitions’ (Non-random selection)
 1. prosody) may in any case be based on unreliable intuitions”. This apparent synonymy is
 2. native speakers have no reliable and accurate intuitions about them”, and later in the
 3. intuitions about frequency and likelihood of co-occurrence are notoriously thin and not
 always accurate”.
 4. chancy and unreliable business of linguistic intuitions and based in systematic 
 5. “polarity is not usually accessible to intuition”, and later asks the question
 6. studies have shown that a speaker’s intuition is usually an unreliable guide
 7. of collocation and that intuition is an even poorer guide to semantic prosody”.
 8. prosodies are less accessible through intuition than most other phenomena to
 9. “the inevitable failures of human intuition” and (ibid:2.1) “the demonstrably
10. it is that their intuitions almost always simplify the picture or tell outright lies
11. or at least not immediately, accessible to intuition”. Remarks concerning
12. “native speaker intuitions are not a reliable source of evidence”, while Channell
13. However, corpus analysis shows that this intuition is wrong. Whether this is
14. demonstrably degraded nature of human intuition”. According to Adolphs and
15. reveal evaluative functions “which intuitions fail to pick up”. Xiao and McEnery
16. instance, talks of the “stranglehold of intuition”, while Hoey (2005:133) writes
17. if not impossible, to determine on the basis of intuition alone”. Finally,
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7.2 INTUITION AND INTROSPECTION IN 
STUDIES ON SEMANTIC PROSODY
It is worth citing some examples of how, in studies on semantic prosody, 
the reader is warned repeatedly, indeed almost automatically, of both the 
untrustworthiness and inaccessibility of intuition(s) (the singular and plu-
ral forms are used almost interchangeably in the literature) and introspec-
tion by comparison with the allegedly less precarious business of direct 
observation of corpus data. The fact that so many authors make reference 
to this issue suggests that it is central to the concept, perhaps even to the 
very existence, of semantic prosody. Let us begin with intuition.
Stubbs (1995:24) takes the view that “attested data are required in col-
locational studies, since native speaker intuitions are not a reliable source of 
evidence”, while Channell (1999:39) aims to demonstrate that “analysis of 
evaluation can be removed from the chancy and unreliable business of lin-
guistic intuitions and based in systematic observation of naturally occurring 
data”, since corpus-based analyses can reveal evaluative functions “which 
intuitions fail to pick up”. Xiao and McEnery (2006:103) begin their study of 
semantic prosody in English and Chinese with the following premise: 
We knew that our approach should be corpus-based as previous stud-
ies have shown that a speaker’s intuition is usually an unreliable guide 
to patterns of collocation and that intuition is an even poorer guide to 
semantic prosody.
Louw (2005: Section 1.1) writes of “the inevitable failures of human intu-
ition” and (ibid.:2.1) “the demonstrably degraded nature of human intu-
ition”. According to Adolphs and Carter (2002:7), “semantic prosodies are 
diffi cult, if not impossible, to determine on the basis of intuition alone”.1 
Finally, Widdowson (2000:6), though his remarks concern language behav-
iour in general rather than semantic prosody, writes: “The quantitative 
analysis of text by computer reveals facts about actual language behaviour 
which are not, or at least not immediately, accessible to intuition”.
Remarks concerning introspection, or at least introspection alone, are 
also reasonably common. McEnery, Xiao and Tono (2006:84) write: “It 
would appear, from the literature published on semantic prosody [ . . . ] 
that it is at least as inaccessible to a speaker’s conscious introspection as 
collocation is”. This links up with Hunston’s (2002:142) observations that 
“the semantic prosody of a word is often not accessible from a speaker’s 
conscious knowledge”, and that (ibid.) “semantic prosody is not always 
part of a speaker’s conscious knowledge of a language”. See 2.2 for other 
comments along the same lines.
What is especially striking, however, is that intuition and introspection 
are often cited together, with no manifest distinction between the two. 
According to Louw (1993:173):
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It may well turn out to be the case that semantic prosodies are less ac-
cessible through human intuition than most other phenomena to do 
with language [ . . . ] corpus linguistics reveals a greater and greater 
mismatch between the products of introspection about language and 
those of direct observation.
Bublitz (1996:8), reporting views of other scholars in the fi eld, writes that 
semantic prosodies are “open to introspection in principle”, but that “native 
speakers have no reliable and accurate intuitions about them”, and later in 
the same article (ibid.:23) he affi rms that 
Of course, lexicographers have been aware for some time now that 
intuition and introspection as sources of dictionary description are 
somewhat of a mixed blessing, if that. In particular, intuitions about 
frequency and likelihood of co-occurrence are notoriously thin and not 
always accurate. 
Channell states (ibid.:41) that “evaluative polarity is not usually accessible 
to intuition”, and later asks the question (ibid.:55) “why are the evaluative 
polarities of many items not discernible from introspection?”.
One has the impression from these observations that the notions of 
intuition(s) and introspection merge considerably (see 7.6. for further 
discussion), even though dictionary defi nitions of the two keep them 
apart. It was noted in 7.1 that in the Shorter OED, intuition is defi ned 
as an instinctive rather than an introspective phenomenon: ‘Immediate 
apprehension of the mind without the intervention of reasoning; direct or 
immediate insight’. Introspection, on the other hand, is defi ned as ‘Close 
inspection, intellectual examination, esp. of one’s own mind; observation 
of one’s own thoughts, feelings, or mental state’. This latter is no doubt 
what Sinclair (1997:29) intends when he affi rms that “the main organis-
ing procedures for composing utterances are subliminal, and not avail-
able to conscious introspection”, though of course the OED entry would 
suggest that the combination ‘conscious introspection’ is a tautology.
7.2.1 IMMEDIATE INSIGHT VS. 
INTELLECTUAL EXAMINATION
Before going any further it is worth investigating with examples the distinc-
tion between the two dictionary defi nitions reported earlier. The notion 
of immediate apprehension or insight, when applied to language, presum-
ably means that competent speakers of English are instinctively aware of 
the fact, for example, that the words photographer and photography have 
the same basic form, i.e., that they are morphologically related. Or, in 
terms of evaluative function, it seems reasonable to assume that immediate 
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apprehension or insight would enable us to appreciate, without pausing for 
refl ection, the fact that if someone describes a house as ‘fi lthy’, then this is 
likely to be a strongly, even aggressively negative criticism of the house in 
question. In these cases the insight is so immediate that the introspection 
stage seems practically superfl uous.
Other examples are more complex. Take the stress patterns of verbal 
phrases consisting of ‘verb + preposition(s)’, such as come in, fall through 
(as in ‘the plan fell through’), carry on (‘continue’) or put up with: does 
the phrase stress normally fall on the verb itself or on the preposition(s) 
which follow(s) it? Although, if asked, most native speakers of English 
would need time to introspect about this in order to come up with an 
answer (the term ‘native speaker’ is used advisedly, because competent 
non-native speakers of English, since they have had to learn the language, 
may be more clued up about such things), it is evident that they intuitively 
know where the stress normally falls because they have no diffi culty in 
producing the correct pronunciation. In the same way, native speakers of 
British English would need some fairly earnest introspection to work out 
the varying stress patterns, on the one hand, of Christmas tree, Christmas 
present and Christmas cake (where the phrase stress normally falls on 
the fi rst word, i.e., Christmas tree), and on the other, of Christmas Day, 
Christmas cracker, Christmas pudding (where the stress normally falls 
on the second word, i.e., Christmas Day). Having said that, they would 
again have no diffi culty producing the appropriate stress when pronounc-
ing these expressions, and would probably notice something odd if other 
speakers were not to respect such patterns. 
To take a lexical example, it seems likely that the different lexico-
grammatical environments of the apparently synonymous nearly and 
almost would create diffi culty on an introspective level (e.g., ‘nearly / 
almost as tall as her mother’, but ‘she will almost certainly fail’ rather 
than ‘she will nearly certainly fail’; ‘their behaviour was almost aggres-
sive’ seems more natural than ‘their behaviour was nearly aggressive’; 
‘it’s almost as if they are trying to conceal their wealth’ rather than ‘it’s 
nearly as if . . . ’). Once again, however, native speakers intuitively adopt 
the appropriate usage. 
The difference between our intuitive ability to produce and detect 
appropriate language patterns and our ability to introspect about them 
can extend to the most banal of language phenomena. Not long ago an 
Italian student asked me whether or not I pronounced the ‘t’ in often. 
Although it seems safe to assume that I have always intuitively pro-
nounced this word in an appropriate manner, my student’s apparently 
innocuous question provoked some lengthy and rather desperate intro-
spective rummaging on my part, and I’m still not sure I gave her an 
accurate answer.
My view is that the situation regarding semantic prosody has much in 
common with the examples discussed above. I would not dispute a priori 
Stewart 6th pages.indd   127 8/11/2009   9:03:16 AM
128 Semantic Prosody
T&F Proofs: Not For Distribution
the idea that competent speakers of a language may experience a degree of 
diffi culty in introspecting about semantic prosody, but surely the same goes 
for countless other aspects of language. This perhaps constitutes another 
reason why we should be wary of over-prioritising the supposedly con-
cealed quality of semantic prosody (see Section 2.2), of overplaying the 
subliminal card. One has the impression that in the literature the “covert”, 
“subliminal” nature of semantic prosody has direct links with our per-
ceived diffi culty in introspecting about it, but if this is the case we may be 
forced to acknowledge a presumably undesirable equivalence between the 
subliminal, mysterious nature of semantic prosody on the one hand, and 
the presence or absence of /t/ in often on the other. Further, if competent 
speakers can intuitively distinguish more appropriate from less appropri-
ate usage—whether they can introspect about it or not—and if this usage 
includes semantic prosody, then, as will be discussed in the next section, 
it is misleading to argue that our intuitions about semantic prosody are 
“poor”, “unreliable” or “inaccurate”.
7.3 INTUITION: OUR ‘FEEL’ FOR LANGUAGE
According to the OED defi nition, intuition could be regarded as some-
thing like our instinctive, immediate ‘feel’ for language. As an exam-
ple I shall take the combination distinctly pleasant, cited by Stubbs 
(2001a:106–107), though he does not use it to exemplify intuition as 
such. According to Stubbs this is a possible but unusual combination: 
“either neutral phrases (e.g., distinctly different) or disapproving phrases 
(e.g., distinctly childish, distinctly odd, distinctly uncomfortable) are 
more usual”. If this is so (though the neutrality of distinctly different 
seems questionable), one would not expect very competent speakers of 
English to reproduce the combination distinctly pleasant unless they 
deliberately wished to deviate from orthodox usage. However, whether 
they wish to deviate or not, it is their intuitions about the English lan-
guage which make them aware of more conventional combinations, and 
to what degree one might depart from these. This seems to be analogous 
to the almost / nearly question mentioned in the previous section: com-
petent speakers of English may not be able to introspect successfully 
about the differences between the two, but their intuitions will make 
them think twice before producing an utterance such as ‘it’s nearly as if 
they are trying to conceal their wealth’.
It follows that if intuitions are interpreted in this way, then any sugges-
tion that semantic prosodies are “beyond the reach” of our intuitions, or 
that intuitions are “thin”, “unreliable” or “inaccurate”, will be more dif-
fi cult to uphold. Indeed if we did not possess intuitions about what words 
can mean and how they combine with other words, it is diffi cult to imag-
ine not only how, for example, we could appreciate literature—which 
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would be the least of our problems—but how we could communicate at 
all. An observation made by Partington (2004a:132) is extremely impor-
tant in this regard. Knowledge of co-occurrence 
is not necessarily either conscious or explicitly recollectable but remains 
part of our communicative competence. Competent speakers’ knowl-
edge of the item set in, then, includes the fact that it is not normally 
found in a favourable environment.
Compare Widdowson’s (2000:6) observations along the same lines:
There are frequencies of words, and regular patterns of collocational 
occurrence, which users are unaware of, though they must be part of 
their competence in a procedural sense since they would not otherwise 
be attested.
If someone makes the perhaps ironic comment ‘Today Robert committed 
a great act of kindness’, the instantiation of the irony relies precisely upon 
the fact that competent speakers / readers of English know intuitively that 
commit (in the sense of do, perpetrate), as Partington puts it, “is not nor-
mally found in a favourable environment”. In other words, the negative 
associations of commit, set in and others are not beyond the reach of our 
intuition at all. 
In the next section I shall examine the roles of introspection and intu-
ition more closely, not only in terms of our reactions to specifi c usage, but 
also in terms of how semantic prosody is typically identifi ed by means of 
corpus searches.
7.4 INTUITION AND INTROSPECTION IN CORPUS SEARCHES: 
SEMANTIC PROSODY IN JAMES JOYCE’S THE DEAD
The fi nal pages of James Joyce’s The Dead, the last story in the collection 
Dubliners, include an extraordinarily lyrical, mournful, allusive passage, 
heavy with symbolism. The passage reproduced below describes Gabriel, 
the main character of the story, sitting in a dark hotel room late at night 
after a party with family and friends in Dublin. While his wife sleeps, he 
refl ects mournfully upon the past and the present, and more specifi cally 
upon the fact that many years before, his wife, as she has just revealed to 
him, had loved another man before she met Gabriel.
The air of the room chilled his shoulders. He stretched himself cau-
tiously along the sheets and lay down beside his wife. One by one they 
were all becoming shades. Better pass boldly into the other world, in 
the full glory of some passion, than fade and wither dismally with age. 
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He thought of how she who lay beside him had locked in her heart for 
so many years that image of her lover’s eyes when he had told her that 
he did not wish to live.
Generous tears fi lled Gabriel’s eyes. He had never felt like that him-
self towards any woman, but he knew that such a feeling must be love. 
The tears gathered more thickly in his eyes and in the partial darkness 
he imagined he saw the form of a young man standing under a drip-
ping tree. Other forms were near. His soul had approached that region 
where dwell the vast hosts of the dead. He was conscious of, but could 
not apprehend, their wayward and fl ickering existence. His own iden-
tity was fading out into a grey impalpable world: the solid world itself 
which these dead had one time reared and lived in was dissolving and 
dwindling.
A few light taps upon the pane made him turn to the window. It had 
begun to snow again. He watched sleepily the fl akes, silver and dark, 
falling obliquely against the lamplight. The time had come for him to 
set out on his journey westward.
I would like to focus upon the two italicised sentences in this extract 
in order to suggest that prosodies are not beyond the reach of our intu-
itions, even if it is not always possible to introspect about habitual lexical 
environment with any great precision.2 I shall fi rstly suggest prosodies 
for the sentences in question with the aid of BNC concordances, paying 
particular attention to how my searches were formulated. I will then 
discuss the implications of my search methods with regard to intuition 
and introspection. The fi rst sentence is “The air of the room chilled his 
shoulders”.
At fi rst glance the sentence is beguilingly simple: on a syntactic level 
it consists of the canonical SVO, and from a semantic point of view it 
seems equally uncomplicated: it is midwinter, it is late at night, and not 
surprisingly Gabriel, who is lost in thought and sitting immobile on the 
bed, begins to feel the cold. Yet it is a sentence which contributes to 
the lugubrious sense of foreboding which characterises the story as a 
whole.
In the sentence in question I originally envisaged that this sense of 
foreboding was in part a result of some of the habitual co-occurrences of 
CHILL, whether as noun or verb. However, since respective searches for 
the noun and the verb retrieved a lot of occurrences (705 as noun, 281 
as verb), I immediately refi ned the search to make it more similar to the 
sentence under analysis: the verb CHILL followed by any one of the pos-
sessive adjectives my / your / his / her / its / our / their within a span of 5. 
This produced a more manageable selection of 46 occurrences, though it 
included cases of her as direct object of the verb rather than as posses-
sive. Relatively few of the occurrences carry the physical meaning of ‘make 
cold’, for example:
Stewart 6th pages.indd   130 8/11/2009   9:03:16 AM
Intuition, Introspection and Corpus Data 131
T&F Proofs: Not For Distribution
was bitterly cold. The air chilled his lungs. The ground was already• 
Washing in from off the water • chilled his face, freshened him. ‘You’re
The great majority appear to convey the idea of fear, for instance:
he lack of warmth in the smile • chilled her. ‘I’ve given much
The grim hostility in his eyes • chilled her. ‘OK, I’ll explain. The
With a sinking feeling that • chilled her more than any explosion
something in his tone that • chilled her even more. It was the note
In many of these (see Table 7.3) the element of fear is made explicit by co-
occurrences such as blood and marrow in particular, but is also suggested 
by elements such as bone, heart, mind and soul.
In consideration of these co-occurrences, the data may be considered 
to suggest that although ‘the air of the room chilled his shoulders’ is 
not obviously metaphorical, the common metaphorical use of CHILL 
remains in the background, giving rise to a prosody of fear or terror, or 
even death.
The second sentence selected for analysis, again italicised in the passage 
from Joyce, is “Other forms were near”. I originally investigated this because 
I had the impression that despite the ostensibly plain, simple quality of the 
sentence, there was something sinister, almost threatening which intensifi ed 
the deathly atmosphere of the passage in question and the story as a whole, 
yet I couldn’t quite put my fi nger on what caused this impression. Initially I 
made a number of apparently fruitless searches, all of them variations upon 
Table 7.3 BNC Concordance to ‘chill/chills/chilling/chilled’ as Verb Followed 
by ‘my / your / his / her / its / our / their’ (Span of 5, Non-random 
Selection of 12/46)
 1. in; his threat was enough to chill her blood. ‘Poor Paige.’ It became
 2. minister’s mind and preferably chill his blood. It is possible to
 3. and saw something that chilled his blood. Like some animated corpse
 4. Over.’ It took them unaware, chilling their blood. The reply, a wierd
 5. more correctly Rachel Mortimer, chilled my soul to the marrow.)
 6. so damned determined it chilled her to the very marrow of her bones
 7. rope, the garrotte—they don’t chill my heart. Poison, however, is a
 8. Are you here? The thought chilled his mind —‘Are you a ghost?’ He
 9. the aggressive determination which chilled her to the bone. ‘Take care
 10. like some succulent titbit which chilled her to the bone. Moving on
 11. doing that?’ The cool threat chilled her to the bone. She swallowed
 12. around her like an icy fi st, chilling her to the bone. There had to be
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‘other forms were near’. These were (SUBST means ‘as a noun’, the asterisk 
means ‘followed by’):
‘other forms’• 
‘other form=SUBST’ • 
‘form=SUBST were’• 
‘form=SUBST * be=VERB’ (span 5)• 
‘were near’• 
‘form=SUBST * near’ (span 5)• 
‘were near.’• 
‘be=VERB * near’ (span 5)• 
This went on for some time until I hit upon the search ‘be=VERB * near.’ 
(span 5), i.e., any form of be followed by near followed immediately by a 
full stop within a span of 5 words. This resulted in 74 hits, of which around 
20 had a biblical quality and/or suggested death or doom (see Table 7.4).
It will be noticed that many of the grammatical subjects of BE refer to 
the end of something, for instance the end of someone’s life, the end of 
the world, the end of time. Other left-hand co-occurrences include death, 
storm, dangerous, hate, lurking, enemies, loses hope. More generally there 
Table 7.4 BNC Concordance to ‘BE’ in All Its Forms Followed by ‘near’ 
Followed Immediately by a Full Stop (Span 5, Non-random 
selection of 20/74)
 1. everyday life for the Lord is always near. The parables of Jesus promise
 2. gather now that the last days are near.’ He looked directly at Morrsleib
 3. plan is dead and the end may be near. ‘We don’t have a chance’, said
 4. coming of Christ the time of Christ is near. It means that it’ll come sort
 5. than you hate me. My own death is near. I shall leave this ship and go
 6. an eagle loses hope then death is near.’ Her voice faded as her body
 7. brochure Proclaiming that the end is near. Black diplomats with stately
 8. be found. Call upon him while he is near. Let the wicked forsake his way
 9. in God’s presence. Our salvation is near. As we wait for Christ to be
 10. Messiah and that the end of the world is near. Federal agents bathed the cult
 11. Messiah and that the end of the world is near. The cult has been barricaded in
 12. and that to see if anyone was lurking near. ‘Ambush – you know, surprise
 13. the main post. The bombers were very near. A crash in the direction of the
 14. too, knew that their last hour was near. Many of them were the scourings
 15. ended up with a newspaper. The end was near. It came in March with the
 16. new organs, Kelly realised her time was near. ‘I was driving Kelly to
 17. dangerous of all possible enemies, man, was near. After ten minutes on
 18. the King that the Day of Judgement was near. It was only after the
 19. who, at 70, knew that his end was near. Mr Gorbachev, you feel, is only
 20. mad certainty that a day of reckoning was near. And underneath these
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is a biblical quality to the occurrences listed, with references to Christ, 
Jesus, salvation, the coming of Christ, let the wicked forsake, the Day 
of Reckoning, the Day of Judgement, impending doom. However, such 
occurrences represent only around a third of the total, so that if one wished 
to suggest a prosody of doom or something similar, it would have to be 
acknowledged that the prosody is not especially strong. At the same time, 
such a prosody would connect powerfully with the doom-fi lled atmosphere 
not only of the fi nal pages of The Dead but also with the atmosphere of the 
story as a whole. 
The other BNC searches I carried out in order to investigate “other 
forms were near” produced quite different concordances. The presence of 
the full stop after near, for example, was crucial, since without it there was 
a high percentage of more banal occurrences such as ‘ . . . near the library’, 
‘ . . . near the school’, or ‘near’ with a place name. Further, the ‘sinister’ 
cases tend to occur when BE is followed directly by near, i.e., when near 
is not qualifi ed by, for example, very, quite, reasonably, too etc., since the 
presence of a qualifi er again tends to produce more prosaic occurrences, 
such as:
but most of the time, she’s fairly near. EFFORTS REWARDED She will• 
weeks by then you Yeah yeah. It’s too near. So the thirtieth of September• 
There are exceptions to this, however, for instance:
of everyday life for the Lord is always near. The parables of Jesus promise• 
7.4.1 Implications of the Searches Carried Out
I would like now to make a brief survey of the corpus searches conducted for 
each of the two sentences, or better a survey of my reasons for making the 
searches. In the fi rst case—“The air of the room chilled his shoulders”—I 
had from the outset felt intuitively that this sentence suggested fear as well 
as cold. Introspecting about this, I surmised that this could be due to the 
use of CHILL in expressions such as ‘it chilled her blood’ (as well as related 
expressions such as ‘spine-chilling’), and I then searched the corpus for 
confi rmation. I had not initially considered that the presence of a posses-
sive adjective could be quite so critical, but since my initial searches did not 
seem to be suffi ciently specifi c, I inserted the possessives. Thus from the 
beginning I had a fairly clear idea of what I was looking for, and promptly 
found it.
The case of “Other forms were near” is rather more complex. It had 
seemed to me that, despite the apparent lexicogrammatical simplicity of this 
line there was once again something disarming about it. The line came across 
as slightly archaic, but also as sinister and threatening. However, I was not 
initially sure why this was so. I refl ected upon various possibilities, including 
Stewart 6th pages.indd   133 8/11/2009   9:03:16 AM
134 Semantic Prosody
T&F Proofs: Not For Distribution
the use of near rather than something like nearby or close by; the fact that 
near was sentence-fi nal; the combination other forms; or perhaps it was sim-
ply the knock-on effect of the broader co-text, which is in any case permeated 
with suggestions of death, whether direct or indirect (e.g., “One by one they 
were all becoming shades . . . fade and wither dismally with age . . . the vast 
hosts of the dead . . . their wayward and fl ickering existence”). Not being 
entirely sure about how to interrogate the corpus, I made quite a number of 
searches which for my purposes proved relatively fruitless. I had all but given 
up when I chanced upon the search outlined in Table 7.4.
What are the implications of these searches in terms of intuition and 
introspection? Certainly introspection played an important role. All the 
searches I made in the corpus were, in a sense, the results of acts of intro-
spection. Yet the searches would never have been made in the fi rst place 
without some sort of intuitive feeling that something was ‘afoot’, i.e., intu-
ition preceded introspection. And of course the feeling that something was 
afoot was conditioned signifi cantly by the fact that the broader co-text 
of the passage examined, and indeed of The Dead in its entirety, is pep-
pered with allusions to the imminence and inevitability of death (some-
thing which links up with the notion which is central to Louw’s (2000) 
Contextual Prosodic Theory—that situational and linguistic contexts are 
co-extensive; see 1.1.8). Readers of The Dead pick up on these allusions 
because they have access to the whole text as Joyce wrote it, and not simply 
to the single lines or fragments privileged by corpus analysis. To take this 
to its logical extreme, one could even dismiss my corpus searches as redun-
dant, because anyone reading the whole of The Dead, rather than just an 
excerpt, would be sensitive in any case to the implications of impending 
death which pervade and haunt the entire story.
Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that corpus searches 
and fi ndings do not just ‘happen’, they are not simply stumbled upon (see 
Whitsitt 2005:294–295). Upriver lie a person’s thought processes about 
language, and these have signifi cant bearing upon the searches conducted 
and therefore upon the results reached. This point will be discussed further 
in the next section, but for the moment suffi ce it to say that we should 
perhaps think twice before stigmatising intuition and introspection as inac-
curate and unreliable by comparison with corpus data, since without them 
most corpus data would be destined to blush unseen. Indeed, if we take 
this argument a step further, there would be no corpus data at all, since 
all the contents of a corpus are the product of people’s language intuitions. 
Corpora are usually described as collections of texts, but they might just 
as well be described as collections of intuitions. As McEnery, Xiao and 
Tono (2006:80) point out, corpora “pool together the intuitions of a great 
number of speakers”. And if it were not for our intuitions, the corpus-as-
real-language argument would simply fall over, and corpora as we know 
them would not exist. As Whitsitt notes (2005:294), intuition “is the very 
thing that makes a corpus possible, for it is surely the collection of people’s 
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intuitive use of language that makes it possible for a corpus to contain ‘real’ 
language”.
7.5 STUMBLING UPON CORPUS FINDINGS?
In the previous section I made the claim that corpus searches and fi ndings 
do not simply ‘happen’, in that they presuppose previous moments of intu-
ition and introspection. These ‘moments’ infl uence not only (i) our decision 
to make corpus searches in the fi rst place and (ii) the way we formulate our 
searches, but also (iii), once the search has been made and the concordance 
produced, how we select data that we consider to be relevant and how we 
eliminate data that we consider to be irrelevant. In short, these moments 
infl uence both what we are looking for and how we go about fi nding it.
In order to consider stages (i) and (ii) let us return momentarily to the 
phrasal verb SET IN, and think about how we might begin to identify any 
prosody or prosodies that this verb might be associated with. Let us begin 
by refl ecting upon why it would occur to us at all to investigate the prosodic 
behaviour of this verb, and why we would wish to confi ne our search to its 
function as phrasal verb (stage (i)). Two main reasons suggest themselves: 
either we have a spontaneous hunch that SET IN as a phrasal verb might 
be worth investigating from this point of view, or we wish to check existing 
studies which claim that it is associated with an unfavourable prosody. Be 
that as it may, before we apply our fi ngers to the keyboard we may already 
have reasons to suppose that the phrasal verb SET IN is of interest from the 
point of view of semantic prosody.
The next stage (ii) is to come up with a search which will capture as many 
occurrences as possible of SET IN as a phrasal verb, and which as far as 
possible will not capture other occurrences of SET IN. The diffi culty is that 
there is no straightforward way of setting about this task, because SET IN 
has so many different meanings. However, we have to start somewhere, so 
one could hypothesise an initial search for SET (in all its forms) followed 
immediately by IN, which produces 2,150 hits in the BNC. This does not get 
us very far, because we are confronted with a prodigious number of occur-
rences containing all sorts of meanings of SET IN, whether as a phrasal verb 
or not. Nevertheless, with this particular search we have already made an 
intuitive statement of our knowledge and expectations of language. Not only 
have we surmised that all the forms of SET will be necessary to investiga-
tions into SET IN as phrasal verb, we have also specifi ed that SET should 
be followed immediately by IN. But why immediately? Why did we not opt 
for SET followed by IN within a span of 3 words, 4 words etc.? There are 
two answers to this question: the fi rst is that the ‘followed immediately by’ 
option already retrieves well over 2,000 occurrences of SET IN in the BNC. 
If we allowed a span of say, 4 words, the number of hits would be formidable 
(5,563), and the search would risk becoming unwieldy. The second is that 
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it seems improbable that the span of 3–4 words would retrieve a signifi cant 
number of further instances of SET IN as a phrasal verb, i.e., we intuitively 
acknowledge the improbability of, say, ‘the decline is setting completely in’ 
(even though something like ‘the rot set right in’ seems possible). 
Corpus software is very sophisticated, allowing the user to make all 
manner of different searches, and any one search is only a single permuta-
tion among many. Thus it should be borne in mind that choosing a search 
means—at least momentarily—not choosing another, and that beginning 
with any given search means in a sense prioritising one search and relegat-
ing others.
In some respects this argument may be considered to be little more than 
nitpicking. One could easily object that although it is true that searches are 
not initiated by mental vacuums, and although it is true that some cognitive 
process must trigger the search, we nevertheless have to start somewhere—
otherwise we would be forced to abandon corpus searches altogether—
and anyway checking out hunches would seem to be a perfectly defensible 
procedure. One could further object that some searches do not have such 
a clear intuitive ‘trigger’, such as when language students are asked to use 
a corpus, with no previous ‘lead’ from the teacher, to investigate certain 
examples of usage.
These objections seem legitimate, but do not take away from the fact that 
in the fi rst two stages previously described—the decision to make a search 
and the formulation of the search—both intuition and introspection play a 
crucial part. Moreover, intuition and introspection can be just as important 
for stage (iii)—the selecting of relevant occurrences and the fi ltering out of 
irrelevant occurrences from a concordance once a search has been made. As 
a more concrete illustration of the points raised concerning stage (iii), I shall 
now examine another verb often cited in studies on semantic prosody.
7.5.1 Selection and Rejection: COMMIT
Let us say we have reason to believe that the verb COMMIT is associated 
with a particular type of prosody. A BNC search for the lemma COMMIT 
produces 6,647 hits. The following comments refer to a sample of 100, 
which is reproduced in the appendix to this chapter (Table 7.5). Scanning the 
lines, we cannot really identify any sort of consistent patterns throughout 
the concordance because, like SET IN, COMMIT has a number of differ-
ent meanings. The most frequent patterns are: the structure be committed 
to (doing) something; refl exive pronouns following the verb; commit as 
active or passive with a semantic preference for crimes and misdemeanours. 
Less frequent occurrences are: people or court cases can be committed for 
trial, and people can be committed to prison; you can commit someone to 
something; you can commit things such as money or resources to some-
thing, and you can commit pen to paper. Yet there is nothing suffi ciently 
‘consistent’ or recurrent at this stage to suggest a dominant prosody. 
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Refl ecting upon this, we may decide that the meaning of COMMIT we 
are really interested in is the one corresponding to the sense of perpetrate. 
This decision may derive from personal preference / curiosity, or from the 
fact that semantic prosodists have focused more on COMMIT with this 
particular meaning than any other. But we are then confronted with the 
problem of how to extract COMMIT with the meaning of perpetrate from 
the total of 6,647 occurrences of COMMIT in the corpus. For reasons 
which I will explain shortly, let us analyse some possible trial-and-error 
moves primarily on the basis of formal patterning in order to fi lter out any 
meanings of COMMIT which do not correspond to that of perpetrate:
eliminate all passive forms, in an attempt to remove any occurrences • 
such as we are committed to addressing this matter thoroughly and 
they were strongly committed to family care. This, however, does 
not appear to work, since we would throw out the baby with the 
bath water—COMMIT in the sense of perpetrate is often used in the 
passive, e.g., a trespass was committed and car thefts are not always 
committed by determined professionals.
eliminate all passive forms followed immediately by • to. This would get 
rid of occurrences like we are committed to addressing this matter thor-
oughly and also his own corrupt fi nancial transactions and was com-
mitted to the Fleet prison, but it has two major drawbacks: (i) it would 
NOT remove usage in the corpus such as we are committed, every one 
of us, to (achieving) higher standards and (ii) it might eliminate, for 
instance, any occurrences such as no crimes were committed to my 
knowledge or the crime was committed to demonstrate . . . (my exam-
ples—I use some invented examples in this section precisely because the 
user is required—in the fi rst instance—to make inventive predictions 
about language in order to fi lter out unwanted / irrelevant occurrences). 
eliminate all passive forms followed by • to within a span of say 5–6 
words. This would have the advantage of eliminating we are commit-
ted, every one of us, to (achieving) higher standards, but of course 
it would fail to remove usage like we are committed, each and every 
one of us in this branch and indeed in Smith’s Bank as a whole, to 
(achieving) higher standards. And once again it would eliminate no 
crimes were committed to my knowledge and the crime was commit-
ted to demonstrate . . . , as well as all the crimes were committed last 
year, and to make matters worse . . . (my examples).
eliminate all passive forms of • COMMIT followed by to, whether it is 
the word immediately after COMMIT or not. Bad idea: this would 
probably eliminate far too many passive forms of COMMIT, since 
with this criteria to could be anywhere in the BNC document in ques-
tion, or better, anywhere after the passive forms of COMMIT. 
keep all passive forms whether followed by • to or not, but eliminate all 
other occurrences of COMMIT not followed by a direct object. This 
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would have the advantage of preserving committed or is about to 
commit a serious crime, but it would also preserve innocuous-looking 
usage such as I can with its aid commit my melodies to paper or gen-
uine Christian love by committing the church to creating . . . . Fur-
ther, it would fail to eliminate any usage involving refl exive pronouns 
as direct objects such as how far does she commit herself to Proteus 
. . . , as well as usage such as the signifi cant sums already committed 
in areas like . . . 
keep all passive forms whether followed by • to or not; eliminate all 
occurrences of COMMIT not followed by a direct object unless the 
direct object in question happens to be a refl exive pronoun, since 
COMMIT followed by refl exive pronouns should also be eliminated. 
This would preserve committed or is about to commit a serious crime 
and eliminate How far does she commit herself to Proteus, but would 
still fail to remove I can with its aid commit my melodies to paper 
and the signifi cant sums already committed in areas like . . . . In any 
case there is again the insidious problem of what ‘followed by’ actu-
ally means, since there are lots of direct objects in a corpus . . . .
The reader is no doubt beginning to weary of these tortuous permutations, 
and rightly so. This is the type of activity one would prefer to reserve for 
the computer, but even with a computer-assisted analysis, the idea that we 
can eliminate, using primarily formal criteria, all those meanings of COM-
MIT which do not correspond to perpetrate is no more than a chimera. 
Even if we take a simpler route, identifying that the sequences COMMIT 
A and in particular COMMIT AN (though not so much COMMIT THE) 
do seem to attract words indicating crimes, nonetheless (i) there are a good 
many exceptions to the rule in the corpus (the anguish of having to commit 
a child to a mental hospital and For example, to commit an account of an 
incident to paper), and (ii) we would still not have accounted for passive 
forms, large numbers of which, as noted earlier, also occur with ‘crime 
words’. 
As a fi nal example, take It is vital to have committed effi cient represen-
tation in the City. One could eliminate this occurrence by contending that 
COMMIT in the sense of perpetrate is unlikely to be preceded by a struc-
ture such as it is vital, but it seems considerably simpler to eliminate it by 
postulating that COMMIT in the sense of perpetrate is followed by words 
whose meaning is associated with crime and death.
The point I wish to make here is that adopting formal parameters in 
order to extract from a corpus occurrences of COMMIT in the sense of 
perpetrate is unspeakably complicated. As corpus users we are more likely 
to favour the far simpler strategy of relying fi rst and foremost upon seman-
tic criteria, and in particular upon our intuitions about the meanings of the 
typical co-occurrences of COMMIT. Of course we will need to avail our-
selves of formal parameters too (and this is not to contest Sinclair’s position 
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that as a rule changes of form go hand in hand with changes of meaning), 
but ultimately it is more realistic to assume that our process of extraction 
would entail the following steps: 
we predict from the outset that • COMMIT in the sense of perpetrate 
will co-occur with words indicating seriously unpleasant things, or 
even, more specifi cally, with words such as crime, murder, suicide.
we scan the concordance for words to do with crime or death, per-• 
haps with the assistance of alphabetical sorting to the right, which 
is of course another introspective move. We then predict that in all 
those instances which do not include references to crime and death, 
COMMIT will not have the sense of perpetrate, so we de-select 
them.
we now have a selection of • COMMIT co-occurring with words indi-
cating crime and death. In a handful of these it could happen that the 
meaning of COMMIT does not correspond to the sense of perpetrate 
(‘they are committed to wiping out the human race’, ‘he even began 
talking of suicide, so I felt committed to helping him’— these are 
again my examples), but the evidence in favour of the perpetrate sense 
is overwhelming.
we conclude that • COMMIT in the sense of perpetrate has co-occur-
rences conveying the meaning of crime and death.
conclusion: an unfavourable prosody can be inferred for • COMMIT 
in the sense of perpetrate.
7.5.1.1 Implications of the COMMIT Searches
Aside from the conclusion, these moves describe a complete circle: we begin 
by surmising that COMMIT in the sense of perpetrate will co-occur with 
words such as crime, murder, suicide, we remove all those instances of 
COMMIT which do not co-occur with words of this description, and we 
end by asserting that COMMIT in the sense of perpetrate has co-occur-
rences conveying the meaning of crime and death. And then we infer the 
prosody. Also troubling is the fact that perpetrate itself co-occurs with 
words indicating crime and death (Partington (2003:231) notes that “per-
petrate collocates with highly pernicious activities”), so the search was ten-
dentious from the start.
The circle described in the preceding paragraph is particularly insidi-
ous in the context of semantic prosody. This is in part because, as noted 
in 2.2.1, in studies on the subject semantic prosody appears to be a mag-
net not only for words with common meanings such as COMMIT, but 
also for phrasal verbs such as BREAK OUT, SET IN, SIT THROUGH, 
COME ABOUT, ANDARE INCONTRO. The main obstacle in these 
cases is to extract from the corpus only those occurrences which are 
of interest for the investigation, but with phrasal verbs this may be a 
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mammoth task, since an awful lot of verb + preposition combinations 
may need to be sifted out, such as ‘she broke out in goose pimples’, ‘the 
hotel is set in the mountains’, ‘they came about 7pm’ (SIT THROUGH, 
on the other hand, is almost always a phrasal verb when the two words 
are immediately adjacent, though it may not be if they are separated: 
‘they just sat there looking through some old papers’). As previously sug-
gested, the simplest way to carry out such fi ltering may well be based not 
on formal patternings but primarily on the semantic characteristics of the 
respective co-occurrences of the various meanings of these words. And 
once the fi ltering is completed and the fi nal selection made, it is of course 
precisely these co-occurrences which will then be such an important fac-
tor in identifying any attendant prosodies.3
7.5.2 Stumbling upon Prosodies? Concluding Remarks
I have described three stages involved in trying to select relevant usage from 
a corpus for the purposes of identifying semantic prosody: the initiative of 
deciding to make a search, the formulation of the search, and the elimina-
tion of usage which is irrelevant to the investigation. A possible irony of the 
third stage is that having introspectively used co-occurrence criteria to sift 
out any usage irrelevant to the investigation, we then infer semantic proso-
dies from those very co-occurrences which we ourselves have prioritised for 
the purposes of the analysis. 
My view is that both intuition and introspection are so crucial to each of 
these three stages that to argue that these are unreliable, inaccurate, thin, 
poor etc. is unfair, since without them no analysis of semantic prosody 
would ever get off the ground. 
It could be contended that no search is innocent, that the moment we 
make a corpus search we almost unavoidably make an intuitive statement 
about language, or more specifi cally about our expectations of language, 
i.e., about what we expect to fi nd. Intuition and introspection are so vital 
in this respect that they may remote-control our investigations, and thus 
dictate our fi ndings, from beginning to end.
7.6 WHY IS INTUITION CONSIDERED AN UNRELIABLE 
WAY TO IDENTIFY SEMANTIC PROSODY?
Although intuition and introspection are clearly distinguished in the OED, 
the division between the two can be a fi ne one, since any transition from 
intuition to introspection may be instantaneous. There was perhaps no 
clear dividing line between, for example, my initial intuitions about “Other 
forms were near” —in the passage from Joyce—and the introspection which 
followed them, and in turn these were followed by further alternating 
moments of intuition and introspection as the corpus search proceeded.
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Thus from a practical point of view it may not be easy to separate the 
two. Having said that, a careful look at the quotations collected in Section 
7.1 reveals that most scholars apparently take issue with intuition rather 
than introspection. In the light of my comments about the central role of 
intuition in investigations into semantic prosody, an obvious question at 
this stage is why scholars so often make a point of affi rming that intuition 
is unreliable and, more specifi cally, that semantic prosodies cannot reliably 
be picked up by intuition. Three possible explanations come to mind:
 (i) it may be that scholars refer in particular to cases where the prosody 
is ‘buried’ so deep that it is barely accessible to our intuition. For example it 
could be argued that the prosody ascribed to “Other forms were near.”—if 
we accept that there is a prosody—is fairly subtle, because the element of 
destiny, impending death, appears to be represented in only a minority of 
the concordance lines examined. 
The drawback of this argument is that almost all the examples of seman-
tic prosody examined in the literature are judged to have consistent lexical 
profi les—as a rule consistently favourable or consistently unfavourable—
and therefore would appear to represent more obvious (or, better, far less 
‘buried’) cases than “Other forms were near.”. 
 (ii) perhaps what is intended is that although we intuitively ‘feel’ some-
thing unusual is happening in a phrase such as ‘Today Robert committed a 
great act of kindness’, we may not ‘feel’ exactly what this is, and as a result 
our intuition is not entirely reliable. This would, however, be unremarkable, 
since once again the same could be said of thousands of other language 
phenomena. If we hear someone say ‘his behaviour was nearly aggressive’, 
we might again ‘feel’ the unusuality of it without however knowing exactly 
what that unusuality is.
 (iii) it may be because in most studies on semantic prosody, and per-
haps in corpus studies and linguistics as a whole, no clear-cut distinction 
is actually intended between intuition and introspection, with both inter-
preted as constituting moments of conscious, deliberate refl ection upon 
the way language is used; this scenario, introduced in 7.2, seems to me 
the most likely. 
Let us return momentarily to an observation made by Widdowson 
(2000:6) quoted earlier in this chapter, to the effect that “the quanti-
tative analysis of text by computer reveals facts about actual language 
behaviour which are not, or at least not immediately, accessible to intu-
ition” (my italics). If we take the dictionary defi nition of intuition cited 
earlier as valid, this statement comes across as contradictory because, if 
intuition is the result of ‘direct or immediate insight’, this would seem to 
preclude the delayed reaction envisaged by Widdowson. If, on the other 
hand, by intuition is actually intended introspection, the proviso ‘at least 
not immediately’ is a telling one, because it would allow that, given time, 
the human brain, though not possessing the speed and effi ciency of com-
puter software, can not only produce and be sensitive to but also predict 
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language patterns, among which co-selection patterns. It follows that if 
we can predict co-selection patterns, if we can introspect about them suc-
cessfully, then we must also be able to predict and introspect successfully 
about semantic prosody, which, it has been claimed, is contingent upon 
those patterns.
Of course it remains possible, within this framework, that a difference of 
degree is intended between intuition as an instinctive, feel-it-in-the-bones 
moment of refl ection, and introspection as a rather more earnest act of rea-
soning. However that may be, there is a frequent tendency to regard both 
as conscious processes. 
With this in mind, I shall now focus upon this conscious act of refl ec-
tion, for which, in accordance with the entries in the OED, I shall prefer 
the term introspection.
7.7 INTROSPECTION AND LANGUAGE USERS
If intuition too is intended as a deliberate act of reasoning, as synonymous 
with introspection, then what the cross-section of quotations reported in 
Section 7.2 really conveys is that, even after purposeful self-examination, 
we still cannot clearly identify prosodies. This interpretation would have 
certain advantages. Firstly, it would have the effect of dissociating seman-
tic prosody from the stress pattern examples and from the different col-
locations and colligations of nearly and always discussed in Section 7.2.1, 
where it was hypothesised that self-examination would help to provide 
some insights. Secondly, if semantic prosody were not accessible, or at least 
not easily accessible, to introspection, then this would support its suppos-
edly hidden, subliminal character. In other words, the barely perceptible 
quality so often assigned to semantic prosody could be considered con-
tingent upon the supposition that introspecting about it is an arduous or 
insuperable task.
The downside of this argument is that—to my knowledge—no tan-
gible evidence has been brought forward to demonstrate the diffi culty 
of introspecting about semantic prosody. Indeed the idea that seman-
tic prosody is scarcely accessible to introspection appears itself to be 
the result of an introspection,4 and relates back to the question, raised 
in 2.2., that some meanings are more transparent than others. Chan-
nell (1999:44) distinguishes (introspectively) between lexis which has 
“obviously and intuitively accessible polarity” (her examples include 
FAT and SELF-IMPORTANT), and lexis where that polarity is “less 
obvious” (REGIME and PAR FOR THE COURSE). See also Hun-
ston’s (2001:21) similar distinction between lexical items with “imme-
diately obvious” and “much less obvious” evaluative function. The 
distinction seems cogent, and may offer interesting avenues of research. 
However, the question which Channell (1999:55) asks (introspectively) 
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later in her article—“why are the evaluative polarities of many items 
not discernible from introspection?”—with its implied link to the more 
transparent / less transparent distinction, must surely be a question of 
a different order. We should be wary of making an automatic equa-
tion—especially in the absence of empirical fi ndings—between meaning 
which is less obvious and meaning which is not identifi able through 
introspection.
I think most people would agree (introspectively) that the unpleasant-
ness of, for example, threaten is more transparent than the unpleasant-
ness of set in as a phrasal verb. This does not mean, however, that the 
unpleasantness of set in is inaccessible to introspection. If our introspec-
tion takes the form of the knee-jerk, time-honoured question ‘What does 
the phrasal verb set in mean?’ we may not arrive at a negative meaning 
of this verb, precisely because it is either not particularly transparent or 
not present at all (the latter would refl ect the hypothesis that set in is a 
verb of neutral meaning which simply happens to keep bad company). 
But if we ask ourselves ‘What kinds of things set in?’, or, reacting to spe-
cifi c usage, ‘How does ‘their marriage set in’ sound?’, rather than simply 
‘What does set in mean?’, it seems to me we are far more likely to gain 
insights into the unpleasantness of this verb. As pointed out by Munday 
(forthcoming):
The potential for conscious manipulation of semantic prosody would 
seem to be rejected by some [ . . . ] This may be the case if an individual 
is asked to describe the prosody of a specifi c word, such as cause. But 
the fact that a violation of prosody (e.g. Louw’s symptomatic of . . . .) 
can be identifi ed by the reader who then interprets the irony of the 
choice, shows that as readers we are at least to some extent aware of a 
word’s profi le.
Indeed the very fact that set in as phrasal verb does appear to have such 
repeatedly undesirable grammatical subjects would if anything lend 
weight to the argument that the unpleasantness of this verb’s habitual 
company is one its primary characteristics, and this is why ‘their mar-
riage set in’ sounds unusual. In other words, even if the unpleasantness 
of this verb is for some reason not as transparent as the unpleasant-
ness of threaten, its recurrent use in unpleasant environments, or better 
its co-occurrence with overwhelmingly bad company, is transparent to 
the extent that any deviation from its generally unpleasant subjects is 
salient.
This is why I stated earlier that a substantial part of the question 
of semantic prosody revolves around the dichotomy more transpar-
ent meaning / less transparent meaning. There is no denying that the 
unpleasantness of threaten, for reasons which have not yet been estab-
lished, is more transparent than the unpleasantness of set in. But this 
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does not mean that the unpleasantness of set in, or its frequent co-oc-
currence with words of unfavourable meaning, cannot, upon refl ection, 
be arrived at.
7.8 COGNITIVE REACTIONS
So far in this chapter I have tried to draw a distinction between intuition 
and introspection, notwithstanding the conceptual merging of these two 
notions in studies on semantic prosody. Indeed the impression from many 
studies is that any such distinction is irrelevant, because this conceptual 
merging derives from assumptions concerning a broader opposition—
that of thought processes, or more specifi cally cognitive reactions, vs. 
corpus data. In other words, the spheres of intuition and introspection 
are tacitly collapsed into a single category which belongs to the sphere of 
thought, and it makes no difference whether we ‘feel’ something spon-
taneously or whether we work something out by means of (conscious) 
refl ection.
According to this reasoning, it would be the language user’s cognitive 
reactions to data which are contested, which are ‘poor’, ‘unreliable’ etc. 
Intriguingly, the reactions of the analyst are rarely called into question, 
yet as scholars and researchers I think we should be wary of falling into 
the trap of explicitly minimising the role of cognitive reactions in gen-
eral and then relying upon them heavily during the course of our own 
investigations. 
I have quoted Xiao and McEnery (2006:103) as saying that “a speaker’s 
intuition is usually an unreliable guide to patterns of collocation and that 
intuition is an even poorer guide to semantic prosody”, yet all the way 
through their article the authors systematically and unquestioningly make 
a three-way distinction between prosodies which are positive, negative and 
neutral, a distinction which is based squarely upon their cognitive reactions 
to “patterns of collocation”. Similarly, Stubbs (1995:24) is of the opinion 
that “native speaker intuitions are not a reliable source of evidence”, and 
yet, with reference to a concordance for CAUSE, has no hesitation, as a 
native speaker of English, in declaring that
Nearly 80 per cent of occurrences have clearly negative collocates, 
usually within a span of 3:3. Conversely, a very small number of oc-
currences have positive collocates. The distribution is: negative 80%, 
neutral 18%, positive 2%.
Aside from the fact that distinguishing favourable and unfavourable co-
occurrences is not as straightforward as it might seem (as claimed in Chap-
ter 5), Stubbs has come up with percentages whose “source of evidence” is 
none other, it would seem, than his native-speaker reactions to the data. 
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Unreliable such reactions may be, but they remain able to generate some 
extremely precise statistics.
Note also in this regard the wording used by Channell (1999:44) when 
she distinguishes between lexis which has “obviously and intuitively acces-
sible polarity” and lexis where that polarity is “less obvious”. Here the 
sequence “obviously and intuitively” is striking, with its suggestion that 
cognitive reactions may be self-evident, something which contrasts dramat-
ically with the author’s previous misgivings about the “chancy and unre-
liable business of linguistic intuitions” (ibid.:39). Adolphs (2006) alludes 
frequently to the idea that semantic prosody is not intuitively apparent 
(e.g., 10, 56), and yet reports that some items (57) “carry a direct negative 
semantic prosody”, which in the context would suggest that prosodies can 
be wholly apparent.
A fi nal example of the unquestioned authority of the analyst’s reactions 
to the data. With reference to Louw’s (1993:159–164) analysis of a concor-
dance for UTTERLY, Gavioli (2005:48) focuses on four lines—out of a 
total of 99—which appear to have favourable occurrences at R1: 
nfi dent, well-trained and • utterly dedicated to the idea of win
h how kind he was oh how • utterly good and what trouble he too
it up—“I think it’s oh • utterly grand of you to give us all
t. Edward III, placid and • utterly venerable, his face fl owing
Gavioli remarks: “Reading the extended context of all these four exam-
ples, one can notice that they carry a fairly obvious ironic intention”. 
The obviousness of the irony is however conditioned by the fact that in 
reality the reader does not have the possibility of “reading the extended 
context”, or rather the extended co-text, because it is not supplied, either 
by Gavioli or Louw, though the latter gives a brief explanation of the 
contexts of the four utterances in question. It is not my intention here to 
support or dispute the notion of ironic authorial intention in these four 
instances, which would in any case require a broader knowledge of the 
relevant co-text and context. The point I wish to raise here is that in this 
case there is apparently a perceived need to comment upon the context 
and co-text only of those occurrences which, it would appear, fl out the 
researcher’s expectations or hypothesis.
This is a widespread phenomenon in corpus investigations. There 
is a tendency to examine expanded concordance lines for further co-
text only when the (unexpanded) lines in question appear to contrast 
with the researcher’s hypothesis, along the lines of, for instance: ‘Lines 
6 and 10 of the concordance would appear to be counter-examples of 
the hypothesis suggested here. However, once the lines in question are 
expanded we can observe that in reality this is not the case’. Yet in order 
to reach foolproof conclusions one would also need to expand all those 
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concordance lines which do appear to support the author’s hypothesis, 
in order to make sure that the expanded texts do not ‘in reality’ contra-
dict it.
Therefore, in order for the irony argument to be empirically sound, we 
would need to investigate the various contexts of the other 95 occurrences 
in the UTTERLY concordance in order to test the hypothesis that these, 
on the contrary, are not intended to be ironic. In other words, the observa-
tion that unusual co-occurrences like utterly good, utterly grand etc. carry 
ironic intention becomes meaningful only if we can also establish that 
the other 95 co-occurrences, which include combinations such as utterly 
obsessed and utterly ridiculous, do not carry ironic intention. Clearly if all 
the occurrences of UTTERLY in the concordance were judged to be ironic, 
then there would be no point in focusing on the irony of utterly good. So 
why—since the logic of the argument critically depends upon this—do the 
expected, the conventional co-occurrences not warrant further investiga-
tion, or even a passing reference? Could it not be for the simple reason that 
their conventionality is considered too cognitively obvious to mention? 
The premise is thus that the conventional contexts of utterance of 
UTTERLY, or at least the great majority of them, are not ironic. Whether 
or not this is true, the question remains as to why the non-irony of the sup-
posedly conventional uses should be considered self-evident. Perhaps, as 
suggested, our cognitive reactions are not as unreliable as has been made 
out. Yet one might also take this a step further and ‘intuit’ an insidious, 
unspoken contrast between on the one hand the supposed poverty of intro-
spection of the non-analyst, and on the other the corpus analyst’s ability to 
introspect about language, an ability which comes across as reliable enough 
not to require verifi cation. 
Finally, our personal reactions may prevail even when not supported by 
corpus data. Take, for example, the last sentence in the passage from Joyce 
in 7.4:
The time had come for him to set out on his journey westward. • 
I remain convinced that the string ‘the time had come’ is unsettling and 
ominous here, perhaps in part on account of expressions such as ‘she 
knew her time had come’ and ‘my time has come’—which to me suggest 
that someone’s life is about to end—but also because it links up with the 
death-ridden implications of the “journey westward” (towards the set-
ting sun) and of The Dead as a whole. I remain convinced of this despite 
the BNC concordance for TIME HAD COME (91 hits), in which—as 
far as I can make out—any such suggestions are all but absent, with the 
exception of the following line:
I thought me time had come to be quite honest. I mean, how frightened were• 
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The BNC data suggest that ‘time had come’ is associated with change, 
with personal resolve, with a new beginning, but not noticeably with 
death or destiny. (This seems to accord with Hoey’s (2007) albeit much 
broader analysis of the string TIME HAS COME in his investigations 
of priming in Lewis Carroll’s The Walrus and the Carpenter.) This dis-
crepancy between personal reactions and corpus data has links with 
the passages cited at the beginning of this chapter, passages which 
supported the idea that intuition and introspection are unreliable by 
comparison with corpus data. Yet here one might just as well postu-
late the opposite—that corpus data are unreliable by comparison with 
intuition and introspection, because the latter have perceived something 
which corpus data have not picked up. In any case the supposition that 
personal reactions can always be checked against the information in 
a corpus is suspect. For example, O’Halloran and Coffi n (2004:281), 
commenting on a claim by Fairclough (1995:113) that the action of 
‘fl ocking’ is usually associated with sheep, ask: “But is Fairclough’s 
intuition here correct? Is the verb fl ock usually associated with sheep? 
[ . . . ] By going to a large corpus of English, we can easily check this 
intuition”. 
O’Halloran and Coffi n believe that intuitions are easily checked in a 
corpus, yet it cannot be excluded that users of English might associate 
fl ock as verb with sheep on a cognitive level even if co-occurrence in the 
corpus does not bear this out (see Widdowson 2000 for a discussion of 
Fairclough’s comments). If, as has been reported in the literature, English 
speakers consider words such as CAUSE and SET IN to be semantically neu-
tral, or at least without unfavourable associations, such an insight, rather 
than being poor, unreliable, inaccurate etc., would actually be invaluable 
within the framework of corpus investigations, precisely because it con-
veys something which the corpus data do not suggest. Teubert (2005:1) is 
of the opinion that “no introspection can claim credence without verifi ca-
tion through real language data”, but it seems just as tenable to claim the 
reverse—that no examination of real language data can claim credence 
without introspection (and of course there is no reason why ‘cognitive data’ 
should not be ‘real’ too). In short, the union of corpus fi ndings and intro-
spective reactions is a consummation devoutly to be wished, particularly 
with reference to semantic prosody, since, as stressed by Sinclair (1998:20, 
see also Section 6.2.5) it is so “diffi cult for a human or computer to fi nd it 
reliably”.
One senses that in corpus studies intuitive or introspective reactions 
are more tolerated, or are considered more valuable, in the interpretative 
stage once the corpus data have been retrieved and arranged for inspec-
tion, rather than in an earlier stage, perhaps before the corpus search 
has been carried out at all (see Stubbs 2007a:130). If this is true, it may 
create the undesirable impression that while the cognitive reactions of 
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language users in general should be treated with great circumspection, 
the reactions of the analyst are unassailable.
My view is, as I have tried to illustrate with my brief analysis of Joyce’s 
The Dead, that intuition and introspection about language lie behind 
(i) the fact that we make corpus searches in the fi rst place, and (ii) our 
arrangement, selection and interpretation of the data. Indeed there is a 
good case for arguing that without intuitive or introspective reactions we 
would not make any corpus searches in the fi rst place, and that therefore 
from the very outset, even before we begin the search at all, they bear 
crucially upon our discoveries.
7.9 SUMMARY
Intuition and introspection, though frequently described in fairly uncom-
plimentary terms in studies on semantic prosody, are so central to such 
studies that one wonders how arguments in support of semantic prosody 
could stand up without them. In particular the following points have been 
stressed:
it would appear that even the most banal of language phenomena may • 
be just as accessible or inaccessible to intuition and introspection as 
semantic prosody
intuition and introspection are not clearly distinguished in the litera-• 
ture, are often treated as synonymous, and/or are absorbed into an 
undifferentiated broader category of cognitive reactions
no empirical data have been produced to support the notion that • 
semantic prosody is inaccessible to our intuition and introspection
the notion that semantic prosody is scarcely accessible to our intuition • 
and introspection has close links with its supposed feature of sublimi-
nality, which in turn rests upon the idea that some meanings are more 
transparent than others
any corpus searches we make, from beginning to end, owe such a • 
huge debt to intuition and introspection that such searches may ulti-
mately have little of the empirical at all
prosodic meaning may be more clearly identifi ed by ‘trusting’ the • 
original text under observation rather than by scanning fragments 
from other texts
many scholars who stress the unreliability of intuition and introspec-• 
tion freely call upon their own intuition and introspection when eval-
uating corpus data
confl icting results obtained from personal reactions and corpus data • 
respectively should ideally be used not to show up the defi ciencies of 
one or the other, but should complement each other in the pursuit of 
more insightful fi ndings.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 7 
Table 7.5 BNC Concordance to ‘commit/committing/commits/committed’ 
(Random Selection of 100/6,647, Alphabetical Sorting at R1)
 1. OF THE OPINION THAT NO CRIME WAS COMMITTED
 2. that they have been accusing our troops of committing ‘atrocities’ in Palestine. No, I
 3. by suing the co-contractor the creditor commits a breach of the contract with the
 4. you of it. In the past a certain d’Urberville committed a crime in his carriage, and since
 5. has witnessed, committed or is about to commit a serious crime. Other provisions
 6. can be said to be at fault whenever he commits a tort. The fault of the plaintiff means
 7. from the West entering the G.D.R. and committing acts of terrorism. “A most wise
 8. the following ‘facts’: that the respondent had committed adultery; that the respondent
 9. contingent, and only the British were fully committed alongside their American allies
 10. in arresting a person suspected of having committed an arrestable offence is to be
 11. grounds to suspect that each appellant had committed an offence by the time when
 12. grounds to suspect each appellant of having committed an offence by the time the fi rst
 13. requires holding your nerve, being totally committed and believing absolutely that’s
 14. in uniform may arrest anybody found committing any of the offences under section
 15. any of the relevant statutory provisions committed by a corporate body is proved to
 16. WITH YOU Car thefts are not always committed by determined professionals, most
 17. hierarchy and see serious crime being committed by the people who are respectable
 18. of their owner; e.g., he would not commit conversion by making jam of strawberries
 19. had been detained because they had ‘committed crimes’ against Kuwaitis during the
 20. with such data. Will people admit to having committed criminal offences, even if they
 21. of Lucy’s North Site. It is vital to have committed effi cient representation in the City
 22. extent of the client’s liability for any breach it commits: for instance, by excluding
 23. of evidence for the Crown, the case was committed for trial. Furthermore, despite the
 24. they are tried in the magistrates’ court or committed for trial in the Crown Court); and
 25. Mortimer Twanley, 29, Liverpool, was committed for trial on three accusations of
 26. Sword horror A MAN who threatened to commit harikiri with a 3ft sword after a row
 27. and her youthful alertness. How far does she commit herself to Proteus, and does she
 28. on the form of a racehorse, a trespass was committed. Hickman v Maisey [1900] 1 QB
 29. plunged, his attempts to achieve security committing him to progressively more
 30. for he is also a natural raconteur. When he commits himself to an assignment – be it
 31. had already been for a pee), he reluctantly committed himself to an extended struggle
 32. Seville. Despite the fact that he had not committed himself to the rising until the last
 33. but that’s how God has done it. He has committed himself to us. Well let’s think for
 35. breaches of the criminal law before they are committed. In general, such an injunction
 36. got approximately eight hundred and fi fty committed in terms of a hundred and eighty
 37. hon. Friend is right. We regard murders committed in this country by terrorists as
 38. private place. Note the offence cannot be committed inside a dwelling when the other
 39. behind the commonsense image. In fact, so committed is RUC management to the
 40. campaign, while UNITA would not commit itself to ending hostilities until its future
 41. energy effi ciency. The government has committed itself to reducing carbon dioxide
 42. away with serious crimes, the powerless commit less serious offences and get prison.
 43. are serious crimes. Thus, if women tend to commit more minor crimes, they will have
(continued)
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Table 7.5 Continued
 44. piano for the dulcimer . . . I can with its aid commit my melodies to paper, and that is
 45. talented son who, right or wrong, I have committed myself to. It’s just not going to
 46. requirement, even though he may have committed no further offences, because of
 47. even forgive him the talk about having her committed, now that that possibility was
 48. at the time when those offences were committed. On that basis he submitted that,
 49. at the price at which it is contractually committed or hedged, adjusted for unexpired
 50. us in historical solidarity with them to commit ourselves to the continuing struggle
 51. the risks: the fact that D has chosen to commit rape, robbery or another serious offence
 52. Ken told a lot of stories about people who committed suicide—and constantly talked
 53. even some of the Rep Men joined in. ‘He committed suicide, 16 August 1977. Not a
 54. be serious and deadly. Most people who commit suicide are depressed (Robins, 1981),
 55. show that a very small minority of anorexics commit suicide, but at the same time Bruch
 56. in England during the war, she literally committed suicide by refusing her food rations
 57. Sally’s story is a common one. 4 farmers commit suicide in Britain every week, making
 58. Seeing his hippy mother and young sister commit suicide left him plagued by demons, 
 59. to the door. He said he thought he would commit suicide. The boy didn’t go away. She
 60. demonstrate genuine Christian love by committing the church to creating a more
 61. However committed the cooperative movement was to
 62. not only come down hard on offenders who\ commit the crime of taking vehicles, but we
 63. (‘with intent to’) and in the different verbs for committing the grievous bodily harm
 64. but doesn’t want to become emotionally committed. The group’s publicity suggests
 65. she’s sorry that she’s committed er she committed the offence. Er, and I don’t think she
 66. assault (as the case may be). The adult commits the offence; the law imposes on him
 67. J had found, each salesman could quickly commit the whole of the sales information
 68. Labour Front-Bench Members seem to have committed themselves to a single currency
 69. by the year 2005. The countries have also committed themselves to (i) promoting
 70. of big names. Sting and Peter Gabriel had committed themselves to the Amnesty world
 71. it. He will only say: ‘Toyota have not committed themselves to the Circuit of Ireland
 72. informal talk because as soon as people commit themselves to writing they’re gonna be
 73. On world trade negotiations, the leaders committed themselves to ‘making a full
 74. argue that if Europe had already been committed to a common foreign and security
 75. colonial minister, E.M.J.A. Sassen, was committed to a tough line. Van Mook was
 76. possible change: older women intensely committed to a work calling, older men who
 77. situation on behalf of the full board. We are committed to addressing this matter
 78. the Greater London Council in 1981 was committed to an extensive programme of
 79. where some gang members had been committed to Approved School after ‘carrying’
 80. And as often happens, United were so committed to attack, that they left the drawbridge
 81. corporate offi cials are comparatively more committed to conventional values and a
 82. to their own families, they were strongly committed to family care as the main form of
 83. US banks to give them a stake in a country committed to free enterprise and profi t,
 84. of nationalisation under a government committed to free-marketism and opposed to
 85. by President Carter (a Democrat nominally committed to peace) and taken to an even
 86. document to the court as required may be committed to prison for a term not exceeding
 87. corrupt fi nancial transactions and was committed to the Fleet prison, from which he
 88. consciousness. [My italics] Nizan was evidently committed to the idea of literature as a
 89. doesn’t see that as any excuse. He is fi rmly committed to the principle that Drama can
 90. the land. Before long, the Earl was totally committed to the project and had agreed to
(continued)
Stewart 6th pages.indd   150 8/11/2009   9:03:17 AM
Intuition, Introspection and Corpus Data 151
T&F Proofs: Not For Distribution
Table 7.5 Continued
 91. and the reporting entity is demonstrably committed to the sale or termination, then
 92. vouchers is less whole-hearted, but those committed to system see it as a means of
 93. year starting in April is £851 million. We are committed to the YT guarantee and we
 94. the judges in calling to the Bar5. It is a power committed to them by the judges, a power
 95. talked of a recent case in which a murder, committed twenty years before, became a
 96. and the Royalist Falkland appears to have committed virtual suicide on the battlefi eld
 97. battery. The general rule is that a battery is committed where a person touches or strikes
 98. Offences Act 1967, this offence is not committed where the act is done in private,
 99. given bail who are found guilty of offences committed while they were on bail is around
 100. Party and State, and for the ideologically committed who had ‘burnt their boats’ with
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8 Semantic Prosody and 
Lexical Priming
And once sent out, a word takes wing beyond recall.
8.0 INTRODUCTION
This brief chapter will try to position semantic prosody in relation to Hoey’s 
theory of lexical priming (all the page numbers given in the current chapter 
will be from Hoey (2005) unless otherwise stated). As explained in the 
Introduction, I have so far withheld detailed comments on lexical priming, 
preferring to address it separately in consideration both of its importance as 
a theory and of the fact that its appearance was subsequent to almost all the 
various contributions on semantic prosody analysed in this book.
The methodology here will simply be to retrace the steps I have taken 
in Chapters 2 to 7, attempting to outline for each chapter the relevance of 
lexical priming for the various issues raised and for the theoretical status 
of semantic prosody itself. In Chapter 1 (1.1.10) a short summary was pro-
vided of lexical priming, to which the reader is referred.
8.1 IMPLICATIONS OF LEXICAL PRIMING 
FOR SEMANTIC PROSODY
In Chapter 2 I discussed the evaluative and the hidden qualities almost 
always attributed to semantic prosody. It was argued that not all the exam-
ples of prosodies supplied in the literature entail a representation of evalu-
ation, and that it is not clear why they need necessarily be regarded as 
hidden. As regards the former argument, what is particularly relevant in 
Hoey’s work is the notion that words and word sequences are primed for 
“pragmatic association” (pp.26–29): “Pragmatic association occurs when 
a word or word sequence is associated with a set of features that all serve 
the same or similar pragmatic functions (e.g., indicating vagueness, uncer-
tainty)” (26). Hoey’s examples of pragmatic association include: the prop-
erty of ‘vagueness’ associated with the word SIXTY (26–27), which often 
co-occurs with expressions such as about, around, almost, up to, getting 
on for; ‘acts of denial’ associated with REASON (28); ‘hypotheticality’ 
and ‘denial’ associated with A WORD AGAINST (157); and the property 
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of appearing in statements rather than questions or instructions identifi ed 
for AGO (177).
As Hoey points out (157), pragmatic association overlaps with Sinclair’s 
description of semantic prosody. For example, the prosody of ‘diffi culty’ 
that Sinclair associates with NAKED EYE might be considered to lie upon 
the same axis as the pragmatic association of ‘vagueness’ linked by Hoey to 
SIXTY. Yet although I claimed in Chapter 2 that an expression of attitude 
is not salient in the unit of meaning containing NAKED EYE, there is no 
question that the attitudinal feature is vital to just about all descriptions of 
semantic prosody, whereas it would seem to be less central to Hoey’s prag-
matic association. For Louw (1993) and many others, semantic prosody is 
indissolubly linked with the conveying, whether it be conscious or uncon-
scious, of a favourable or unfavourable evaluation of the utterance in ques-
tion on the part of the speaker / writer. Louw was particularly interested in 
how unexpected word combinations (utterly venerable, bent on sincerity, 
symptomatic of the University of Zimbabwe) might convey (i) irony or (ii) 
meanings that the producer of the utterance would have preferred to suppress. 
However, the transition from unorthodox word combinations to expressions 
of attitude is problematic, mainly because the phenomena posited by Louw 
can by no means be claimed for all unusual combinations (see 2.1.1). Can the 
theory of lexical priming help us out here in explaining this type of creative 
usage, and the expression of attitude that might emanate from that usage? 
Hoey tells us that every word is primed to occur in association with particu-
lar semantic associations and with particular pragmatic functions (13), and 
these are the priming processes of most interest to us here. But he stresses 
that words are primed in all sorts of different ways, and when all these prim-
ings are consonant with each other, the result is ‘priming prosody’ (166):1
Priming prosody occurs when the collocations, colligations, semantic 
associations, textual collocations, textual semantic associations and 
textual colligations of words chosen for a particular utterance harmon-
ise with each other in such a way as to contribute to the construction 
and coherence of the utterance.
When priming prosody is fl outed, the result is ‘priming confl ict’ (170):
just as priming prosody contributes to the apparent naturalness of an 
utterance, so a lack of prosody may contribute to the apparent unusual-
ness of an utterance. One manifestation of a lack of priming prosody 
is priming confl ict, which occurs when a choice of one priming is over-
whelmed by another, more dominant priming. The result here is either 
ambiguity or humour.
Examples are supplied from newspapers of this ambiguity and/or humour, and 
these are followed by some considerations on literary creativity in Dickens, 
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Tennyson, and Dylan Thomas, and in particular on the way primings may be 
overridden (though even in the most creative of writing some primings have to 
be preserved, otherwise the result (177) “would not correspond to anything 
recognisable as an instance of language use”). The analysis of primings—
preserved or overridden—in literary texts is taken up again in Hoey (2007), 
where the authors examined are Lewis Carroll, Michael Moorcock and Philip 
Larkin, and where the objective is (2007:27) “to account for how literary 
writers manage to say something new, for how they are creative as well as nat-
ural”. This goal is certainly achieved, with reference to both literary and non-
literary creativity, and Hoey’s examples make fascinating reading, but I am 
not sure they provide a broad answer to the question posed earlier regarding 
the way unusual language may (or may not) convey expressions of attitude. 
This is because primings may be overridden for all sorts of reasons 
which may not connect with evaluation or even with creativity. If a primary 
school teacher announces to his/her students that there are sixty seconds in 
a minute, and sixty minutes in an hour, it would seem excessive to construe 
this as a creative violation of the pragmatic association of vagueness posited 
for the word sixty. Yet what makes Hoey’s notion of priming prosody so 
central is that it would suggest that in a given textual sequence there are 
all sorts of primings present, and that therefore it might be reductive to 
propose—as many studies on semantic prosody have done—an attitudinal 
quality on the basis of the fl outing of a single semantic or pragmatic asso-
ciation. As I claimed in Chapter 7 during the analysis of Joyce’s The Dead, 
prosodies may be instantiated over a much wider discourse.
Also important in this respect is the fact that “words are never primed 
per se; they are always primed for someone” (15). It is individuals who are 
primed on the basis of their encounters with language, and thus they are all 
primed differently. Corpora will refl ect individuals’ primings up to a point, 
or at least those which are likely to be shared by the majority of speakers, 
but the ‘individuality’ of priming means that accounting for personal atti-
tude is more complicated, at least using corpus methods. This question will 
be taken up again later.
In Chapter 2 I also discussed the covert nature of prosodies, another 
attribute which seems to be common to almost all descriptions of seman-
tic prosody, and which is often included as part of its defi nition. Hidden 
qualities of priming are not emphasised, though it is clear that users of a 
given language are unconscious of many of the phenomena associated with 
it, just as they are unconscious of so many other language phenomena (as 
discussed in 7.2.1). Hoey makes very occasional reference to hidden pro-
cesses, e.g., to hidden colligational signalling (150), and to the uncovering 
of hidden patterns in corpora (2007:27), and many of these processes and 
patterns certainly surprise us, but the hidden attribute is not presented as 
central, perhaps because all words or word sequences have priming poten-
tial, and because some primings are more intuitively obvious than others. 
See also my comments on intuition towards the end of this chapter. 
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Chapter 3 addressed diachronic and synchronic questions which have been 
raised in connection with semantic prosody. Sinclair (2007:2) notes that the 
diachronic dimension is not central to lexical priming, though Hoey stresses 
that as words are acquired through encounters with them, they become 
“cumulatively loaded” (2005:8) with their contexts and co-texts (9):
Every time we use a word, and every time we encounter it anew, the 
experience either reinforces the priming by confi rming an existing as-
sociation between the word and its co-texts and contexts, or it weak-
ens the priming if the encounter introduces the word in an unfamiliar 
context or co-text or if we have chosen in our own use of it to override 
its current priming. It follows that the priming of a word or word se-
quence is liable to shift in the course of an individual’s lifetime, and if 
it does so, and to the extent that it does so, the word or word sequence 
shifts slightly in meaning and/or function for that individual. This may 
be referred to as a drift in the priming.
The notion of drifting embraces diachronic considerations to an extent, but 
since priming is a descriptor for individual behaviour and is psychological 
in nature, the drifting described over an individual’s lifetime is resistant to 
empirical investigation (though corpus data may afford insights into drifts 
among a community of users). Thus priming certainly involves the shifting 
of meaning over time, but unlike many studies on semantic prosody, it does 
not stress the transfer of meaning between words. The shifting is more 
readily describable in terms of the expectations of the language user, in 
particular (i) the adjustments consequent to the upsetting of those expecta-
tions, and (ii) the consolidations consequent to the substantiation of those 
expectations. Sinclair (2007:1–2) sums up the situation as follows: “For 
Hoey, each instance of a word, a structure, a pattern in use leads to all 
the participants in the event adjusting their expectations in the light of 
that shred of experience”. This adjustment, Sinclair continues, “is a direct 
connection between experience and expectation, and as repeated instances 
crop up in further encounters, the adjustment is proportionate to the fre-
quency of the events”.
It was further noted in Chapter 3 that the great majority of prosodies 
identifi ed in the literature are unfavourable in some way. Hoey, on the 
other hand, since priming is ubiquitous, does not focus on words or word 
sequences that are primed for unpleasant associations. This might sug-
gest that all lexical items have prosodic potential, and that the customary 
weighting in favour of unpleasant prosodies is disproportionate, constitut-
ing more a refl ection of human interests than of prosodic distribution.
In Chapter 4 I contended that some descriptions of semantic prosody 
take the word as their starting point, others take a longer sequence, and 
others again appear to embrace both. The theory of lexical priming is cer-
tainly constructed around the word, though priming also applies to longer 
Stewart 6th pages.indd   155 8/11/2009   9:03:18 AM
156 Semantic Prosody
T&F Proofs: Not For Distribution
sequences built out of those words (8), and indeed the phrasing “words and 
word sequences” is often adopted during the course of the work (e.g., 13).
Hoey tackles this issue head-on in his chapter 8, when he compares his 
own work with Sinclair’s model of the unit of meaning. It is underlined 
(158) that priming has a more textual dimension, with networks of prim-
ings informing considerably longer stretches of text than Sinclair had in 
mind. Hoey then writes (ibid.) that “while accepting the insights tied up 
in Sinclair’s notion of the lexical item, I am less confi dent that the lexical 
item can replace the word as an analytical starting point”. This is in part 
because (ibid.) there is “no obvious boundary to the posited notion of the 
‘lexical item’”, and in part because “the notion of priming and the opera-
tion of nesting can account in a systematic way for the move from the word 
to the lexical item, and indeed, from the lexical item to the wider text”. The 
passage from Joyce analysed in Chapter 7 exemplifi es how we may need to 
look beyond the shorter stretches of discourse to which semantic prosody 
has normally been assigned.
The fact that priming favours the word as the departure point of analy-
sis might initially provide some support for those descriptions for which 
semantic prosody characterises words rather than multi-word expres-
sions. Yet Hoey illustrates that from its point of departure a word takes 
wing beyond recall, and that priming gains much of its strength from its 
ability to go beyond the phrase, sentence and textual chunk. It is my view 
that we can take these characteristics of priming and apply them, to a 
degree, to the various descriptions of semantic prosody. In other words, 
we could posit that all items, whether words or word sequences, have 
prosodic features which may combine with each other across stretches 
of discourse to produce functionally complete utterances. The pragmatic 
element which is so crucial to semantic prosody would thus be expressed 
over longer stretches of discourse than has previously been envisaged. Of 
course just how long those stretches of discourse might be remains an 
open question, which subsequent investigations in corpus linguistics will 
help to answer.
Chapters 5 and 6 dealt with the use, role and infl uence of corpus 
data. These were assisted by Hoey’s discussion of collocation (3ff), and 
his point that semantic prosody is not a purely collocational phenom-
enon, inasmuch as it is contingent upon all co-occurrences and not only 
upon collocations (16–20). Further, Hoey fi nds too limiting the frequent 
ascribing of prosodies to favourable and unfavourable categories on the 
basis of co-occurrences which are similarly classifi ed as good or bad. 
And indeed Hoey’s notions of semantic and pragmatic association are 
generally much more nuanced, going well beyond these basic dichoto-
mies. His examples of semantic association include not only semantic 
sets connecting with ‘vehicles’ or ‘periods of time’, but with a more 
subtle range of sets such as those evinced for CONSEQUENCE, i.e., 
(i) the underlying logic of the process described by CONSEQUENCE, 
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(ii) negative evaluation, (iii) the seriousness of the consequence, (iv) the 
unexpectedness of the consequence. He recognises, however, that the 
way we as analysts classify co-occurrences is relatively unscientifi c, with 
excessive reliance on single ad hoc reactions to the data, unsupported by 
the reactions of other language users.
Hoey does not comment upon the question of how the physical struc-
ture of the concordance might affect the analyst’s interpretation of the data 
within it, but he includes some signifi cant remarks concerning the status of 
the corpus as evidence of priming (14):
it does not automatically follow that exploration of the nature of prim-
ing can be achieved through the study of computer corpora. A cor-
pus, whether general—like the British National Corpus or the Bank 
of English—or specialised—such as the Guardian corpus used in this 
work—represents no one’s experience of the language.
For Hoey, each person has mental concordances supplied by a personal 
corpus which is “by defi nition irretrievable, unstudiable and unique” 
(ibid.). As mentioned earlier, words and word sequences are primed for 
the user, but not per se, and it is this more individual, more psychologi-
cal element which represents one of the major differences between the 
theory of priming and Sinclair’s theory of the unit of meaning. Having 
said that, common ground is to be found in the fact that a computer 
corpus, although it cannot tell us the personal primings of any single lan-
guage user, can indicate the type of data a language user might encounter 
in the course of being primed, and therefore may suggest that certain 
primings are liable to be shared by the community. Certainly the more 
personal characteristic of priming, and the fact that it is more contingent 
upon mental concordances than computer concordances, encourages us 
to refl ect upon the supposedly inextricable association between semantic 
prosody and corpus data, and upon viewpoints which regard the user’s 
mental and psychological reactions as at best ancillary and at worst to be 
blackballed.
This brings us on to Chapter 7, which was concerned with the role of 
intuition and introspection in work on semantic prosody and in corpus 
linguistics in general. Hoey (29–31) observes that different researchers may 
construe the same data in quite different ways, and that reactions to the 
data may in any case be distorted by the individual researcher’s needs. As 
far as informants are concerned, Hoey warns that reactions to data may 
be distorted by the education of informants, “who may have endeavoured, 
quite possibly unsuccessfully, to modify their primings” (30). The latter is 
an important proviso which I did not take into account in Chapter 7, where I 
encourage the use and the reporting of informants’ reactions to data, which 
could then be compared and contrasted with corpus data. Hoey makes the 
point that we should be wary of the introspections both of researchers and 
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informants. He also observes that pre-corpus dictionaries may constitute a 
good source of introspections about word meaning.
Hoey’s work is thus of important assistance in assessing and in recon-
ciling the ways in which semantic prosody has been approached over the 
years, and paves the way for a number of concluding observations, which 
will be presented in the fi nal chapter.
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9 Conclusions
Dressing old words new
9.0 SUMMING UP
This book has addressed a series of issues linked to semantic prosody and 
to the role and interpretation of corpus data in general. These are sum-
marised, albeit simplistically, in the following paragraphs.
Although semantic prosody has been assigned certain features which 
would appear to be common to almost all accounts of it, it is nonetheless 
the case that the fi rst two exponents of semantic prosody, Louw and Sin-
clair, described it in very different ways. Most subsequent contributions on 
the subject contain features of each of these descriptions, and some may be 
crudely divided into those infl uenced primarily by Louw, and those infl u-
enced primarily by Sinclair. It is normal that as a concept develops, it will 
be approached and discussed in several ways, but the impression is that 
single contributions do not give suffi cient stress to the degree of difference 
between these main approaches. As a consequence, the appellation ‘seman-
tic prosody’ has become something of an umbrella term whose breadth may 
deceive those anxious to fi nd out more on the subject.
My feeling is, however, that most of the characteristics that have been 
attributed to semantic prosody, whichever of the two approaches is privi-
leged, are questionable in some way. First of all I argued that not all the 
prosodies identifi ed in the literature have evaluative function, and that they 
need not necessarily be hidden or be associated with semantically neutral 
items. By extension it was contended that all lexical items may have pro-
sodic potential, even those with conspicuously attitudinal basic meaning. 
It was suggested that descriptions of prosodies in connotative terms are 
best avoided, though some overlap between semantic prosody and conno-
tation seems inevitable (Chapter 2, as well as 4.5, on semantic prosody vs. 
connotation). 
It was then pointed out that semantic prosody has been examined along 
both the diachronic and synchronic axes, and that very often both axes 
are included within a single account but are not suffi ciently distinguished. 
Diachronic explanations tend to be couched in metaphorical terms which 
embrace the notion of good being gradually tainted by evil (Chapter 3).
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Following on from this it was noted that semantic prosody is sometimes 
described as characterising primarily the word, and sometimes as characteris-
ing a longer sequence, though some accounts hover between the two. Both 
approaches, however, have certain drawbacks: in the former, which includes 
a diachronic emphasis, the notion of semantic contamination soon runs 
aground, while in the latter, there is the risk of stating the obvious when the 
basic meaning of the core item dominates the unit of meaning (Chapter 4).
In the following chapter I contended that the traditionally tight link 
between semantic prosody and corpus data is not entirely justifi ed, and that 
the basic interpretative strategies adopted in order to infer prosodies from 
the data may differ markedly from one analyst to the next, in part because 
the concepts of collocation and semantic consistency have been construed 
in very broad terms (Chapter 5).
It was then claimed that the juxtaposing of lines of text within the con-
cordance may result in analysts ‘envisaging’ untenable relationships of 
semantic proximity, and that from the structure of the concordance may 
derive a number of tenets put forward in studies on semantic prosody, for 
example that the word is the object of analysis, and that prosodies are 
‘shown’ by corpus investigations (Chapter 6).
Finally, I promote the view that intuition and introspection, often pre-
sented as pariahs in corpus linguistics, are central to the identifi cation of 
prosodies and should go hand in hand with corpus data (Chapter 7).
9.1 SEMANTIC PROSODY: CONCEPT OR CONCEPTS?
The question that arises at this point is whether semantic prosody can be 
preserved as a single concept, on the basis of features which are common 
to almost all descriptions of it, or whether it should ideally be broken down 
into less broad concepts. In order to consider this, let us remind ourselves 
of the various similarities and differences in the way semantic prosody has 
been described.
Common features:
it is evaluative or attitudinal (and many scholars refer to connota-• 
tional aspects)
it is hidden• 
it is contingent upon co-text, which is best revealed by computational • 
methods
In view of the continuing importance and infl uence of the contributions by 
Sinclair and by Louw, the various other features of semantic prosody may 
be collapsed, again simplistically, into (i) those which stem primarily from 
Sinclair’s work and infl uence, and (ii) those which stem primarily from 
Louw’s work and infl uence:
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Elements prioritised by Sinclair’s approach:
it is central to the unit of meaning, one of the two obligatory elements• 
it is considered within a synchronic framework• 
it is a feature of a unit which is larger than the single word/expression• 
it is not restricted to semantically ‘neutral’ lexical items• 
it is not restricted to descriptions in terms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’• 
Elements prioritised by Louw’s approach:
it is transferred or attached meaning• 
it is considered within both a diachronic and synchronic framework• 
it is a feature of the word• 
it is associated above all with more semantically ‘neutral’ lexical items• 
it is generally expressed by means of a binary distinction whose pri-• 
mary terms are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (positive / negative, favourable / 
unfavourable)
Up until fairly recently semantic prosody had been treated as a single con-
cept, but the latest contributions on the subject, notably Whitsitt (2005) 
and Hunston (2007), would suggest that this is implausible. Problems in 
this sense had already been signalled by Partington (2004a), while other 
scholars have tried to remove the ambivalence of semantic prosody by pro-
posing terminological alterations. It was noted in Chapter 1 that Stubbs 
(2001a:66) switches from ‘semantic prosody’ to ‘discourse prosody’ “in 
order to maintain the relation to speakers and hearers, but also to empha-
size their function in creating discourse coherence”, a switch which per-
haps indicates the wish to keep semantic prosody within the parameters 
established by Sinclair. More recently, Baker (2006:86–87) and Baker et 
al. (2006:144–145) have identifi ed overlaps between ‘discourse prosody’, 
‘semantic prosody’ (in Louw’s terms) and ‘semantic preference’. According 
to Hunston (2007:265–266), ‘semantic prosody’ is best restricted to Sin-
clair’s interpretation of the term, while ‘semantic preference’ or ‘attitudinal 
preference’ could be adopted for “the frequent co-occurrence of a lexical 
item with items expressing a particular evaluative meaning” (ibid.:266), a 
defi nition refl ecting Louw’s approach. 
Greater terminological clarity and consistency is clearly crucial to the 
preservation of semantic prosody as a theoretical concept / concepts, and 
one appreciates the laudable attempts to remove conceptual fuzziness. 
Although I am reluctant to muddy the waters further, my own view of this 
is as follows:
the ‘Sinclair interpretation’ is perhaps best referred to as ‘discourse • 
prosody’, in order to bring out the function in the discourse so 
strongly emphasised in his descriptions, while his ‘semantic preference’ 
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could remain as it is, though an important rider here is that certain 
prosodies suggested by Sinclair seem very akin to his category of 
semantic preference, for example the prosody of ‘informal invitation’ 
(1996a:92–93) he posits for PLACE as noun, or more specifi cally MY 
PLACE.
for the ‘Louw interpretation’ I am not keen on either ‘semantic prefer-• 
ence’ or ‘attitudinal preference’—the terminology proposed by Hun-
ston. The former comes across as inappropriate, fi rstly because as a 
term it seems to minimise the attitudinal quality so important to Louw 
and others, and secondly because Louw’s (and others’) interpretation 
of semantic prosody does not correspond to Sinclair’s defi nition of 
‘semantic preference’, in that, as noted in 5.2.1.2, Louw’s semantic 
prosody derives from the favourableness or unfavourableness of an 
item’s co-occurrences, and not from specifi c semantic sets. Thus the 
nomenclature proposed might prove to be misleading and therefore 
counterproductive. The latter (‘attitudinal preference’) seems closer 
to the mark, but may give the undesirable impression that the attitu-
dinal feature applies to Louw but not to Sinclair. With this in mind, I 
would propose that to refer to Louw’s interpretation we maintain his 
use of ‘semantic prosody’, if only because, aside from the fact that he 
was the fi rst to use this nomenclature in published form, his reading 
of it seems to be the most widespread and thus perhaps merits the 
‘original’ appellation.
Thus I would propose ‘discourse prosody’ to denote the ‘Sinclair interpre-
tation’, and ‘semantic prosody’ to denote the ‘Louw interpretation’. This 
solution is far from perfect. It might have been preferable, for instance, to 
do away with the term ‘prosody’ altogether, because (i) the prosodic ele-
ment is based on a dubious analogy with phonology (3.3), and (ii) prosody 
has traditionally been associated with the rhythm of sounds in language, 
particularly poetry. Louw (1993:158–159) has expounded his reasons for 
adopting the term, but instinctively one would in the fi rst instance expect it 
to refer to the meaning of sound patterns, or to the ‘semantics of prosody’ 
(it is perhaps signifi cant that we often say that a sequence of words ‘sounds 
right/wrong’). Interestingly, Gavioli (2005:46) makes an explicit connec-
tion between meaning and sound in the context of semantic prosody:
The term ‘prosody’, which is generally used in linguistics to refer to 
the sound or rhythm of words, is applied here to the sound of mean-
ings rather than phonemes and particularly to the way in which words 
and expressions create an aura of meaning capable of affecting words 
around them.
Gavioli establishes a connection between the sound of meanings and the 
creation of an aura, taking the view that the resulting aura may make a 
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given expression “sound better” in certain types of contexts rather than in 
others” (ibid.), and this certainly seems a topic worth pursuing.
9.2 WHITHER SEMANTIC PROSODY?
My view is therefore that semantic prosody1 could profi tably be split into 
two concepts, notwithstanding some overlap between the two. This does 
not take away from the fact that there remain a number of fl ashpoints in 
this domain which need attention and research if semantic prosody is to 
withstand the various criticisms of it both in this book and elsewhere. 
Below I list just a few among many possible avenues of research.
As pointed out earlier, the contingency of semantic prosody upon • 
co-text is an almost unanimously agreed characteristic, though as 
claimed in 4.4.1, the ‘Louw interpretation’ runs into diffi culties when 
confronted with words such as ALLEVIATE and HEAL. Whether 
that co-text is primarily responsible for the meaning of the item in 
question, whether it combines with the item to create meaning across 
a broader unit, whether it is retrieved by corpus software or by the 
mind, it is co-text which, so to speak, allows the show to go on. In my 
view the greatest outstanding problem for semantic prosody is how 
we choose to examine that co-text, in terms of (i) its relationship to 
the node / core item, (ii) the co-textual chunk that we select for analy-
sis, (iii) the methods we adopt to ‘translate’ that chunk into seman-
tic preference, and (iv) the way in which we ‘translate’ that semantic 
preference into a prosody. In other words, in view of the multitude of 
imponderables that go with the territory, what is required is a more 
consistent and more rigorous interpretation of the sequence analysed, 
in order, as it were, to safeguard the lexicogrammatical environment. 
The categories proposed by Dilts and Newman (2006) for the iden-
tifi cation of good and bad co-text could certainly be of use here, as 
could the Appraisal model, and indeed future insights in this area 
may lie in a fruitful blending of Appraisal resources and corpus data, 
for example in the manner of Coffi n and O’Halloran (2006).
Many accounts of semantic prosody concern the way unusual combi-• 
nations of words can create intertextual ‘resonance’ and can suggest 
speaker/writer attitude. Yet what is under-researched here is not only 
why this might happen, but more to the point why very often it does 
not happen. It was surmised in Chapter 2 that there must be countless 
cases in language where one would expect an unorthodox combina-
tion to convey particular stylistic effects, but where such effects do not 
appear to be present—for example the BNC occurrences of UTTERLY 
COMPELLING, a combination which appears to violate the norm 
that UTTERLY enjoys bad company, or better will only keep good 
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company for reasons of irony, insincerity etc. or to achieve particular 
stylistic effects. And this must relate in some way to the more general 
question of creative juxtapositions in language, such as owls alongside 
pussy-cats in pea-green boats. Is Lear’s poem interpretable in prosodic 
terms? Future research might suggest how theories of semantic prosody 
can be related more explicitly to speech act theory and to the illocution-
ary force of utterances (see Stubbs 2006).
The overlapping features of connotation and semantic prosody cer-• 
tainly deserve more investigation than has been offered in this book, 
and the conundrum of whether all lexical items might not have pro-
sodic potential, covert or overt, offers practically unlimited research 
opportunities.
The diachronic dimension of many contributions on semantic pros-• 
ody would certainly be worth pursuing, in order to test the hypoth-
eses such as that postulated for CAUSE, i.e., that this word once had 
a neutral to good meaning and co-occurred with neutral to good 
company, but that over the decades / centuries its company has wors-
ened and that this unfavourable promiscuity has led to a change in its 
meaning. Why and how meanings change over time can be diffi cult 
to pinpoint, but it would at least be a start if it could be unerringly 
established that the type of company CAUSE keeps has in fact altered 
over time.
There is also plenty of research potential concerning the role of intu-• 
ition and introspection in the identifi cation of prosodies. Research 
of this nature could investigate reactions to specifi c examples of 
usage on the part of signifi cant numbers of competent speakers of 
English. Collections of introspective data could be accumulated, and 
then compared and contrasted with collections of corpus data. This 
is important because up to now the only reactions supplied in studies 
on semantic prosody are those of the corpus analyst. It would also be 
interesting to compare the reactions of corpus analysts with people 
unconnected with corpus work. This line of research would also help 
to clarify how ‘hidden’ prosodies really are.
The notion of words or sequences of words ‘sounding right’, alluded • 
to in 9.1, potentially queries the prioritising of semantics and prag-
matics in studies on collocation and co-occurrence in general, with 
consequent neglect of the implications of euphony. For example, the 
collocation earth, wind and fi re is preferred to other possible combi-
nations of the three lexical words in the phrase. One imagines that 
such collocations are infl uenced more by sound factors than semantic 
ones, and the same may be true for all sorts of word combinations 
(see Whitsitt 2005:296–298), something which would have obvious 
implications for work on semantic prosody. Further, since research 
has, on the basis of a posited close link between semantic prosody and 
corpus data, focused almost exclusively on the written word (whether 
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the utterance was originally written or whether it is transcribed spo-
ken), there has been a consequent overlooking of intonation factors, 
which can be so crucial in identifying utterance meaning. It could 
be surmised, for example, that in speech the unfavourable mean-
ing attributed to SIT THROUGH (6.2.2) would in large part be the 
outcome of an impatient / irritable / exasperated etc. intonation (the 
recent creation of corpora transcribed for intonation patterns will be 
of crucial importance in identifying the pragmatic implications of 
discourse intonation—see, for example, Cheng, Greaves and Warren 
2005). This would tie in with my suggestion in Chapter 6 that seman-
tic prosody, unlike little children, should ideally be seen and heard. 
And of course impatient gestures, tutting, eyebrows-raising etc. could 
also contribute to the instantiation of the prosody.
9.3 L’ABITO NON FA IL MONACO?
I have now reached the closing stages of what has certainly been a journey 
of experience, and my hope is, if nothing else, that I have encouraged dis-
cussion, and the dressing of old words new. 
The reader may recall that in 3.4.1 I likened semantic prosody to a 
coat of many colours. Well, although this particular coat may be unwill-
ing to budge, the time has come to slip it off and await some cognitive 
reactions to it.
I have been wearing it for several years now, so if I do manage to 
remove it: 
I could wash it, though I fear the colours might run• 
I could beat the dust out of it, though such good and enduring com-• 
pany would merit less brutal methods
I could store it my basement, though I shall never get rid of it. • 
Or I could take it to the cleaners, though others may do that for me.
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Notes
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION
 1. Throughout this book capital letters are used to indicate the word / expression 
under observation. Unless otherwise indicated, what is represented is the word 
in all its infl ected forms, i.e., in the present case BREAK OUT corresponds to 
break out, breaks out, breaking out, broke out, broken out. If necessary the 
relevant part of speech will also be indicated, i.e., noun, verb, adjective etc.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
 1. http://www.grammatics.com/appraisal. Accessed 28.1.09.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
 1. It has been argued that all corpus linguistics is essentially diachronic in 
nature, e.g., Stubbs (2007a:130–131) writes that “Corpus linguistics [ . . . ] 
is inherently diachronic: it studies what has frequently occurred in the past”. 
This is an important point, since it stresses that corpora perforce represent 
not what is, but what has been. Indeed Teubert (2005:4) argues that all dis-
course has by necessity a diachronic dimension. In this chapter, however, 
diachrony refers to the widespread interpretation of diachronic linguistics, 
i.e., the evolution of language over time as a constantly changing medium 
and as a continuing series of language states.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
 1. As far as I know this issue was fi rst raised by Whitsitt in 2000 at the con-
ference Corpus Use and Learning to Translate (CULT) 2000: An Interna-
tional Workshop, held at Bertinoro, Forlì, Italy, 3–4 November 2000, and 
the author subsequently alludes to it in Whitsitt 2005 (296–297). Brief refer-
ences may also be found in Stewart (2003:244) and Partington (2004a:155).
 2. One might wish to draw a distinction between the narrower context as a 
means to access phenomena such as co-occurrence and local grammar, and 
this wider context as a means to access phenomena such as schemata.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
 1. In a later work (2005:23) Hoey provides a caveat to the effect that he had 
previously confl ated the concepts of ‘semantic preference’ and ‘semantic 
prosody’. In the 1997 work cited here, his use of ‘semantic prosody’ actu-
ally corresponds to ‘semantic preference’ or, as he terms it in his 2005 work, 
‘semantic association’. See also Section 1.1.10.
 2. This is something I had not properly understood in Stewart (2003:242), 
where I give the impression that prosodies are to be inferred only from an 
item’s “most frequent signifi cant collocates”. Note also the manifest termino-
logical uneasiness of the expression adopted. Evidently I was unsure that an 
unqualifi ed use of ‘collocates’ would ensure the attribute of frequency that I 
had in mind.
 3. Perhaps this step is based on the idea that foreigners, fans etc. themselves 
have unfavourable semantic preferences and are thus associated with an 
unfavourable prosody, though this would carry the risk of infi nite regres-
sion—consider, for example, the following observation by Dam-Jensen and 
Zethsen (2008:208): “The results of the analysis show that CAUSE almost 
without exceptions has a negative prosody. Examples of collocates include 
death, damage, accident and pain; that is, words with a very strong negative 
prosody”. The authors do not supply profi les to support the unfavourable 
prosody they ascribe to death etc., but had they done so, they might then—if 
only for the sake of consistency—have had to check those profi les for further 
items which in turn might be associated with further prosodies.
 4. Xiao and McEnery (2006:126), on the other hand, associate change / changes, 
and in particular dramatic changes, with a favourable prosody, since they 
label the phrase caused dramatic changes, used by a Chinese learner of Eng-
lish, as “inappropriate word choice arising from an ignorance of semantic 
prosody”, i.e., the unfavourable prosody ascribed to CAUSE clashes with 
the favourable prosody ascribed to dramatic changes. The overall situation 
regarding the favourable / unfavourable qualities of change / changes is far 
from clear. See also Dilts and Newman (2006:236), and some comments by 
Sinclair reported in Section 5.3.2.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 
 1. My comments in this section are for the most part based on the reactions of 
the analyst, who will have electronic access to the corpus (s)he is analysing, 
but tables of concordances on the printed page can, as mentioned, prove 
particularly forbidding for the reader. Colleagues sometimes informally 
confess that for reasons of time they rarely examine in detail concordances 
reproduced in academic works, preferring to accept the author’s conclu-
sions about them as given.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
 1. All this seems a long way from the view expressed by Mahlberg (2005:15), 
who writes that, subsequent to Fillmore’s (1992) caricatures of the armchair 
linguist on the one hand, and the numbers-addicted corpus linguist on the 
other, “the extreme positions gave way to a more balanced view, and it now 
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seems widely accepted that corpora and intuition are not mutually exclusive 
but complement each other”. 
 2. For a discussion of the translation into Italian of the sentences highlighted, 
and therefore of the question of translating prosodies, see Stewart 2009.
 3. My argument here has not contemplated a halfway position, which is to 
select all instances of COMMIT followed by direct objects (if the corpus is 
parsed), to calculate the percentage of instances of direct objects which have 
as referents crime or death, and on the basis of this percentage to infer a 
partial semantic relationship. This could then be applied to the interpretation 
of passives. There would still be drawbacks even with this procedure, but it 
might facilitate a more ‘formal’ search.
 4. In the literature on corpus linguistics, (apparent) introspections about intro-
spection are not uncommon. Biber and Conrad (2004:42), for instance, write 
that 
one of the most widely-held intuitions about language use among Eng-
lish language teachers is the belief that the progressive aspect (as in ‘He 
is reading a book’) is the normal choice in conversation. As a result, tra-
ditional textbooks have often introduced the progressive in the very fi rst 
chapter. However, corpus analysis shows that this intuition is wrong. 
Whether this is a “widely-held intuition” or not (it is unfamiliar to me, 
though I have been teaching English for longer than I care to remember), the 
authors do not supply data concerning how the reactions were prompted, 
how many subjects were questioned, the time-scale involved etc., so it may be 
that on the basis of their teaching experience they have simply introspected 
about the introspections of others.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
 1. It should be clarifi ed that Hoey’s concept of ‘priming prosody’ draws upon 
the phonological prosody analogy directly, rather than upon semantic pros-
ody itself.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9
 1. In order to avoid confusion I shall continue to adopt ‘semantic prosody’ as a 
hypernym during the rest of this chapter.
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